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by Bryan K. Fair*
INTRODUCTION
The problem of the twenty-first century will be the problem of colorblind-
ness.1 In constitutional doctrine, this problem will persist because there are at
least two different statements of the colorblindness model expressed in the
opinions of the United States Supreme Court. Justice John M. Harlan, in his
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Alabama School of Law, 1991 to present.
I am writing to add a new voice to the many profound voices currently writing about how the
color of one's skin permeates every aspect of one's existence in the United States. I have consistently
employed the upper case when using the labels "Black" and "White." I believe that racial equality
requires that we use proper nouns to designate all racial groups. Also, the term "Black" is frequently
used interchangeably with the terms African American and Negro, and the term "White" is fre-
quently used in place of the terms Caucasian and Anglo-European. Finally, the labels seem to have
significant meaning beyond chromatic colors.
This article would not have been possible without the generous support of several people. I wish
to thank Dean Nathaniel Hansford and the Law Foundation for financial support during the 1991
and 1992 summers. I have also received invaluable criticism from Pat Hermann, Ken Randall,
Martha Morgan, Tony Freyer, Susan Randall, Pamela Bucy, Norman Stein, Tim Hoff, and other
colleagues who attended my colloquium in October 1992. I owe an even greater debt to Michelle
Monse, Wythe Holt, and Patty Lovelady Nelson for their substantial critiques and their willingness
to talk about each section of this work. Although I have benefitted tremendously from their ideas,
the errors which remain are mine.
1. The writer who has most significantly influenced my thinking regarding race is William Ed-
ward Burghardt DuBois (1868-1963). My topic sentence is paraphrased from DuBois' prophetic
words published in 1903, that:
The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line,-the relation of
the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the
sea. It was a phase of this problem that caused the Civil War; and however much they who
marched South and North in 1861 may have fixed on the technical points of union and local
autonomy as a shibboleth, all nevertheless knew, and we know, that the question of Negro
slavery was the real cause of the conflict.
See W.E.B. DuBois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 54-55 (New American Library, Inc. 1969) (1903).
DuBois was a distinguished teacher and prolific American scholar. For a concise, informative biblio-
graphic essay and selected bibliography on DuBois, see MANNING MARABLE, W.E.B. DuBoIs:
BLACK RADICAL DEMOCRAT 267-80 (John Milton Cooper, Jr., ed., Twayne Publishers 1986).
Professor Derrick A. Bell, Jr. is the most influential contemporary writer on race and law. Pro-
fessor Bell is the author of the only casebook on racism and American law. Bell has taught law at
Harvard University, Stanford University, the University of Oregon, and New York University,
among others. He is the "Dean" of a new critical race theory movement whose members uniformly
point to Bell's scholarship as pathbreaking. See DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERI-
CAN LAW (Little, Brown & Co. 1992); BELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: LEADING CASES (Little, Brown & Co.
1980); BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (Basic Books
1987); BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (Basic Books
1992).
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revered dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,2 first wrote that "Our Constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." 3 Justice
Harlan believed that the Constitution prohibited government-sponsored racial
subordination, and, therefore, he concluded that it was unconstitutional for
Louisiana to adopt a statute which treated Blacks as inferior to Whites.'
More recently, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., in his opinion in Regents of the
Univ. of California v. Bakke,5 articulated a second statement of the colorblind-
ness principle.6 Justice Powell believed that constitutional colorblindness pro-
hibited the use of race as the sole factor in governmental decisions, absent a
compelling justification.7
Justices Harlan and Powell each contended that his colorblindness model
was derived from the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.'
Yet, their opinions in Plessy and Bakke read diametrically. Justice Harlan
argued that the Fourteenth Amendment held special significance for Blacks,9
while Justice Powell stated that the Fourteenth Amendment meant that
Blacks and Whites must receive the same treatment. 10
The opinions of Justices Harlan and Powell have been cited by jurists and
commentators on some occasions to uphold affirmative action designed to
eradicate racial subordination,"1 and at other times to invalidate such affirma-
2. 163 U.S. 537, 558 (1896).
3. Justice Harlan was the first member of the Supreme Court to articulate the doctrine of color-
blindness. To understand what Justice Harlan meant, it is instructive to note the text preceding his
quote. Before writing that "Our Constitution is color-blind," Justice Harlan wrote that:
The White race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in
prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not it will
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the
principles of constitutional liberty. But in the view of the Constitution, in the eye of the
law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste
here. Our Constitution is color-blind ....
Id
My translation of Justice Harlan's statement is that he believed that if Whites were faithful to
their heritage and held fast to constitutional principles, Whites would remain the dominant race
because of their numerical majority. Justice Harlan understood that 60 million Whites were in no
danger of domination by 8 million Blacks. Similarly, 200 million Whites are in no danger of domina-
tion from 30 million Blacks today.
I read Justice Harlan's dissent to mean that the Constitution prohibits Whites from using race as
a basis for subordinating Blacks. Justice Harlan could not have meant that it was unconstitutional
for government to take race into account because he acknowledged that the Civil War Amendments
were in fact adopted to secure for the newly freed Blacks all the civil rights enjoyed by Whites, and,
he had written 13 years earlier that:
If the constitutional Amendments be enforced, according to the intent with which, as I
conceive, they were adopted, there cannot be in this Republic, any class of human beings in
practical subjection to another class, with power in the latter to dole out to the former just
such privileges as they may choose to grant.
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 59-62 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
4. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 558-61 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). (See also infra notes
183-190 and accompanying text.)
5. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
6. Justice Powell agreed with four other members of the Court that race could be one of many
factors considered by admissions officers in their selection among applicants for medical school. Id.
at 325-26 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
7. See text infra pp. 39-43 and accompanying notes.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I provides in pertinent part: "No State shall.., deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
9. See text infra pp. 33-34 and accompanying notes.
10. See text infra pp. 39-40 and accompanying notes.
11. See text infra pp. 32-73 and accompanying notes.
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tive action. 2 When the modem Court cites the colorblindness doctrine, it is
unclear whether the Court is invoking the meaning of Justice Harlan, Justice
Powell, or yet another meaning of constitutional colorblindness.1 3 Thus, the
problem for the next century in the Court's race jurisprudence will be to rec-
oncile Justice Harlan's concern for eradicating racial subordination, Justice
Powell's concern that government not use race as the sole basis for classifying
between persons, and Justice Scalia's concern that racial classifications not be
used, except in emergencies.
Numerous scholars writing about racism or affirmative action have criti-
qued the doctrine of colorblindness. 14 While some find colorblindness essen-
tial to equality, others find colorawareness 15 more consistent with
constitutional guarantees of equality. Professors John Kaplan and William
Van Alstyne, among others,16 have argued forcefully that race is an improper
criterion for classifying or assigning government benefits or burdens under
law. Each contends that in nearly all settings, the government should act
without reference to the race of any party. On the other hand, Professors
John Ely and Paul Brest, among others, 17 have argued that the colorblindness
12. See text infra pp. 32-73 and accompanying notes.
13. The most recent articulation of the colorblindness principle provides that a state may act by
race only when it acts to undo the effects of its own discrimination or when it acts in a social emer-
gency, such as a prison race riot. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521-24
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
14. See, eg., William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46
U. CH. L. REv. 775, 809 (1979) (arguing in support of colorblindness); Paul Brest, Foreword: In
Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1-2, 16-23 (1978) (arguing against
colorblindness standard); John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41
U. CHi. L. REV. 723 (1974) (arguing against use of a strict colorblindness model when a political
majority discriminates against itself); John Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for
the NegroThe Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 363 (1966) (arguing against use of
race as basis for special treatment for Blacks in the employment context). See also infra notes 16-18.
15. By that term, I mean the general practice of many public entities and private persons to use
race in decision making. I use the term "colorawareness" because it contrasts most effectively with
colorblindness. It reflects the reality that most people who have grown up in the U.S. are aware of or
want to know the color of others. Many commentators use race-consciousness in place of this term.
See, eg., articles by T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Gary Peller, infra note 17.
16. See also Charles Fried, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104
HARV. L. REV. 107, 110-11 (1990) (critiquing the group rights conception of equal protection analy-
sis); Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiques of LegalAcademia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989) (arguing
that recent race-conscious scholarship of authors such as Bell, Matsuda and Delgado lacked merit);
Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1312
(1986) (arguing against affirmative action); Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment
on The Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327 (1986) (arguing in favor of limited affirma-
tive action).
17. See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case For Race-Consciousness, 91 COLuM. L. REv. 1060,
1062-63 (1991) (arguing that America is not a color-blind society, and that race has a deep social
significance that continues to disadvantage Blacks and other Americans of color); Nell Gotanda, A
Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1991) (examining the ideolog-
ical content of the phrase "our constitution is color-blind"); Donald Lively and Stephen Plass, Equal
Protection: The Jurisprudence of Denial and Evasion, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1307, 1312-46 (1991) (dis-
cussing how equal protection jurisprudence is characterized by patterns of denial and evasion); Alan
Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View From 1989, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1407, 1408-09 (1990)
(arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court has enshrined a vision of America that normalizes existing
patterns of inequality and hierarchy); Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case For Affirmative
Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705, 705-12 (discussing the political and cultural argu-
ments for affirmative action in legal academia); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J.
758, 760 (exploring the ideological roots of the Critical Race Theory movement); Patricia J. Williams,
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times, 104 HARV. L. REV. 525 (1990)
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model is inconsistent with the meaning of equality in the Constitution. They
argue that government can use racial classifications when eradicating past and
continuing racial subordination.18
Most recently, Professors Neil Gotanda and Andrew Kull have written
extensively on constitutional colorblindness. 19 Both have made important
contributions toward understanding the meaning of colorblindness. Professor
Gotanda has explained how the Court uses the colorblindness model and ar-
gues for its abandonment.2 ° Professor Kull, on the other hand, has demon-
strated that colorblindness rhetoric has existed since the 1850's and has been a
constitutional alternative since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868.21 Interestingly, Professor Kull concludes that the colorblindness model
should be embraced.22
I share many of the concerns articulated by Professor Gotanda. But I am
not persuaded that the religion-blind alternative that he proposes to replace
colorblindness is very meaningful.23 First, he does not demonstrate how ap-
plication of the Court's Free Exercise or Establishment Clause jurisprudence
would diminish racial subordination.24 He comes closest when he writes that
under an "establishment" analogy for race "what government may not 'estab-
(discussing the significance of and necessity for group claims within our legal system and the costs of
pitting individual rights against group interests at a moment in history when such categories as race
and class intersect so that race defines class); Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Re-
trenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1331,
1334-35 (1988) (criticizing both neo-conservative scholars and Critical Legal Studies scholars for
their failure to analyze the significance of race in the legal and political subordination of Blacks);
David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup. CT. REv. 99, 100-13 (discussing the doctri-
nal consistency between affirmative action and antidiscrimination principles); Laurence H. Tribe, In
What Vision of the Constitution Must the Law Be Color-blind, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 201, 203
(1986) (discussing Justice Harlan's view that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited government
laws enshrining White supremacy); Suzanna Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the Equal Protec-
tion Context: Democracy, Distrust and Deconstruction, 73 GEO. L.J. 89, 91-99 (1984) (analyzing the
implications of replacing the suspect classifications doctrine with a disfavored class doctrine in the
contexts of race and gender cases); Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through An-
tidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978)
(discussing how antidiscrimination law has, at the same time, outlawed racial discrimination and
legitimized the subordinate status of Blacks).
18. In addition to the scholars previously identified, Derrick A. Bell, Jr. and Richard Delgado
are two of the clearest thinkers and writers on race, racism, and American law. Both have written
extensively on race and law and each in some way deserves special recognition for pioneering scholar-
ship. A comprehensive listing of the writings of Professors Bell and Delgado is beyond the scope of
this article. Combined, the two have authored nearly one hundred law review articles since 1980.
(An unpublished bibliography is available from the Author.)
19. See Gotanda, supra note 17. See also ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION
(Harvard Univ. Press 1992).
20. See generally Gotanda, supra note 17.
21. See KULL, supra note 19, at 1-6.
22. Id. at 22-52, 112-30, and 151-63. Professor Kull's fine new book contributes substantially to
scholarship relating to how the colorblindness doctrine has evolved. He traces the origins of color-
blindness rhetoric to the middle of the nineteenth century in the work of abolitionists in Massachu-
setts and he argues that by the time the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided Roberts v.
City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850), the doctrine had been stated fully and eloquently by
Charles Sumner in his brief for the plaintiffs in that case. But, I disagree with Kull's conclusion. He
asserts that the colorblindness model has been official policy since the 1850's. However, what he
demonstrates through excellent research is that the colorblindness model has been consistently re-
jected by courts because of its inflexibility.
23. See Gotanda, supra note 17, at 62-68.
24. Id. at 65-67.
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lish'is racial subordination and white supremacy. ' 25 The problem today is
that the Court seems unwilling to permit government to eliminate existing
racial subordination. Thus, I do not think Professor Gotanda goes far enough.
The purpose of this essay is to explain why the Supreme Court should
reject the colorblindness model and replace it with an analytical standard that
can reduce racial subordination. In Part I, I offer a short personal narrative
regarding the racial milieu that has influenced my thinking about racial cate-
gories, racism, and colorblindness.2 6 In Part II, I investigate the historical
origins of antidiscrimination law, 7 which reveal that racial inequality and
colorawareness have been dominant themes in the racial history of the United
States. I illustrate how, after two centuries of government-sponsored or -sanc-
tioned discrimination against Blacks and others, 28 Congress enacted the first
antidiscrimination laws and initiated a federal policy of nondiscrimination. I
also show that Congress adopted antidiscrimination laws to eradicate racial
subordination, but that its efforts failed. In Part III, I examine the evolution
of the antidiscrimination principle and the competing visions of the color-
blindness model.2 9 I try to demonstrate that some commentators and jurists
have transformed the original meaning of colorblindness by removing the term
from its historical context. Today, colorblindness appears to permit racial
subordination similar to that so prevalent under the separate but equal philos-
ophy of Plessy. In Part IV, I critique the doctrine of colorblindness3 ° to illus-
trate that most contemporary commentators reject colorblindness as
unrealistic, ahistorical, and antithetical to racial equality in the U.S. In Part
V, I set forth a series of modem gender classification cases to demonstrate that
the Supreme Court analyzes race and gender classifications differently, and to
suggest it is not immediately apparent why analogous race and gender dis-
crimination cases are analyzed so differently by the Court. I examine the rea-
sons offered by the Court for treating race and gender classifications
differently and conclude that the distinction is unwarranted. I then argue that
the ground of difference jurisprudential standard used in many gender cases
could apply effectively in analogous race cases.3 1 In Part VI, I propose that
the Court apply its ground of difference rationale from gender discrimination
jurisprudence to analogous race cases.32 I apply that standard to the facts of
Croson to illustrate that such application of that jurisprudential standard to
25. Id. at 67.
26. See text infra pp. 6-11 and accompanying notes.
27. See text infra pp. 11-31 and accompanying notes.
28. What emerges from a review of the racial history of the U.S. in terms all too clear to ignore is
that a constitution that fully protected the property interests of slave owners through positive law
subsequently has been interpreted to provide only meager authority to eradicate subordination of
former slaves. Justice Harlan pointed out this irony as early as 1883, when he wrote:
With all respect for the opinion of others, I insist that the National Legislature may, with-
out transcending the limits of the Constitution, do for human liberty and the fundamental
rights of American citizenship, what it did, with the sanction of this court, for the protec-
tion of slavery and the rights of the masters of fugitive slaves.
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 50-53 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
29. See text infra pp. 31-64 and accompanying notes.
30. See text infra pp. 64-73 and accompanying notes.
31. See text infra pp. 73-77 and accompanying notes.
32. See text infra pp. 77-81 and accompanying notes. Briefly, the Court has held that a gender
classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike.
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affirmative action race cases would enable the Court to distinguish among "in-
vidious" and "benign" race cases on a principled basis, and would allow gov-
ernments to eliminate racial subordination arising from past and continuing
discrimination against Blacks without running afoul of the Constitution.33
PART I
A PERSONAL NARRATIVE ON RACIAL CATEGORIES, RACISM,
AND COLORBLINDNESS
I was born in Columbus, Ohio, in 1960.11 My mother is Black,3" there-
fore, I am a Black American. I have nine brothers and sisters and my mother
has been a single parent for as long as I can remember. Consequently, we
were poor.
The Black population in Columbus has been approximately fifteen to
twenty percent during the past 30 years. Most Blacks live on either the east-
side or northside of Columbus in predominantly Black neighborhoods. My
family lived almost exclusively on the eastside of Columbus, in rental housing.
We moved frequently in search of better or cheaper housing.
I attended "de facto" segregated schools in Columbus. 36 Columbus fol-
lowed a neighborhood school assignment policy and I lived in Black neighbor-
hoods; so, with the exception of first grade, I attended elementary and high
school with almost all Black classmates. During junior high school I partici-
pated in a voluntary busing program, travelling about ten miles to a predomi-
nantly White37 school.
33. See text infra pp. 77-82 and accompanying notes.
34. I am persuaded by Richard Delgado's Storytelling for the Oppositionists and Others: A Plea
for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989), that this brief narrative helps me explain why I reject
colorblindness and hopefully aids the reader's understanding of my biases.
35. Professor Neil Gotanda has recently written that American racial classifications follow two
formal rules:
1) Rule of recognition: Any person whose Black-African ancestry is visible is Black.
2) Rule of descent: (a) Any person with a known trace of African ancestry is Black,
notwithstanding that person's visual appearance; or, stated differently, (b) the offspring of a
Black and a White is Black.
See Gotanda, supra note 17, at 24. For a recent study of the "one drop" of blood rule, see F. JAMES
DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK? ONE NATION'S DEFINITION (Penn State Univ. Press 1991). For an argu-
ment that racial purity is largely myth, see MARVIN HARRIS, PATTERNS OF RACE IN THE AMERICAS
(Walker 1964).
36. I started school in 1965. Although that date was a decade after the Supreme Court decided
segregated public schools were inherently unequal, I nonetheless attended segregated schools. The
segregation in Columbus schools was not required by statute. Instead, as in many school districts
outside the South, school officials achieved their goal of segregation through school assignment poli-
cies and decisions to open or close schools in strategic locations. This type of school desegregation is
called "de facto" segregation. See, e.g., Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189
(1973). After I graduated from high school in 1978, Columbus public schools were ordered to deseg-
regate. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979) (the Court found the district
court judge had applied the proper standard in requiring proof that segregated schools existed and
that they were brought about by intentional action of school officials).
37. Defining "White" is perplexing. Among the definitions in Webster's Dictionary may be
found: "free from color"; "being a member of a group or race characterized by reduced pigmentation
and usually specifically distinguished from persons belonging to groups marked by black, brown,
yellow, or red skin coloration"; "free from spot or blemish"; or, as "free from moral impurity."
WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1017 (G. & C. Merriam Co. 1976) (1961).
Professor Patricia Williams has discussed "whiteness" as follows:
The parallelism of "whiteness" as culture or as any kind of unified experience is not imme-
diately apparent. Although remaining convinced that there is a culture of whiteness in the
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I do not recall when I discovered that being Black made me different. It
may have been as early as the first grade when I had a fight at school. My
"girlfriend" was White. As I recall, her brother did not approve of our friend-
ship. One day after school her brother and I fought. I won the fight, but lost
my "girlfriend."
Although most of my classmates were Black, almost all of my teachers
were White. In fact, save junior high school, most of my daily contact with
White people was through my teachers. Most of them neither lived in nor
came from my neighborhood. And, for some, teaching was a second, "part-
time" job. Too many teachers in my schools appeared indifferent toward the
training of their charges. Occasionally, during annual Black History Month
celebrations, my teachers would emphasize the life experiences and contribu-
tions of Black Americans. Otherwise, in English, math, science, and history
my teachers virtually never mentioned Black folk. A few teachers were, how-
ever, especially interested in my education. I attribute my academic progress
to their dedication, which often extended beyond regular school hours.
Black schools in Columbus were different from the White schools in
other ways. They were usually old and overcrowded, and books and equip-
ment were more obsolete and less abundant than in White schools. Another
significant problem in Black schools was the low level of parental involvement
in the schools. At my predominantly White junior high school parental in-
volvement was substantial. There seemed to be more pressure on the teachers
to work even harder because of that parental oversight. In predominantly
Black schools teachers and administrators seemed less accountable.
Therefore, through my public education I learned how being Black made
me different. I learned that my public educational opportunity was inferior to
the educational opportunity of students at predominantly White schools. Per-
haps the most compelling argument for integrated public education is that
only when all of us have an equal risk of poor schools will we become serious
about equity in all schools.
Although I "excelled" in school, I neither understood nor discussed
many fundamental social issues in school. I did not understand why most
Black people in Columbus were poor, or why most of the middle-class and
upper-class residents of Columbus were White. I did not understand why
Whites and Blacks lived in separate parts of Columbus. I did not understand
why schools in Black neighborhoods were usually old while schools in White
neighborhoods were usually new. I also did not understand how a few Blacks
could afford to own houses in White neighborhoods and send their children to
private schools and colleges. My teachers rarely discussed race, racism, or
racial subordination. When I graduated from high school I was not prepared
to fight racism.
I was also not prepared to attend college. My high school was not a
college preparatory school. Most of my classmates did not complete algebra,
physics, or advanced English. Instead, most completed vocational training
and took jobs immediately after high school. I enrolled in several special
United States, I appreciate the extent to which its contours are vaguely or even negatively
discerned, so that its assertion is most clearly delineated as "not other," and most specifi-
cally as "not black."
Williams, supra note 17, at 530.
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classes and after-school programs with a dozen other students. A significant
part of my high school education came from those activities.
During my final year of high school, I visited my counselor to discuss
colleges. I was interested in four: Harvard University, Duke University,
Howard University, and Vanderbilt University. My counselor told me that I
should prepare to go to one of the local schools, such as Capital University.
He said I would not do well at a school like Duke University. He did not
explain why I would not do well. I ignored his advice, and when Duke admit-
ted me, I accepted.
I attended Duke University when its Black enrollment was approximately
five percent. Students at Duke came from all fifty states as well as many other
countries. Fifteen percent were from North Carolina. Ninety percent were
White. All but a couple of my teachers were White. Virtually all the profes-
sional administrative staff at Duke were White folk. (And, unfortunately, al-
most all of the blue collar, "unskilled" workers were Black. All of the Black
workers at Duke had skills, but they were not the skills society rewards
highly.)
It was not long before I realized that I was not as well trained as my
classmates. I knew that I could read and write, but my initial evaluations
from teachers were average or below. I learned that there were courses I had
not taken and books I had not read that my classmates had covered as early as
junior high school. I began to believe that the high school counselor who
discouraged me from attending Duke knew that my education was inferior to
that received by my prospective classmates. But, he never explained that to
me. This realization taught me that I was different from most of my Duke
classmates and that I had to work hard just to be an average Duke student.
Teachers introduced me to the work of W.E.B. DuBois and Black history
generally. I discovered pride in my culture and history. And at Duke I had
my first adult experiences with White folk. As a history major I read about
slavery and began to examine the origins of racism in the United States. I
studied the Civil War, the promise of Reconstruction laws, and the failure of
Populism. I read about the Jim Crow era and the subsequent campaign to end
segregation in schools and all areas of public accommodations, such as restau-
rants, theaters, swimming pools, parks, golf courses, and, of course, restrooms
and drinking fountains.
At Duke then, I became educated about how being Black made me differ-
ent, how my race gave me a different legacy, a different history, a different
perspective on the world, not only in comparison with many Whites, but also
with some Blacks and other racial minorities. Being Black meant that I had a
history of cumulative disadvantage in terms of social, political, and economic
opportunities in this society based in significant part on my race-a history of
disadvantage that I did not create. I realized that no matter where I went or
what I accomplished I would always be Black: a Black Duke student, a Black
Duke graduate, a Black law student, a Black lawyer, a Black law professor,
perhaps even a Black dean or a Black university president. I learned that
despite my racial pride, the term "Black," when used by many Whites and
some Blacks, operated as a negative modifier on my personhood and all my
achievements. Somehow, my humanity and my accomplishments were dimin-
ished by my race.
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At bottom, I learned time and again that people were not color-blind.
My classmates always noted my race. So did my teachers and the Duke ad-
ministrators. In each job that I held on campus, I was the only Black or one
of very few Blacks working in that department. I was a member of the Black
Student Alliance and one of a handful of Black students elected to student
government at Duke. I believe people always see me at least in part in terms
of my race and I see others the same way. I am not color-blind.
During law school at the University of California, Los Angeles, I met for
the first time substantial numbers of Latinos, Mexicans, Asian Pacific Island-
ers, Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans. UCLA is a remarkably diverse place.
Within that diverse community, I existed first as a Black student and then as
one of six Black faculty members. Between graduation and my beginning in
law teaching in 1987, I was one of six Black lawyers in a large commercial law
firm with 300 lawyers headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri. I worked in the
Los Angeles branch office where I was the only Black associate until my final
year there. In law school and in law practice, my colleagues did not subscribe
to colorblindness rhetoric. We acknowledged racial differences and tried to
promote awareness of racial differences. We shared food, music, religion, and
other cultural differences and we talked about racial subordination. And, both
the law school and the law firm accepted the need for affirmative action.
Colorblindness is a fiction that well might apply in a futuristic, make-
believe world. But I reject colorblindness38 either as a legitimate mode of con-
stitutional analysis or as a utopian goal because, despite my best efforts, I am a
racist. 9 Indeed, I think all Americans' are racists because we live in a cul-
ture infused with racism. Moreover, I think the colorblindness model permits
us to pretend that we are not racists: to ignore all the racial subordination
which we encounter each day of our lives.41 Constitutional colorblindness ac-
38. See text infra pp. 64-73 and accompanying notes.
39. Racism has been defined as a conscious or unconscious attitude, action, or institutional struc-
ture which subordinates a person or group because of his, her, or their color. See ANTHONY DOWNs,
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACISM IN AMERICA AND How TO COMBAT IT 5-6 (U.S. Gov't
Printing Office 1970). In the United States the visibility of skin color marked Blacks, among others,
as targets of White racism. White majorities have enacted numerous laws that were overtly racist
(slave codes), and other laws which appear neutral on their face but that disproportionately disadvan-
tage Blacks (locating new schools in White suburbs, or selecting college entrance criteria that exclude
most Black applicants).
I do not think all racial separation is racism, nor do I think recognizing someone's race or even
taking it into account when making decisions is always racist. For example, the decision to live in a
Black community would not necessarily be racist. However, the exclusion of all Whites from that
neighborhood would be racist. Similarly, I do not think it is necessarily racist to take race into
account in deciding how to allocate units of public housing; however, I do think it is racist to concen-
trate all public housing in minority communities.
I am a racist because I live in a society whose fundamental institutions reflect racial subordina-
tion. The social, economic, and political relationships among Blacks and Whites in the U.S. illustrate
the disproportionately subordinate status of Blacks. The point is not only whether I subordinate
White people by my attitudes, actions, or the institutions which I support, but also whether I
subordinate any race of people. My argument is that racial subordination is so systemic that all
Americans become its agents.
40. I use the term "American" to mean persons who were born or who have grown up or lived
primarily in the United States.
41. Hundreds of forms of overt racism and institutional subordination remain throughout the
United States. Examples are the deliberate exclusion of Blacks from the best educational opportuni-
ties, careers in professions such as law and medicine, all-White neighborhoods, schools, and private
business/social clubs. In addition, Blacks and other racial minorities "have been treated as inferiors,
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cepts contemporary racial subordination in the United States as normative,
even though it is clear that existing racial subordination is neither legitimate,
natural, or inevitable.
Like slavery, racial subordination is not inevitable. Kenneth Stampp cor-
rectly found that the use of slaves in the United States was a deliberate choice
(among several alternatives) made by men who sought greater economic re-
turns than they could obtain from their own labor alone, and who found other
forms of labor more expensive.42 Similarly, overt racism and racial subordina-
tion today are at least derivative of past deliberate choices.43 What is more,
they continue to exist because of our failure to eradicate them. We are racists,
then, because we live in a country that has been a racist country since its
colonial beginnings. Our collective historical experience is littered with racist
attitudes, practices, and institutional structures that place Whites over Blacks.
The social, political, and economic relationships that exist in the United States
today are derived from past and continuing racist practices. We have never
eradicated racism or racial inequality in the United States.' We have at best
aspired to linguistic equality.45
We live, play, work, and worship in institutions that have inculcated ra-
cial subordination. In my schooling, I frequently learned about the accom-
plishments of outstanding Whites, but seldom about outstanding Blacks. At
home and in my neighborhood, I learned the shame of poverty and the mani-
festations of self-hate and desperation, such as domestic violence, teenage
pregnancy, and crime and drug usage, which are so commonplace in poor
Black communities. I saw Black people abused by Whites and by each other,
and heard Blacks talk about their hatred for Whites. I lived by race and was
aware of my color every day. We are racists because we know our conduct
creates racial impressions, both intra-racially and inter-racially, and that
knowledge influences our conduct. In the United States too often it seems we
join a world, a culture, or a side of the race-line. Sometimes our "place" is
determined by the circumstances of our birth. Other times we "choose" a side
of the race-line simply by selecting a place to live, a church to attend, or a life-
partner. Very few Americans try to live integrated lives by finding a way to
protest this seemingly "natural" racial choice pattern.
For most of my adult life I have tried to understand racism in the United
given inferior jobs and legal rights, compelled to accept inferior schooling, forced to live in inferior
housing and neighborhoods, made to use inferior public facilities, and constantly told that they were
inferior human beings and had no chance to be otherwise." See DOWNS, supra note 39, at 7.
42. KENNETH STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION 5-6 (Vintage Books 1956).
43. The conditions of Blacks today are derivative of slavery. Where Blacks live, their aggregate
income, their self-image and degree of self-confidence, the nature and stability of their families, their
attitudes toward authority, their levels of educational and cultural attainment have been significantly
impacted by their historical treatment in the United States. See DOWNS, supra note 39, at 7.
44. I think it is fundamentally unfair to compare Whites and Blacks mechanically. For example,
in hiring decisions it is unfair to hire Whites over Blacks because Whites have more experience or
greater skill levels. Whites, on average, should have greater experience and skill levels than Blacks in
light of their historical advantages. Similarly, Whites should have higher test scores on college en-
trance exams since it was illegal to teach Blacks to read or write, and since Blacks have most often
been relegated to inferior schools. Such mechanistic comparisons between Blacks and Whites con-
tinue to harm Blacks in a myriad of ways. See DOWNS, supra note 39, at 8-10.
45. In short, I contend that despite formal laws mandating equality between Whites and Blacks,
racial inequality persists. See text infra pp. 25-31 and accompanying notes.
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States and to move beyond it. Professor Charles Lawrence is correct when he
writes that:
Racism in America is much more complex than either the conscious con-
spiracy of a power elite or the simple delusion of a few ignorant bigots. It is
a part of our common historical experience and, therefore, a part of our
culture. It arises from the assumptions we have learned to make about the
world, ourselves, and others as well as from the patterns of our fundamental
social activities.4
I agree with Professor Lawrence that racism in the United States has a
universality that extends to all of us who live here. Thus, to assert that I am a
racist is an essential step toward identifying the ways in which my conduct
promotes racial subordination. The colorblindness model is incongruous with
identifying racial subordination.47
Occasionally I meet White people who suggest that they do not "think"
of me as Black or that race is not an "issue" between us. I assure them that in
the United States race is almost always an issue between Blacks and Whites if
not between the individuals themselves, then between them and their families
or their peers. Reactions of family and friends are especially problematic
when an intimate, interracial, sexual relationship develops.4 8
Similarly, I tell Whites it is an insult for them not to see me as Black,
because I am proud to be Black and my race should be recognized and cele-
brated too, since my ancestors were also integral in building this country into
what it is today. Colorblindness permits us to continue to ignore significant
Black contributions to the creation of the wealth of this nation and it is anti-
thetical to eliminating racial subordination.
The purpose of this narrative is to suggest that if my personal experiences
are generalizable, then the colorblindness model is a myth. I am not and do
not wish to be color-blind. I also do not believe that other people are color-
blind. To the contrary, Americans are intensely color-aware.
PART II
RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS AND THE ORIGINS OF
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
How does a nation overcome an ideology of White supremacy?4 9 How do
46. Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Ra-
cism, 39 STAN. L. Rav. 317, 330 (1987).
47. Many of us have tried affirmatively to eliminate overt racism from our lives. We avoid any
conduct that we believe is overtly racist. And, many of us become indignant at the claim that we are
racists. However, when we examine our most routine affairs more closely, we see that racial subordi-
nation and overt racism abound. For example, we bank with institutions that actively discriminate
against Blacks, we shop at stores that hire virtually no Blacks, and we send our children to schools
that we know are better than those available to Blacks. Fighting racial subordination requires us to
identify it and to protest it in all its manifestations. I think the colorblindness doctrine hinders such
an attack.
48. Kenneth Lay makes this point persuasively in his Note set out below.
49. Beliefs in the superiority of Whiteness and the inferiority of Blackness pre-existed their appli-
cation to racial relationships in America and were prevalent in literature even before the sixteenth
century. In his seminal work on racial attitudes, Professor Winthrop Jordan wrote:
In England perhaps more than in southern Europe, the concept of blackness was
loaded with intense meaning. Long before they found that some men were black, English-
men found in the idea of blackness a way of expressing some of their most ingrained values.
No other color except white conveyed so much emotional impact. As described in the
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we overcome our legacy of slavery, racial inequality, and racial discrimination
and end the racial hegemony of Whites over Blacks? To what institutions do
we turn? What does racial equality50 mean and how do we achieve it? Must
we first take account of race, in the form of remedial racial preferences, in
order to move beyond it?5' Or must government now decide all issues in a
racially neutral manner? 2 Answers to these questions have eluded clear con-
sensus among legal commentators and jurists. One obstacle to answering
some of these questions is that, too often, academic and judicial writing re-
garding the meaning of racial equality emerges acontextually. The term racial
equality becomes aracial, simply "equality"and the historical subordination of
Blacks by Whites becomes distant history, rather than a contemporary, cogni-
zable issue.
Oxford English Dictionary, the meaning of black before the sixteenth century included,
"Deeply stained with dirt; soiled, dirty, foul.... Having dark or deadly purposes, malig-
nant; pertaining to or involving death, deadly; baneful, disastrous, sinister.... Foul, iniqui-
tous, atrocious, horrible, wicked.... Indicating disgrace, censure, liability to punishment,
etc." Black was an emotionally partisan color, the handmaid and symbol of baseness and
evil, a sign of danger and repulsion.
Embedded in the concept of blackness was its direct opposite whiteness. No other
colors so clearly implied opposition, "beinge coloures utterlye contrary"; no others were so
frequently used to denote polarization:
Everye white will have its blacke,
And everye sweete its sowre.
White and black connoted purity and filthiness, virginity and sin, virtue and baseness, beauty and
ugliness, beneficence and evil, God and the devil.
WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO 1550-
1812, at 3-4 (Penguin Books 1968).
50. At times I use the term "equality" in this article as Professor Kenneth Simons used it in
Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U. L. REV. 387, 389 (1985):
A right to equal treatment is a comparative claim to receive a particular treatment just
because another person or class receives it. The claim to that treatment is not absolute, but
relative to whether others receive it. And the claim is satisfied by giving the comparatively
situated classes the required equal treatment. For example, if men and women have a right
to equal treatment in employment, then women have a comparative right to whatever em-
ployment benefits otherwise similarly situated men receive. But the claim is not absolute
because an employer may, consistent with that claim [of equal treatment], deny benefits to
men and women.
At other times I use the term "equality" to invoke the equal citizenship principle articulated by
Professor Kenneth Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REv. 245, 247-48 (1983) (arguing that
the equal citizenship principle has a substantive component; that is, to be treated by organized society
as a respectable, responsible, and participating member who belongs to our national community).
51. Justice Blackmun expressed this view in his separate opinion in Regents of University of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., separate opinion). Justice Blackmun wrote:
I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affirmative action program in a racially
neutral way and have it successful. To ask that this be so is to demand the impossible. In
order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way. And
in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently. We cannot-we dare
not-let the Equal Protection Clause perpetrate racial supremacy.
52. Professor William Van Alstyne wrote:
... We shall not now see racism disappear by employing its own ways of classifying people
and measuring their rights.
Rather, one gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now: by a complete, resolute, and
credible commitment never to tolerate in one's own life or in the life or practices of one's
government the differential treatment of other human beings by race. Indeed, that is the
great lesson for government to teach, in all we do in life, whatever we do in life, to treat any
person less well than another or to favor any more than another for being [B]lack or [W]hite
or [B]rown or [R]ed, is wrong. Let that be our fundamental law and we shall have a Consti-
tution universally worth expounding.
Van Alstyne, supra note 14, at 809-10.
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In order to move beyond racism and to create racial equality we must
first acknowledge that racial subordination has existed continuously in the
English colonies and the United States for almost four centuries and that an-
tidiscrimination laws enacted to eradicate the racial domination of Whites
over Blacks and others have never achieved that goal. To understand these
facts we need simply to recall our racial history. We cannot understand the
meaning of modem antidiscrimination laws if we do not know how such laws
evolved.
1. Indentured Servitude and Slavery in the Colonies
The racial history of Blacks and Whites in the United States begins at
least by the early seventeenth century. While some historians would use a
date in the sixteenth century,5 3 it seems clear that the first Black indentured
servants were sold in the Virginia colony around August 1619.11 Professor
Higginbotham has chronicled the Black experience in colonial America in his
important book In the Matter of Color which contains extensive historical ref-
erences to the experiences of Blacks in colonial Virginia,
5 Massachusetts,56
New York,57 South Carolina,58 Georgia,59 and Pennsylvania.'
Virginia, the homeland of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and
James Madison, was a leader not only in shaping the new nation after the
American Revolution, but in the debasement of Blacks through its institution-
alization of slavery.61 Higginbotham wrote:
[Virginia] pioneered a legal process that assured blacks a uniquely degraded
status--one in which cruelties of slavery and pervasive racial injustice were
guaranteed by its law. Just as [other colonies] emulated other aspects of
Virginia's policies, many colonies would also follow Virginia's leadership in
slavery law.
62
Thus, the Virginia experience can serve as a window upon the racial history of
Blacks and Whites during the colonial period.
The legal status of Blacks in Virginia from 1619 to 1660 is unclear.63 In
1619, John Rolfe, the Secretary and Recorder of the Virginia colony, wrote
that "there came to Virginia a Dutchman of Warre that sold us twenty
Negers."' 6 Scholars have been unable to agree whether the first twenty Blacks
were slaves or indentured servants. 65 However, scholars do agree that they
53. JORDAN, supra note 49, at 3-4. See also JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREE-
DOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS 46-49 (Vintage Books 1969) (1947), and IRVING J.
SLOAN, BLACKS IN AMERICA 1492-1970, at vii-viii (Oceana 1971).
54. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATrER OF COLOR 19-20 (Oxford Univ. Press
1978). See also RONALD SANDERS, LOST TRIBES AND PROMISED LANDS 353-63 (Little, Brown &
Co. 1978); JORDAN, supra note 49, at 44-48; and FRANKLIN, supra note 53, at 7.
55. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 54, at 19-60, and FRANKLIN, supra note 53, at 71-75.
56. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 54, at 61-99, and FRANKLIN, supra note 53, at 101-11.
57. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 54, at 100-50, and FRANKLIN, supra note 53, at 90-94.
58. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 54, at 151-215, and FRANKLIN, supra note 53, at 78-83.
59. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 54, at 216-66, and FRANKLIN, supra note 53, at 83-85.
60. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 54, at 267-310, and FRANKLIN, supra note 53, at 96-100.
61. HIGGINBOTHAM, at 19.
62. Id.
63. Id. See also SANDERS, supra note 54, at 353-54.
64. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 54, at 20. See also SANDERS, supra note 54, at 353.
65. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 54, at 21. Higginbotham compares the positions articulated by
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were not free in the modem sense of that term.66
Although the legal status of Blacks in colonial Virginia is the subject of
significant debate,67 judicial decisions of the time quickly began to reflect a
hierarchy among types of servants. Helen Catterall, who compiled a state-by-
state summary of judicial decisions on slavery, suggested the following hierar-
chy in cases adjudicating the rights of Indians, poor Whites, and Blacks:
1. White indentured servants
2. White servants without indentures





The list is significant because it illustrates the social preference of Whites over
colored persons. It also underscores how Black slavery relegated most Blacks
to the bottom of the laboring class.
Higginbotham, however, argues that the few surviving judicial opinions
from colonial Virginia do not indicate whether the holdings were based on
race or on other findings of fact.69 The first judicial decision in Virginia to
make reference to Blacks was Re Davis (1630).10 The case report reads as
follows: "Hugh Davis to be soundly whipt before an assembly of negroes &
others for abusing himself to the dishonor of God and shame of Christianity
by defiling his body in lying with a negro which fault he is to actk Next sab-
bath day."' 7 1 Higginbotham infers that Davis must have been White since Da-
vis was charged with defiling his body by lying with a Negro. The inference
seems reasonable since the charge would be nonsensical if Davis were Black.
The opinion also suggests a perception of Black inferiority.72
The notion of Black inferiority is more apparent in subsequent cases. For
example, in Re Sweat (1640),1 3 Sweat was charged with impregnating a Negro
Philip A. Bruce (slaves), J.C. Ballagh (servants), John Hope Franklin (servants), and Mary and Oscar
Handlin (unfree servants).
66. Id Higginbotham concluded that the weight of the historical evidence suggests that the first
Blacks in colonial America were identified and treated as servants rather than slaves.
There is an emerging body of literature regarding the legal status of labor in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. Contemporary labor historians contend that almost all workers were unfree.
See, e.g., ROBERT STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE 1350-1870 (Univ. North Carolina Press 1991). I am
indebted to my colleague Wythe Holt for this observation.
67. And, as Professor Genovese has pointed out, the debate has considerable significance because
"it remains possible that for a brief period a less oppressive pattern of race relations had had a chance
to develop in the upper South." EUGENE GENOVESE, ROLL JORDAN ROLL: THE WORLD THE
SLAVES MADE 31 (Vintage Books 1976) (1972). But, Genovese concluded, before the turn of the
eighteenth century the issue had been resolved and Blacks condemned to the status of slaves for life.
Id
68. 1 HELEN CATrERALL, JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NE-
GRO 53-54 (Octagon Book, Inc. 1968). See also HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 54, at 22.
69. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 54, at 22.
70. Id. at 23. See also CATTERALL, supra note 68, at 77.
71. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 54, at 23. Higginbotham argues that Davis is significant, despite
its ambiguity, assuming Davis was White, because the opinion suggests that his crime violated both
the laws of the colony and the laws of the church.
72. Id. See also JORDAN, supra note 49, at 6-11.
73. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 54, at 23-24. See also CATTERALL, supra note 68, at 78.
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woman servant belonging to a third party.74 The court ruled, "[T]he said ne-
gro woman shall be whipt at the whipping post and the said Sweat shall to-
morrow in the forenoon do public penance for his offense at James city church
in the time of devine service according to the laws of England in that the case
provided."' 75 Here, it is interesting to note the differential treatment. Again,
assuming that Sweat was White, his punishment appears much less severe
than that of the Negro woman. This pattern of disparities between the punish-
ment of Blacks and Whites and men and women became commonplace.76
Some evidence suggests that some Blacks exercised basic civil rights in
seventeenth century Virginia. For example, early colonial court records illus-
trate how John Graweere, "a negro servant to William Evans," petitioned the
court for permission to purchase the freedom of his young son.77 The court
granted Graweere's petition and ordered "that the child shall be free from the
said Evans or his assigns and to be and remain at the disposing and education
of said Graweere and the child's godfather-who undertaketh to see it
brought up in the christian religion as aforesaid." '78 Higginbotham argued
that Graweere was able to exercise other rights, including those incident to
keeping hogs, to purchase his child's freedom, and to petition the court.79
The same legal system that gave privileges to some Black servants simul-
taneously sanctioned perpetual servitude for other Blacks. In several commer-
cial transactions in the 1640's, Blacks were sold by contract for life. In one
case, Francis Potts sold a Black woman and child to Stephen Carlton, "to the
use of him forever."8 0 In another, William Whittington sold a ten-year-old
girl "along with any issue she might produce for her and her children's 'life-
time and their successors forever.' "81 What emerged from such contracts was
Black slavery.
Once the practice of selling Blacks for life became commonplace, it was
not long before the courts began to impose perpetual servitude on Blacks as
punishment for their crimes. For example, in In re Negro John Punch s2 three
runaway servants were captured in Maryland and each was sentenced to be
whipped. The court then imposed different sentences as follows:
One called Victor, a dutchman, the other a Scotchman called James Greg-
ory, shall first serve out their times with their master according to their In-
dentures, and one whole year apiece after the time of their service is Expired
... and after that service ... to serve the colony for three whole years apiece,
and that the third being a negro named John Punch shall serve his said
master or his assigns for the time of his natural life here or elsewhere.
83
The Punch decision illustrates that colonial courts were willing to exercise
extreme partiality in favor of Whites and against Blacks. A similar conclusion
is apparent from the one-sentence-long opinion in In re Warwick decided in
74. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 54, at 24.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 25 (citing In re Graweere (1641)). See also CATrERALL, supra note 68, at 78.
78. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 54, at 25.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 26.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 28. See also CATTERALL, supra note 68, at 77.
83. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 54, at 28.
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1669.84 In Warwick the court wrote, "Hannah Warwick's case extenuated
because she was overseen by a negro overseer."'8 5 Assuming Warwick was a
White servant, the opinion means nothing less than that a White servant was
given more lenient treatment because she had a Negro overseer. More
broadly, the decision suggests that Whites, even if wrong, could refuse to sub-
mit to the authority of Blacks.86 Higginbotham said, "Thus, Warwick sub-
scribes judicially to the view that the function of Blacks in Virginia was to be
ordered, and never to order others."87
It was not until 1659 that Virginia legislation referred to Blacks as
slaves.88 The statute provided a tax incentive for merchants bringing slaves
into the country, which led directly to an increased supply of slave labor.89 By
1660 it is likely that Blacks in lifetime bondage had become the primary labor
force in colonial Virginia."
By 1669 the Virginia legislature had enacted statutes punishing Whites
who conspired to escape service in the company of Negroes,9 and exempting
slave owners from criminal prosecutions for the casual killing of slaves.92 In
addition, the Virginia legislature enacted a statute that baptism did not alter
the condition of bondage of Blacks or Indians.93 In 1670, Virginia enacted a
law which divided non-Christian servants into two categories: those imported
into the colony by shipping "who shall be slaves for their lives" and those who
shall come by land who shall serve until age 30.94 By 1680, Virginia developed
84. Id. at 29-30. See also CATrERALL, supra note 68, at 78.
85. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 54, at 29-30.
86. Id. at 30.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 34. See also FRANKLIN, supra note 53, at 72.
89. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 54, at 34. The 1659 Act provided:
1659. Act XVI. Dutch and all strangers of Christian nations are allowed free trade if they
give bond and pay import of ten shillings per hogshead laid upon all tobacco exported to
any foreign dominions; always provided that if Dutch or other foreigners shall import any
Negro slaves they, the said Dutch or other foreigners, shall for the tobacco really produced
by the said Negroes, pay only the impost of two shillings per hogshead, the like being paid
by our own nation.
90. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 54, at 34. See also FRANKLIN, supra note 53, at 72.
91. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 54, at 34. The 1660 Act provided:
1660. Act XXII. It is enacted that in case any English servant shall run away in company
with any Negroes who are incapable of making satisfaction by addition of time that the
English so running away shall serve for the time of the Negroes' absence as they are to do
for their own by a former act.
92. Id. at 36. The Act provided:
1669. An Act about the casuall killings of slaves
Whereas the only law in force for the punishment of refractory servants resisting their
master, mistress or overseer, cannot be inflicted on negroes [because the punishment was
extension of time], Nor the obstinacy of many of them by other than violent meanes sup-
prest. Be it enacted and declared by this grand assembly, if any slave resist his master...
and by the extremity of the correction should chance to die, that his death shall not be
accompted Felony, but the master (or that other person appointed by the master to punish
him) be acquit from molestation, since it cannot be presumed that propensed malice (which
alone makes murther [sic] Felony) should induce any man to destroy his own estate.
93. Id. at 36-37. The Act provided:
1667. Act III. Whereas some doubts have arisen whether children that are slaves by birth,
and by the charity and pity of their owners made partakers of the blessed sacrament of
baptism, should by virtue of their baptism be made free, it is enacted that baptism does not
alter the condition of the person as to his bondage or freedom; masters freed from this doubt
may more carefully propagate Christianity by permitting slaves to be admitted to that
sacrament.
94. Id. at 37. See also FRANKLIN, supra note 53, at 74.
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a legal system that denied most Blacks even the limited rights enjoyed by poor
Whites.9"
One 1680 statute provided an excellent illustration of the extent of the
debasement of Blacks in Virginia. The Act provided:
Whereas the frequent meetings of considerable numbers of Negro slaves
under pretense of feasts and burials is judged of dangerous consequence [it
is] enacted that no Negro or slave may carry arms, such as any club, staff,
gun, sword, or other weapon, nor go from his owner's plantation without a
certificate and then only on necessary occasions; the punishment of twenty
lashes on the bare back, well laid on. And further, if any Negro lift up his
hand against any Christian he shall receive thirty lashes, and if he absent
himself or lie out from his master's service and resist lawful apprehension, he
may be killed and this law shall be published every six months.
96
The 1680 Act became the model of Black repression throughout the South for
the next two centuries.
97
After eliminating the basic civil rights of Blacks, the Virginia legislature
codified the status of slaves as a form of property. Thus, in 1705 Virginia
enacted the following law:
All Negro, mulatto, and Indian slaves within this dominion shall be
held to be real estate and not chattels and shall descend unto heirs and wid-
ows according to the custom of land inheritance, and be held in 'fee simple."
Provided that any merchant bringing slaves into this dominion shall hold
such slaves whilst they remain unsold as personal estate. All such slaves
may be taken on execution as other chattels; slaves shall not be escheatable.
No person selling any slave shall be obliged to have the sale recorded as
upon the alienation of other real estate. Nothing in this act shall be con-
strued to give the owner of a slave not seized of other real estate the right to
vote as a freeholder.
98
The legislature revised the 1705 Act every several years until 1792. But, the
essential provisions of the slave code remained virtually the same throughout
that period.99 The Virginia slave code is representative of other colonial slave
95. Professor Kenneth Stampp wrote that "the master class, for its own purposes wrote chattel
slavery, the caste system and color prejudice into American custom and law." See supra note 42, at
23.
96. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 54, at 39. The 1680 Act proved unsuccessful so it was followed
by additional provisions in 1682. That Act provided:
1682. Act III. Whereas the act of 1680 on Negro insurrection has not had the intended
effect, it is enacted that church wardens read this and the other act, twice every year, in the
time of divine service, or forfeit each of them six hundred pounds of tobacco, and further to
prevent insurrections no master or overseer shall allow a Negro slave of another to remain
on his plantation above four hours without leave of the slave's own master.
97. Id. Higginbotham proceeded to examine statutes that proscribed interracial sex and mar-
riage, as well as those that restricted the terms by which a master could free a slave. Id. at 40-50.
The statutes would later serve as the model for the post-war Black codes and Jim Crow laws.
98. Id. at 52. Another section of the 1705 law gave the master greater control over the life of his
slave. Chapter 34 provided:
And if any slave resist his master, or owner, or other person, by his or her order,
correcting such slave, and shall happen to be killed in such correction, it shall not be ac-
counted felony; but the master, owner, and every such other person so giving correction,
shall be free and acquit of all punishment and accusation for the same, as if such accident
had never happened.
Iai
99. Id. at 58. According to Higginbotham, some of the more interesting provisions of the Vir-
ginia slave code included:
1. A 1723 provision permitting certain free Negro or mulatto house-keepers to keep a gun.
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codes which remained in force after the adoption of the Constitution. I°"
2. Slavery and the American Revolution
By the time the Virginia statesmen prepared their Bill of Rights"'1 in
1776, slavery was entrenched in the colonies, especially throughout the South.
For nearly 120 years Virginia had sanctioned perpetual servitude for Blacks.
Even though the revolutionary language in Virginia's Bill of Rights, in the
Declaration of Independence, and in the Constitution of the United States
contained many references to rights of the people, as one of my colleagues has
recently observed: "'We the People' in the Constitution's preamble really
meant "'We the white male [adult] property owners.' ,102
The Declaration of Independence 3 is the United States' freedom mani-
festo. It announces the union of the colonies as independent states and the
specific reasons for severing allegiance with the British crown. The represent-
2. A 1769 provision banned the dismemberment of Blacks because it was often "dispropor-
tioned to the offense and contrary to the principles of humanity." Nevertheless, the statute
authorized the castration of any slave who attempted to ravish a White woman, but it con-
tained no comparable provision when White men attempted to ravish or actually ravished a
Black woman.
3. In proceedings solely between Blacks, they were allowed to testify in court. But their
testimony was admissible only against Blacks. No White person could ever be found guilty
of a crime on the word of a Black person.
100. For a comprehensive collection of nineteenth century slave statutes, see STATUTES ON SLAV-
ERY: THE PAMPHLET LITERATURE (Paul Finkelman, ed., Garland Publishing, Inc. 1988), and
STATE SLAVERY STATUTES: A GUIDE TO THE MICRO-FICHE COLLECTION (Paul Finkelman, ed.,
Garland Publishing, Inc. 1989). See also GENOVESE, supra note 67, at 33-41.
The Author has also examined nineteenth century legal digests for references to slaves, mulat-
toes and free Negroes. Most of the relevant provisions are found in statutes at large for each state and
are interspersed with other general provisions. The slave codes demonstrate as clearly as any other
available evidence that Blacks in the U.S., whether slave, mulatto, or free, did not enjoy equal rights
with Whites. The slave codes contained any combination of the following provisions:
1. Blacks could not engage in certain occupations;
2. Blacks could not freely assemble;
3. Blacks could not enter some states;
4. Blacks could not remain in some states if manumitted;
5. Free Blacks could not trade or engage in commerce with slaves;
6. Blacks could not obtain education, vote, or testify in court against a White person;
7. Blacks could not keep certain animals, such as dogs, horses, or some livestock;
8. Blacks could not travel without passes or certificates.
101. HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY (Appleton-Century-
Crofts 1968). The Virginia Bill of Rights was presented on June 12, 1776. The first section provided:
1. That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherited
rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot by any compact deprive
or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquir-
ing and possessing property, pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.
Id. at 103. See also HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 54, at 59.
102. Kenneth C. Randall, Foreign Affairs in the Next Century, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 2097, 2100
(1991) (reviewing LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(1990)).
Since the adoption of the Declaration of Independence, and the ratification of the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights, there has been a contradiction between the language of rights and the reality of
rights in the United States. The contradiction arises from several sources including the language
selected and the interpretation of that language. Any principle can be construed broadly or narrowly
to achieve one's goals. It seems that, time and again, laws have been construed narrowly when they
were enacted on behalf of Blacks, but broadly when they were enacted on behalf of Whites.
In addition to the "We the People" slogan, there is the familiar "All men are created equal"
language of the Declaration of Independence. The latest slogan in this tradition is "colorblindness."
103. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
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atives of the colonies complained of tyranny and despotism by King George.
They wrote "all MEN are created equal, that they are endowed by their Crea-
tor with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
Pursuit of Happiness...."
Despite references to equality and unalienable rights, the final draft of the
Declaration of Independence said nothing about slavery in the colonies.
Thomas Jefferson's initial draft of the Declaration criticized the institution of
slavery and the King of England for that Government's participation in the
slave trade.105 In the end, the society described by Jefferson and others in
America's fundamental legal documents excluded the 500,000 Blacks held in
slavery.10 6 In order to promote the interests of Whites, our Founding Fathers
"involuntarily" sacrificed the rights of Blacks.107
Similarly, the Constitution of the United States was largely a compromise
between Southern planters and Northern merchants. At the heart of this com-
promise was slavery. Although the drafters of the original Constitution did
not employ the terms "slave" or "slavery," their intent to protect slavery is
clear in the several provisions relating to apportionment, importation of
slaves, and the fugitive slave.
The representation of Southern states in the House of Representatives
would increase because slaves would be included in calculating apportion-
ment. Similarly, Article I, Section 9, prohibited congressional interference
with slave migration or importation until 1808. And, Article IV, Section 2,
Clause 3 prohibited states from emancipating fugitive slaves and provided that
states would deliver fugitive slaves to their owners. 108
104. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. I and 2 (U.S. 1776).
105. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 1, at 20-21, (quoting Staughton
Lynd, Slavery and the Founding Fathers, in BLACK HISTORY 119 (M. Drimmer, ed., 1968)). See also
JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 13-14 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1976), and
FRANKLIN, supra note 53, at 129-30.
106. See FRANKLIN, supra note 53, at 141-47.
107. This concept of involuntary sacrifice is borrowed from Bell's description of racial history in
the U.S. See BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 1, at 34-36.
108. Id. at 26-30. Bell cites the historian William Wiecek for compiling the following list of direct
and indirect accommodations to slavery contained in the Constitution:
1. Article I, Section 2: representatives in the House were apportioned among the states on
the basis of population, computed by counting all free persons and three-fifths of the
slaves (the "federal number," or "three-fifths," clause);
2. Article I, Section 2, and Article I, Section 9: two clauses requiring, redundantly, that
direct taxes (including capitations) be apportioned among the states on the foregoing
basis, the purpose being to prevent Congress from laying a head tax on slaves to en-
courage their emancipation;
3. Article I, Section 9: Congress was prohibited from abolishing the international slave
trade to the United States before 1808;
4. Article IV, Section 2: the states were prohibited from emancipating fugitive slaves, who
were to be returned on demand of the master;
5. Article I, Section 8: Congress was empowered to provide for calling up the states' mili-
tias to suppress insurrections, including slave uprisings;
6. Article IV, Section 4: the federal government was obliged to protect the states against
domestic violence, including slave insurrections;
7. Article V: the provisions of Article I, Section 9, clauses 1 and 4 (pertaining to the slave
trade and direct taxes) were made unamendable;
8. Article I, Section 9, and Article I, Section 10: these two clauses prohibited the federal
government and the states from taxing exports, one purpose being to prevent them from
taxing slavery indirectly by taxing the exported product of slave labor.
BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 1, at 34-35.
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One can read the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of
the United States as pro-slavery documents. Their provisions protected slav-
ery by omission or commission and advanced the debasement and dehumani-
zation of all Blacks, whether slave or free. Therefore, it should surprise no one
that Frederick Douglass would state in a Fourth of July oration in 1852 that
the holiday did not apply to him. He said:
What to the American slave is your Fourth of July? I answer, a day
that reveals to him, more than all other days of the year, the gross injustice
and cruelty to which he is the constant victim. To him your celebration is a
sham; your boasted liberty an unholy license; your national greatness, swell-
ing vanity; your sounds of rejoicing are empty and heartless; your denuncia-
tions of tyrants, brass-fronted impudence; your shouts of liberty and
equality, hollow mockery; your prayers and hymns, your sermons and
thanksgivings, with all your religious parade and solemnity, are to him mere
bombast, fraud, deception, impiety, and hypocrisy; a thin veil to cover up
crimes which would disgrace a nation of savages. There is not a nation on
the earth guilty of practises more shocking and bloody than are the people of
these United States at this very hour .... 109
And in a similar vein, the late Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall, on
the occasion of the bicentennial of the Constitution, wrote about his reluctance
in joining the celebrations:
I cannot accept this invitation, for I do not believe that the meaning of
the Constitution was forever "fixed" at the Philadelphia Convention. Nor
do I find the wisdom, foresight, and sense of justice exhibited by the framers
particularly profound. To the contrary, the government they devised was
defective from the start, requiring several amendments, a civil war, and mo-
mentous social transformation to attain the system of constitutional govern-
ment, and its respect for the individual freedoms and human rights, that we
hold as fundamental today. When contemporary Americans cite "The Con-
stitution," they invoke a concept that is vastly different from what the fram-
ers barely began to construct two centuries ago.
Thus, in this bicentennial year, we may not all participate in the festivi-
ties with flag-waving fervor. Some may more quietly commemorate the suf-
fering, struggle, and sacrifice that has triumphed over much of what was
wrong with the original document, and observe the anniversary with hopes
not realized and promises not fulfilled. I plan to celebrate the bicentennial of
the Constitution as a living document, including the Bill of Rights and the
other amendments protecting individual freedoms and human rights.' 10
The revolution that occurred in the United States between 1776 and 1791 did
not liberate Blacks in ways that it did many Whites. Most Blacks remained
enslaved or, if free, circumscribed by state laws that limited and, in some
cases, prohibited their exercise of basic civil rights.
3. Slavery, Sectionalism, and the Prelude to War
Although our Founding Fathers accepted slavery as a necessary evil in
109. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, What to the Slave is the Fourth of July, cited in MASTERPIECES OF
NEGRO ELOQUENCE 46-48 (Alice Moore Dunbar, ed., Bookery Publishing Co. 1914). For contem-
porary treatments of the thoughts of Douglass, see WALDO E. MARTIN, JR., THE MIND OF FREDER-
ICK DOUGLASS (Univ. North Carolina Press 1984), and WILLIAM S. McFEELEY, FREDERICK
DOUGLASS (W.W. Norton & Co. 1991).
110. Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 2, 5 (1987).
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order to form a national government, the sectional fight over the existence and
expansion of slavery in new states and territories continued for the next half
century. The sectional conflict was ultimately decided by the Civil War. The
prelude to war included passage of the Missouri Compromise of 1820,11' the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850,112 the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854,13 and per-
haps the most significant race case ever decided by the U.S. Supreme Court,
Dred Scott v. Sandford.11 4 The Missouri Compromise permitted the inhabit-
ants of the Missouri territory to organize into a slave state and it prohibited
slavery in the territory north of Missouri's southern boundaries."'5 The Act
attempted to accommodate both a policy of nonintervention, as well as a pol-
icy of prohibition.
The compromise on the expansion of slavery did not remain settled long.
As additional territories lobbied for statehood, the concerns of pro-slavery and
anti-slavery advocates mounted regarding the expansion of slavery. 16 For ex-
111. 3 Stat. 545, 645 (1820). The Missouri Compromise of 1820 provided in pertinent part:
That the inhabitants of that portion of the Missouri territory included within the
boundaries hereinafter designated, be, and they are hereby, authorized to form for them-
selves a constitution and state government, and to assume such name as they shall deem
proper; and the said state, when formed, shall be admitted into the Union, upon an equal
footing with the original states, in all respects whatsoever.
And be it further enacted, That in all that territory ceded by France to the United
States, under the name of Louisiana, which lies north of thirty-six degrees and thirty min-
utes north latitude, not included within the limits of the state, contemplated by this act,
slavery and involuntary servitude, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the
parties shall have been duly convicted, shall be, and is hereby, forever prohibited: Provided
always, That any person escaping into the same, from whom labour or service is lawfully
claimed, in any state or territory of the United States, such fugitive may be lawfully re-
claimed and conveyed to the person claiming his or her labour or service as aforesaid.
112. 9 Stat. 462 (1850), repealed by 13 Stat. 200 (1864). The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 provided
that if a fugitive slave escaped into any state or territory in the United States, the slave could be
reclaimed by the slave's owner or the owner's agent. In addition, the Act gave the slave owner a right
of action in the circuit courts of the U.S. to reclaim fugitive slaves. Interestingly, Section 5 of the Act
commanded good citizens to assist with the slave's recapture. Under Section 6 of the Act, the testi-
mony of the alleged fugitive was inadmissible. Section 7 made it a criminal offense to hinder the
arrest of or return of a slave.
113. 10 Stat. 277 (1854). The Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 provided that the Territories of
Kansas and Nebraska could organize into states and that the issue of slavery was to be decided locally
under the doctrine of popular sovereignty.
114. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 691 (1857). First, it was extremely rare for the Court to invalidate federal
laws, and Dred Scott was a direct challenge to congressional power to regulate territories of the U.S.
In that sense, Dred Scott compares with the importance of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803). Second, in Dred Scott the Supreme Court defined persons of African ancestry as nonci-
tizens for purposes of suing in federal courts. The Court said for the first time that Blacks, whether
slave or free, were not citizens within the meaning of the Constitution. Third, the Dred Scott decision
reflected the deep division in the country over slavery and prompted the fears of many that slavery
would expand throughout the country.
115. See supra note 111.
116. A full exposition of the fight to abolish slavery is beyond the scope of this article. However, I
should note the efforts of several American heroes who made the abolition of slavery their life work.
In addition to Frederick Douglass, others included William Lloyd Garrison, Elijah Lovejoy, Wendell
Phillips, Susan B. Anthony, Harriet Tubman, Angelina and Sarah Grimk6, Lucretia Mott, Maria
Weston Chapman, Charles Sumner, John Brown, Sojourner Truth, and Ida B. Wells. See
MCFEELEY, supra note 109, at 147-47 and 274-75. See also WALTER M. MERRILL, AGAINST WIND
AND TIDE (Harvard Univ. Press 1963); LAWRENCE LADER, THE BOLD BRAHMINS (E.P. Dutton &
Co. 1961); BENJAMIN QUARLES, BLACK ABOLITIONISTS (Oxford Univ. Press 1969); and DAVID
BRION DAVIS, THE SLAVE POWER CONSPIRACY AND THE PARANOID STYLE 32-86 (LSU Press
1969).
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ample, David Wilmot proposed his famous Proviso designed to prohibit slav-
ery in any territory that might be acquired as a result of the war with Mexico
in 1846.117 What emerged from such pressure was the doctrine of popular
sovereignty,"' which provided that each new state would decide for itself
whether it would permit slavery.11 9 What seems too clear for dispute is that
the first half of the nineteenth century was filled with intense color-aware-
ness. Even some of the most ardent supporters of ending slavery could not
envision a perfect equality between Blacks and Whites. So, for example, mem-
bers of the American Colonization Society thought Black emigration was
essential. 12
0
The early history of Dred Scott provides an excellent vehicle for reviewing
the racial history in the United States during the first half of the nineteenth
century.12 1 Professor Fehrenbacher has traced Dred Scott's movement, as the
slave property of Peter Blow, from Virginia in the early 1800's, through Ala-
bama, and on to St. Louis, Missouri, around 1830.122 Once in St. Louis, Peter
Blow sold several of his slaves. Dr. John Emerson, an Army surgeon,
purchased Dred Scott.123 Dr. Emerson travelled to many forts and he fre-
quently took his slave with him.' Dred Scott sued for his family's freedom
on the grounds that he had been taken to Fort Armstrong, Illinois which,
according to the Compromise of 1820, was in a nonslave state, and to Fort
Snelling in the Wisconsin Territory which, according to the Ordinance of
1787, was a nonslave territory.125 Several states, including Missouri, had
adopted the common law policy that if a slave was taken into a free state or
territory for an indefinite period the slave upon his return to the slave state
could sue for his freedom.1
26
The most significant Missouri precedent was Rachel v. Walker.
127
Rachel, a slave woman, had accompanied her master, an Army officer, to Fort
Snelling and they had remained there for several years. On their return to St.
Louis, Rachel sued for her freedom. The Missouri Supreme Court upheld
Rachel's claim for freedom and declared that an officer of the U.S. Army who
takes his slave to a military post within a territory where slavery is prohibited
and retains her there for several years forfeits his property in such slave by
virtue of the Ordinance of 1787.128 Missouri, then, by statute permitted a
slave to sue for freedom based on having been taken into a nonslave state or
territory. 
2 9
When Dred Scott filed his complaint in 1846 the law of Missouri ap-
peared quite favorable. However, between 1846 and 1857 two events occurred
117. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED ScoTr CASE 257-58 (Oxford Univ. Press 1978).
118. See supra note 113.
119. Id. One of the chief proponents of the doctrine of popular sovereignty was Stephen Douglas.
His role in the sectionalism dispute is summarized by Fehrenbacher, supra note 117, at 150-87.
120. LADER, supra note 116, at 45-47 and 117-19.
121. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 117.
122. Id. at 239-49.
123. Id. at 240.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 250.
126. Id. at 51-56.
127. 4 Mo. 354 (1837).
128. Id.
129. See Mo. REV. STAT., ch. 69, at 531-34 (1845).
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that foreshadowed the now infamous Dred Scott opinion. First, in Strader v.
Graham,131 the U.S. Supreme Court announced that it would follow the state
supreme court's interpretation of slave laws. Second, in 1852 the Missouri
Supreme Court ignored its precedent (Rachel v. Walker) and held that Mis-
souri was not obliged to give extraterritorial effect to the laws of nonslave
states or territories.' 3 ' Thus, by 1857, the law of slavery in Missouri had been
construed to protect property interests in slaves, notwithstanding laws such as
the Ordinance of 1787 or the Missouri Compromise.
Dred Scott presented three issues "that had been much debated in court-
rooms, legislative halls and newspapers throughout the country: (1) Negro
citizenship; (2) the status of slaves who had been held on free soil; and (3) the
constitutionality of federal legislation prohibiting slavery in the territories."'
1 32
Although the U.S. Supreme Court might have decided the case solely on juris-
dictional grounds, Chief Justice Taney wrote the pro-slavery diatribe that has
become his legacy. 133 He wrote:
The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors were im-
ported into this country, and sold as slaves, become a member of the polit-
ical community formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the
United States, and as such become entitled to all rights, and privileges, and
immunities, guaranteed by that instrument to the citizen?...
The words "people of the United States" and "citizens" are synony-
mous terms, and mean that same thing. They both describe the political
body who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty,
and who hold the power and conduct the Government through their repre-
sentatives .... The question before us is, whether the class of persons de-
scribed in the plea in abatement comprise a portion of this people and are
constituent members of this sovereignty?
We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not
intended to be included under the word "citizens" in the Constitution ....
On the contrary, they were at the time considered as a subordinate and infer-
ior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and,
whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and
had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power the Govern-
ment might choose to grant them.
134
Chief Justice Taney concluded that persons of African ancestry, whether slave
130. 10 How. 82 (1850).
131. See Emerson v. Scott, 15 Mo. 576 (1852).
132. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 117, at 235.
133. The first question was simply whether Dred Scott as a descendant of the African race could
meet the diversity of citizenship requirements to sue in federal court. If the Court answered nega-
tively (which in fact it did), it could have ended its discussion of the case for want of subject matter
jurisdiction. Instead, Chief Justice Taney went on to write an opinion that reaffirmed the rights of
states over slave property and that invalidated federal legislation prohibiting slavery in certain territo-
ries. Id. at 323.
For an interesting recent treatment of Dred Scott in which the author analyzes the legal status of
Blacks in Chief Justice Taney's home state, see David Skillen Bogen, The Maryland Context of Dred
Scott: The Decline in the Legal Status of Maryland Free Blacks 1776-1810, 34 AM. J. OF LEGAL
HisTORY 381 (1990) (arguing that the rights of free Blacks in Maryland worsened during the period).
There were several different opinions delivered by the Court. Chief Justice Taney's opinion is
the most famous because of its characterization of persons of African descent. Justice Benjamin
Curtis of Massachusetts presented the most persuasive challenge to Chief Justice Taney's view. Dred
Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 767 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
134. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 700 (emphasis added).
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or free, could not invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts.135
The Chief Justice did not end the opinion with a simple jurisdictional
statement. Instead, he recounted in detail the "universal" characterization of
persons of African descent. Chief Justice Taney wrote:
They had for more than a century been regarded as beings of an inferior
order, and altogether unfit to associate with the White race, either in social
or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the
White man was bound to respect .... The opinion was at the time fixed and
universal in the civilized portion of the White race.136
Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott has been criticized by com-
mentators and jurists.1 37 However, Abraham Lincoln expressed a view consis-
tent with Chief Justice Taney in 1858 when he said:
'I will say then that I am not, nor ever have been in favor of bringing
about in any way the social and political equality of the white and black
races [applause] that I am not nor ever have been in favor of making voters
or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry
with white people, and I will say in addition to this that there is a physical
difference between the black and white races which I believe will forever
forbid the two races living together on terms of social and political equality.
And inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do remain together there
must be the position of superior and inferior, and I as much as any other
man am in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white
race.' 
138
On the other hand, the post-war "Radical Reconstruction" is evidence
that a number of very powerful Whites, such as Thaddeus Stevens 139 and
Charles Sumner," ° sought to invest Blacks with the basic civil rights enjoyed
by Whites and with property confiscated during the war. 141 Moreover, shortly
after the announcement of the Dred Scott decision, Dred Scott and his family
were purchased and then freed by Taylor Blow, a grandson of Peter Blow who
had acquired Dred Scott in the early 1800's in Virginia. 14 2 Thus, Chief Justice
135. Id. at 703-10. Chief Justice Taney wrote: "The court is of the opinion that, upon the facts
stated in the plea of abatement, Dred Scott was not a citizen of Missouri within the meaning of the
Constitution of the United States, and not entitled as such to sue in its courts; ... 
136. Id. at 701-02 (emphasis added).
137. Criticism of Chief Justice Taney and the Dred Scott decision was swift and extensive.
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 117, at 417-48. See also WALTER EHRLICH, THEY HAVE No RIGHTS
(Greenwood Press 1979). Ehrlich wrote:
The repercussions to the Dred Scott decision were of the greatest magnitude. The press and
the pulpit, the political stump and the halls of Congress, all reverberated with scathing
condemnations as well as vigorous defenses of the Court's pronouncements. Sectional dif-
ferences, serious enough before March 6, 1857, now became more pronounced and more
polarized as the impact of this decision added still more to those divisive forces already
leading the nation inexorably toward civil war. Forces intent on ridding the nation of slav-
ery now mounted an unprecedented assault upon the Court, determined to reverse Dred
Scott before the unthinkable next step could occur the legalizing of slavery everywhere.
Id at 179-80. See also, Bogen, supra note 133, at 410-11.
138. 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 145-46 (Roy Basler, ed., Rutgers Univ.
Press 1953).
139. See EDWARD B. CALLENDER, THADDEUS STEVENS: COMMONER (AMS Press, Inc. 1972),
and RALPH KORNGOLD, THADDEUS STEVENS (Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1955).
140. See MOORFIELD STOREY, CHARLES SUMNER (Houghton, Mifflin and Co. 1972), and DAVID
DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR (Alfred A. Knopf 1960).
141. See infra notes 144 to 171 and accompanying text.
142. EHRLICH, supra note 137, at 181-82.
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Taney's opinion represented but one of many views regarding the status of
Blacks in the middle of the nineteenth century.
Slavery dominated the racial history between Blacks and Whites in the
United States between 1619 and 1860.143 Blacks for the most part could exer-
cise neither the political, economic, nor social rights that most Whites took for
granted. Americans were not color-blind.
4. Slavery and Antidiscrimination Law
In the decade of reconstruction, between 1865 and 1875, the federal gov-
ernment enacted legislation and constitutional amendments to end slavery,
grant citizenship to former slaves, enfranchise them, and accord former slaves
all the rights and liberties enjoyed by Whites.1"
The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and involuntary servitude
in the United States, except as punishment for a crime. 145 Pursuant to its new
constitutional power, Congress enacted the Freedmen Bureau Act of 1865146
to assist former slaves with food, clothing, and other necessaries. One could
describe that Act as an early form of an affirmative action remedy for former
slaves. When states attempted to continue slavery in all but its constitutional
143. It is very difficult for us today to comprehend what it meant to be a slave. DuBois described
this dilemma effectively when he wrote:
What did it mean to be a slave? It is hard to imagine it today. We think of oppression
beyond all conception: cruelty, degradation, whipping and starvation, the absolute negation
of human rights; or on the contrary, we may think of the ordinary worker the world over
today [1935], slaving ten, twelve, or fourteen hours a day, with not enough to eat, compelled
by his physical necessities to do this and not to do that, curtailed in his movements and his
possibilities; and we say, here, too, is a slave called a "free worker," and slavery is merely a
matter of name.
But there was in 1863 a real meaning to slavery different from that we may apply to the
laborer today. It was in part psychological, the enforced personal feeling of inferiority, the
calling of another Master; the standing with hat in hand. It was the helplessness. It was the
defenselessness of family life. It was the submergence below the arbitrary will of any sort of
individual. It was without doubt worse in these vital respects than that which exists today
in Europe or America.
See GENOVESE, supra note 67, at 68-69, quoting W.E.B. DuBois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION: AN
ESSAY TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE PART WHICH BLACK FOLK PLAYED IN THE ATTEMPT TO
RECONSTRUCT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 1860-1880, at 8-9 (Harcourt Brace & Co. 1935).
144. The Reconstruction period extended from approximately 1865 with the adoption of the
Freedmen's Bureau Act to 1875 with the passage of the Civil Rights Act.
The Freedmen's Bureau Act created an agency to assist former slaves who after the war were no
longer the wards of their former slavemasters. Professor Melvin Urofsky has described the period at
the end of the war as most desperate for former slaves who were without shelter or food and other
necessaries of life. See MELVIN UROFSKY, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 436 (Alfred A. Knopf 1988). See also ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:
AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877 (Harper & Row 1988), and DUBois, supra note
143.
145. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. The Amendment provides:
SECTION 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States,
or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
SECTION 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
146. 13 Stat. 507 (1865). Section 2 provided: "That the Secretary of War may direct such issues
of provisions, clothing, and fuel, as he may deem needful for the immediate and temporary shelter
and supply of destitute and suffering refugees and freedmen and their wives and children, under such
rules and regulations as he may direct." For subsequent amendments, see 14 Stat. 173 (1866) and 15
Stat. 83 (1868).
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sense,147 Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866148 and amended the
Freedmen's Bureau Act to strengthen the power of the national government
over civil rights within each state and territory. 149 Both Acts contained identi-
147. Most Southern states responded to the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment with predict-
able indifference. Professor John Hope Franklin has described the enactment of the new Black Codes
as follows:
Through 1865 and 1866 the states of the South gradually assumed the responsibility of
governing their people. The greatest concern of Southerners was the problem of controlling
the Negro. There were all sorts of ugly rumors of a general uprising in which Negroes
would take vengeance on whites and dispossess them of their property. Most Southern
whites, although willing to concede the end of slavery even to the point of voting for the
adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, were convinced that laws should be speedily en-
acted to curb the Negroes and to insure their role as a laboring force in the South. These
laws bore a remarkable resemblance to the ante-bellum Black Codes and can hardly be
described as measures which respected the rights of Negroes as free men. Several of them
undertook to limit the areas in which Negroes could purchase or rent property. Vagrancy
laws imposed heavy penalties that were designed to force all Negroes to work whether they
wanted to or not. The control of the Negro permitted to white employers was about as
great as that which slaveholders had exercised. If a Negro quite [sic] his job, he could be
arrested and imprisoned for breach of contract. Negroes were not allowed to testify in court
except in cases involving their race. Numerous fines were imposed for seditious speeches,
insulting gestures or acts, absence from work, violating curfew, and the possession of fire-
arms. There was, of course, no enfranchisement of Negroes and no indication that in the
future they could look forward to full citizenship and participation in a democracy.
FRANKLIN, supra note 53, at 303. See also UROFSKY, supra note 144, at 436-37.
148. 14 Stat. 27 (1866). The Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided in pertinent part:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, ex-
cluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such
citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every state and Territory in the United States,
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That any person who, under color of any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any in-
habitant of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by
this act, .... shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be punished
by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or
both, in the discretion of the court.
SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That the district courts of the United States, within
their respective districts, shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several States, cogni-
zance of all crimes and offences committed against the provisions of this act, and also,
concurrently with the circuit courts of the United States, of all causes, civil and criminal,
affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of the
State or locality where they may be any of the rights secured to them by the first section of
this act ....
SEC. 10. And be it further enacted, That upon all questions of law arising in any cause
under the provisions of this act a final appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court of the
United States.
The complete Act is collected along with other post-war civil rights statutes in THEODORE EI-
SENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: SELECTED STATUTES AND
REGULATIONS (Michie Co. 1991).
149. The history of the Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866 is summarized in UROFsKY, supra note
144, at 437-38. Urofsky wrote that in February of 1866 Congress extended the life of the Bureau
indefinitely and placed protection of Black civil rights under direct control of the army. Persons
depriving Blacks of their rights could be tried in military courts or Freedmen's Bureau courts.
President Johnson vetoed the first Freedmen's Bill on the grounds that it violated the Fifth
Amendment and that Congress had no right to pass any legislation in the absence of almost one-third
of the states. After Johnson's veto was sustained, Congress introduced another Freedmen's Bureau
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cal lists of the civil rights to be guaranteed by the national government,
including:
a) The right to make and enforce contracts;
b) The right to buy, sell, and own realty and personalty;
c) The right to sue, be parties, and give evidence; and
d) The right to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property.
150
When Professor Eugene Gressman analyzed the congressional Recon-
struction debates surrounding the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, the
Freedmen's Bills, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, he found compelling evi-
dence that the proponents of the laws believed:
[That] the opposite of slavery is freedom, that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment established that freedom by abolishing slavery, and that the freedom so
established consisted of the rights which had been denied the slaves and
which were now spelled out in the two bills. And to them the concept of
equal protection of the laws, which was so prominent in their philosophy
and in their framing of the proposals, meant an affirmative, full protection of
all the laws rather than a mere comparative equality. 51
On the other hand, opponents of the new laws sought to construe them nar-
rowly to eliminate only the master-slave relationship. 52 However, the words
of Senator Lyman Trumbull, the chief sponsor of the Thirteenth Amendment
and the Civil Rights Bills are quite clear:
Congress is bound to see thatfreedom is in fact secured to every person
throughout the land; he must be fully protected in all his rights of person
and property; and any legislation or any public sentiment which deprived
any human being in the land of those great rights of liberty will be in defi-
ance of the Constitution; and if the states and local authorities, by legislation
or otherwise, deny those rights, it is incumbent on us to see that they are
secured. 
153
Congress enacted the Fourteenth Amendment 54 because of lingering
doubts about the adequacy of the Thirteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil
Rights Act to secure former slaves their full civil rights. Gressman wrote:
Its proponents, fresh from the legislative battles of the Thirteenth
Bill and easily overrode Johnson's veto. Urofsky wrote that from then on, Reconstruction policy was
firmly under congressional control. Id. at 438.
150. See Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REv.
1323, 1326 (1952). Professor Gressman wrote: "Together, these bills effectively nationalized the civil
rights of all inhabitants of the United States, white or colored." Id. at 1326.
151. Id. at 1327.
152. Id.
153. Id. (emphasis added), citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 77 (1866). The spon-
sors of the new legislation saw it clearly as within their power and duty to affirmatively protect the
freedom of former slaves. For a comprehensive summary of the Reconstruction debates, see gener-
ally ALFRED AVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES (Virginia Comm'n on Con-
stitutional Gov't 1967).
154. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in pertinent part:
SECTION 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
SECTION 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
NATIONAL BLACK LAW JOURNAL
Amendment, the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the Freedmen's Bureau Bill,
desired to solidify their intentions. They wished, by virtue of a new constitu-
tional provision, to make certain that civil rights would be truly national-
ized, that the federal government would inject itself into this realm that had
hitherto been exclusively reserved to the states, and that all individuals
would be protected in the full and equal enjoyment of the rights of person
and property. More specifically, the provisions and implications of the 1866
act were meant to be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 5
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment granted state and national citi-
zenship to all persons born or naturalized in the U.S. It also prohibited states
from depriving persons due process of law, equal protection of the laws, or
from abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.
15 6
The Fifteenth Amendment157 was ratified in March 1870. Section 1 ex-
tended to citizens of the U.S. the right to vote without regard to race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.
1 58
After the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress exercised its
powers to enforce the Civil War amendments by appropriate legislation. First,
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1870.159 The new Act reenacted the
155. Gressman, supra note 150, at 1329.
156. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, supra note 154. The "intended" meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment has generated a volume of scholarship that has been rarely rivaled in size or disagree-
ment. For part of the story of the legislative developments and debates leading to the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see HORACE E. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT (1908), and Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill ofRights? 2
STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949). See also WILLIAM NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (Harvard
Univ. Press 1988).
157. U.S. CONST. amend. XV provided:
SECTION 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condi-
tion of servitude.
SECTION 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
158. Id.
159. 16 Stat. 140 (1870), as amended by 16 Stat. 433 (1871). The Civil Rights Act of 1870 con-
tained 23 sections. The complete Act can be found in EISENBERG, supra note 148, at 434-41. Sec-
tions 1, 2, and 6 are set out in pertinent part below:
... That all citizens of the United States who are or shall be otherwise qualified by law to
vote at any election by the people in any State, Territory, district, county, city, parish,
township, school district, municipality, or other territorial subdivision, shall be entitled and
allowed to vote at all such elections, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude; any constitution, law, custom, usage, or regulation of any State or Territory, or
by or under its authority, to the contrary notwithstanding.
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That if by or under the authority of the constitution
or laws of any State, or the laws of any Territory, any act is or shall be required to be done
as a prerequisite or qualification for voting, and by such constitution or laws persons or
officers are or shall be charged with the performance of duties in furnishing to citizens an
opportunity to perform such prerequisite, or to become qualified to vote, it shall be the duty
of every such person and officer to give to all citizens of the United States the same and
equal opportunity to perform such prerequisite, and to become qualified to vote without
distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; and if any such person or
officer shall refuse or knowingly omit to give full effect to this section, he shall, for every
such offence, forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred dollars to the person aggrieved
thereby, to be recovered by an action on the case, with full costs, and such allowance for
counsel fees as the court shall deem just, and shall also, for every such offence, be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction thereof, be fined not less than five hun-
dred dollars, or be imprisoned not less than one month and not more than one year, or both,
at the discretion of the court.
SEC. 6. And be it further enacted, That if two or more persons shall band or conspire
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Civil Rights Act of 1866, included new provisions for voting rights, and added
criminal penalties for depriving or conspiring to deprive anyone of rights
under the 1866 or 1870 Acts." Next, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act
of 187 1.161 This Act, known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, was designed to
counter the acts of the Klan and others who were committing various atroci-
ties against former slaves and their sympathizers.162 The core of the Act was
section 2, which made it illegal to "conspire together, or go in disguise upon
the public highway or upon the premises of another for the purpose ... of
depriving any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws .... 163 In addition, the person whose civil rights were violated was
given a civil cause of action against any officer who failed to protect him."
together, or go in disguise upon the public highway, or upon the premises of another, with
intent to violate any provision of this act, or to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any
citizen with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or
privilege granted or secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or
because of his having exercised the same, such persons shall be held guilty of felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be fined or imprisoned, or both, at the discretion of the court, the
fine not to exceed five thousand dollars, and the imprisonment not to exceed ten years,and
shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to, and disabled from holding, any office or place of
honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
160. Gressman, supra note 150, at 1333-34.
161. 17 Stat. 13 (1871). The Civil Rights Act of 1871 provided in pertinent part:
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured
in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding
to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the United States, with and
subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in like
cases in such courts, under the provisions of the act of the ninth of April, eighteen hundred
and sixty-six, entitled "An act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights,
and to furnish the means of their vindication"; and the other remedial laws of the United
States which are in their nature applicable in such cases.
SEC. 2. That if two or more persons within any State... shall conspire together, or go
in disguise upon the public highway or upon the premises of another for the purpose, either
directly or indirectly, of depriving any person or any class of persons of the equal protection
of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State from giving or securing to
all persons within such State the equal protection of the laws, or shall conspire together for
the purpose of in any manner impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating the due course
of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen of the United States
the due and equal protection of the laws, or to injure any person in his person or his prop-
erty for lawfully enforcing the right of any person or class of persons to the equal protection
of the laws, or by force, intimidation, or threat to prevent any citizen of the United States
lawfully entitled to vote from giving his support or advocacy in a lawful manner towards or
in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector of President or Vice-
President of the United States, or as a member of the Congress of the United States, or to
injure any such citizen in his person or property on account of such support or advocacy,
each and every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a high crime, and, upon con-
viction thereof in any district or circuit court of the United States or district or supreme
court of any Territory of the United States having jurisdiction of similar offences, shall be
punished by a fine not less than five hundred nor more than five thousand dollars, or by
imprisonment, with or without hard labor, as the court may determine, for a period of not
less than six months nor more than six years, as the court may determine, or by both such
fine and imprisonment as the court shall determine. ...
162. Gressman, supra note 150, at 1334. The atrocities included various forms of intimidation
such as maimings, lynchings, and other mob violence.
163. Id.
164. Id.
NATIONAL BLACK LAW JOURNAL
The Civil Rights Act of 1875165 was the final antidiscrimination law en-
acted in the nineteenth century. Its authors described it as "an Act to protect
all citizens in their civil and legal rights." 16 6 The Preamble stated that,
it is essential to a just government that.., we recognize the equality of all
men before the law, and hold that it is the duty of government in all its
dealings with the people to mete out equal and exact justice to all, of
whatever nativity, race, color, or persuasion, religious or political .... 167
Section 1 required all public accommodations to be open to all persons within
the jurisdiction of the U.S., subject only to legal restrictions imposed on
Whites and Blacks alike. 168 Section 2 made a violation of section 1 a misde-
meanor and gave the injured person a right to recover $500 for each offense.
In addition, the Act gave federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over cases aris-
ing under its provisions, with possible review by the U.S. Supreme Court. 69
The Civil War amendments and Reconstruction civil rights statutes are
important because, before their enactment, state and federal laws permitted
slavery and all forms of discrimination against Blacks. Also, the new laws
reflected the federal government's commitment to a new antidiscrimination
principle. However, even while Congress was enacting its legislation to aid
Blacks, the U.S. Supreme Court was rapidly construing that legislation as con-
stitutionally redundant or unconstitutional.' 70 Congress did not enact its next
165. 18 Stat. 335 (1875). The 1875 Act provided in pertinent part:
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and
equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public
conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject only
to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every
race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.
SEC. 2. That any person who shall violate the foregoing section by denying to any
citizen, except for reasons by law applicable to citizens of every race and color, and regard-
less of any previous condition of servitude, the full enjoyment of any of the accommoda-
tions, advantages, facilities, or privileges in said section enumerated, or by aiding or inciting
such denial, shall, for every such offense, forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred dollars to
the person aggrieved thereby, to be recovered in an action of debt, with full costs; and shall
also, for every such offense, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not less than five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, or
shall be imprisoned not less than thirty days nor more than one year: Provided, That all
persons may elect to sue for the penalty aforesaid or to proceed under their rights at com-
mon law and by State statutes; and having so elected to proceed in the one mode or the
other, their right to proceed in the other jurisdiction shall be barred. But this proviso shall
not apply to criminal proceedings, either under this act or the criminal law of any State:
And provided further, That a judgment for the penalty in favor of the party aggrieved, or a
judgment upon an indictment, shall be a bar to either prosecution respectively.
166. Id.
167. Id. See also Gressman, supra note 150, at 1334-35.
168. See supra note 165.
169. Id.
170. In the Slaughter-House cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied only to rights of
national citizenship and did not comprehend any of the fundamental rights of the individual. Those
rights, according to Justice Miller, related only to state citizenship. For Justice Miller, rights of
national citizenship included the right to travel to the national seat of government, the right to sue in
federal courts, and the right to protection on the high seas or abroad. Id. at 79. The Court has never
overruled Slaughter-House. The decision mocks congressional efforts to nationalize protection of the
basic civil rights of former slaves.
Several other opinions of the Court following the rationale of Slaughter-House specifically under-
mined the Civil Rights Acts of 1870, 1871, and 1875. In U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 548-55
(1876), the Court applied the theory of Slaughter-House to an alleged violation of two Blacks' rights
to assemble. The Court held that unless the purpose of the assembly had some connection to the
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civil rights laws to redress racial discrimination until the late 1950's and
1960's during the second Reconstruction. 171 The first Reconstruction was not
color-blind. Congress enacted a series of laws designed to ensure that Blacks
would enjoy the same rights as Whites. The Reconstruction laws defined na-
tional rights in terms of those enjoyed by Whites.
PART III
THE EVOLUTION OF THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE IN
RACE JURISPRUDENCE
Although Congress acted boldly to protect the civil rights of all citizens
by placing those rights under national protection, its efforts were thwarted,
undermined, and ultimately perverted by interests within Congress, by the
United States Supreme Court, and by citizens who refused to obey the Consti-
tution and federal law. 172 Despite the herculean efforts by Congress to eradi-
cate racial inequality, the racial history between Blacks and Whites in the
United States after 1877 continued in its familiar pattern. At least one reason
person's relationship to the federal government, such as to petition the government for redress of
grievances, the Civil Rights Act of 1870 provided no relief. Therefore, the Court essentially held that
the right to assemble was not one of the privileges and immunities of national citizenship. What the
Court had done three years earlier to the Fourteenth Amendment, it had now repeated with the civil
rights statutes. The Cruikshank opinion went further and held that the Fourteenth Amendment gave
the national government power only to see that states did not deny their citizens equality of rights.
The Court therefore further restricted the Fourteenth Amendment to "state" action. The Court set
out the state action doctrine again three years later in Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879). By
reading a "state" action requirement into the civil rights statutes, the Court made it virtually impossi-
ble to use the civil rights acts to prosecute private individuals who most often violated the rights of
former slaves. See also U.S. v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882) (where the Court concluded that the
conspiracy section of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 was void).
The U.S. Supreme Court delivered its greatest blow to the civil rights laws in The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). There the Court invalidated the first two sections of the Civil Rights Act of
1875, which outlawed discrimination in public accommodations. Again, extending the reasoning of
Slaughter- House, the Court held that because the provisions were directed at private individuals and
not the state or its agents, the provisions were unconstitutional. Essentially, the Court concluded that
private discrimination was beyond the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore also be-
yond the scope of laws that were derived from the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court specifically
concluded that the fifth section of the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress power to correct the
effects of state laws that violated the first section of the amendment. Id. at 3, 9-24. Justice John
Harlan, presenting the lone dissent, wrote, "I cannot resist the conclusion that the substance and
spirit of the recent [Civil War] Amendments of the Constitution have been sacrificed by a subtle and
ingenious verbal criticism." Id. at 24-27 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
171. The first Reconstruction ended abruptly after the Hayes-Tilden compromise of 1877. In the
presidential election of 1876, Democrat Tilden appeared to win the election by the narrowest of
margins. Hayes and the Republicans challenged the election returns in Florida, South Carolina, and
Louisiana. Pursuant to the Constitution, the House of Representatives took up the election dispute.
The House, unable to resolve the dispute, adopted a special resolution establishing a committee to
decide who should become President. There were eight Republicans and seven Democrats on the
committee. They voted by party affiliation, so Hayes was selected President. As the quidpro quo for
the presidency, Hayes and the Republicans agreed to withdraw all remaining federal troops from the
South and to restore home rule. For an analysis of the Compromise of 1877, see FONER, supra note
144, at 575-85. See also DuBois, supra note 143.
The second Reconstruction occurred during the late 1950's and 1960's. It included passage of
the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964, the Voting Rights Acts of 1965 and 1970 and the Fair
Housing Act of 1968. For a comprehensive treatment of each statute, see BELL, RACE, RACISM AND
AMERICAN LAW, supra note 1, at 200-12 and 719-38.
172. Derrick Bell has described the enforcement efforts of Congress and the Court as cyclical,
with periods of apparent progress and reform followed by periods of greater repression. BELL, RACE,
RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 1, at 6-7.
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for the failure of the Civil War amendments and civil rights legislation enacted
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is that Blacks had to turn to Whites
for protection against White supremacy and racial subordination.
17 3
In 1877, Whites running the national government sacrificed the rights of
Blacks once again. 74 And, after the Supreme Court decided The Civil Rights
Cases in 1883, state legislatures had full discretion over the civil rights of
Blacks. One after another, most states, both North and South, extended
laws175 designed to control Blacks into a system that required separation of
Blacks and Whites in virtually every conceivable aspect of life.' 6 The U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of state laws mandating racial
separation in Plessy v. Ferguson.177 The Plessy opinions provided both the
doctrine of "separate, but equal" and the doctrine of colorblindness. There-
fore, to understand the evolution of the modern antidiscrimination principle,
one must examine Plessy and its progeny.
173. See GENOVESE, supra note 67, at 48-49.
174. See COMER VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (Oxford Univ. Press
1974). He wrote:
The phase that began in 1877 was inaugurated by the withdrawal of federal troops
from the South, the abandonment of the Negro as a ward of the nation, the giving up of the
attempt to guarantee the freedman his civil and political equality, and the acquiescence of
the rest of the country in the South's demand that the whole problem be left to the disposi-
tion of the dominant Southern white people. What the new status of the Negro would be
was not at once apparent, nor were the Southern white people themselves so united on that
subject at first as has been generally assumed. The determination of the Negro's 'place' took
shape gradually under the influence of economic and political conflicts among divided white
people conflicts that were eventually resolved in part at the expense of the Negro. In the
early years of the twentieth century, it was becoming clear that the Negro would be effec-
tively disfranchised throughout the South, that he would be firmly relegated to the lower
rungs of the economic ladder, and that neither equality nor aspirations for equality in any
department of life were for him.
Id. at 6-7.
175. Woodward wrote that the Jim Crow laws enacted in the late nineteenth century:
constituted the most elaborate and formal expression of sovereign white opinion upon the
subject. In bulk and detail as well as in effectiveness of enforcement the segregation codes
were comparable with the black codes of the old regime, though the laxity that mitigated
the harshness of the black codes was replaced by a rigidity that was more typical of the
segregation code. That code lent the sanction of law to a racial ostracism that extended to
churches and schools, to housing and jobs, to eating and drinking. Whether by law or by
custom, that ostracism extended to virtually all forms of public transportation, to sports and
recreations, to hospitals, orphanages, prisons, and asylums, and ultimately to funeral
homes, morgues, and cemeteries.
Id. at 7. The racial separation was not limited to the South. In the North, Woodward wrote:
... [T]he Northern Negro was made painfully and constantly aware that he lived in a
society dedicated to the doctrine of white supremacy and Negro inferiority. The major
political parties, whatever their position on slavery, vied with each other in their devotion to
this doctrine, and extremely few politicians of importance dared question them. Their con-
stituencies firmly believed that the Negroes were incapable of being assimilated politically,
socially, or physically into white society. They made sure in numerous ways that the Negro
understood his 'place' and that he was severely confined to it. One of these ways was segre-
gation, and with the backing of legal and extra-legal codes, the system permeated all aspects
of Negro life in the free states by 1860.
Id. at 18. See also LEON LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES 1790-
1860 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1961), and FRANKLIN, supra note 53, at 324-44.
176. Perhaps the greatest irony in the racial history between Blacks and Whites in the United
States is that Blacks have had to turn to Whites for protection against and relief from White
supremacy and racial subordination. This fact certainly explains in part why three constitutional
amendments and a half dozen federal statutes failed to eradicate White supremacy and racial subordi-
nation. See GENOVESE, supra note 67, at 48-49.
177. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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1. The Doctrine of Colorblindness
In 1896, Homer Plessy challenged the constitutionality of a Louisiana
statute requiring separate railway cars for Whites and Blacks on grounds that
it violated his rights under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
17 8
Plessy alleged that he was entitled to every right, privilege, and immunity se-
cured to citizens of the United States of the White race. 179
The Court rejected both constitutional challenges. Justice Brown wrote
that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited only slavery and involuntary ser-
vitude. But, he continued:
A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the White and
colored races a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races,
and which must always exist so long as White men are distinguished from
the other race by color has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the
two races, or re-establish a state of involuntary servitude.
180
Justice Brown also rejected the Fourteenth Amendment challenge. He
noted the existence of separate schools for Blacks and Whites in the District of
Columbia and in various states, and state laws forbidding interracial marriage
as one form of evidence of his separate but equal philosophy. He concluded:
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equal-
ity of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not
have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce
social, as distinguished from political, equality or a commingling of the two
races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.
81
For the majority then, state segregation laws were within a state legisla-
ture's police power. The Court later repudiated the majority opinion. 82 Yet,
it remains important for its validation of racial superiority. The Court was
aware of color and accepted racial subordination as permissible under the
Civil War amendments.
Justice John M. Harlan was the lone dissenter.1 83 He argued that the
Thirteenth Amendment not only struck down slavery, but also prohibited any
burden or disability that constituted a badge of slavery or servitude.18 4 He
said, when joined with the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of citizenship,
"the two amendments, if enforced according to their true intent and meaning,
will protect all the civil rights that pertain to freedom and citizenship." ' 5
178. Under the Louisiana statute all railway companies had to provide equal but separate accom-
modations for Whites and Blacks or to partition a single coach. The conductor directed persons to
the proper area. Failure to comply with the conductor's order was punishable by a fine of $25 or
imprisonment for not more than 20 days. If the conductor assigned a passenger to the wrong com-
partment, the conductor could be fined $25 or imprisoned for 20 days. The conductor could refuse to
carry a passenger who refused to follow his order without any risk of liability to the conductor or the
railway company. Id. at 540-41.
179. Plessy was apparently seven-eighths Caucasian blood and one-eighth African blood. He
claimed that his mixture of African blood was not discernible. He therefore took a vacant seat in the
coach for Whites. After he refused an order to move, Plessy was forcibly ejected and arrested. Id. at
541.
180. Id. at 543.
181. Id. at 544.
182. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and infra note 206.
183. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552-64 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 555.
185. Id. at 555. Justice Harlan continued by saying that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth Amendments removed the race line from our government systems. He said:
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Justice Harlan argued that while the language of the Fourteenth Amendment
was prohibitory, it also contained:
a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the
colored-race the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against
them distinctively as colored-exemptions from legal discriminations, im-
plying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of
the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps toward
reducing them to the condition of a subject race.'
86
Justice Harlan next wrote:
[T]he Constitution of the United States, in its present form, forbids, so far as
civil and political rights are concerned, discrimination by the general gov-
ernment or the states against any citizen because of his race. All citizens are
equal before the law. i"'
The sure guaranty of the peace and security of each race is the clear, distinct,
unconditional recognition by our governments, national and state, of every
right that inheres in civil freedom, and of the equality before the law of all
citizens of the United States without regard to race.18s
Justice Harlan argued that the Constitution mandated that the races be
equal before the law. Yet Justice Harlan knew that even after the adoption of
the Civil War amendments, Blacks were not the equals of Whites, especially if
states such as Louisiana could adopt statutes that subordinated Blacks to
Whites. And, under that reading, Justice Harlan's colorblindness principle is
inapposite where racial classifications do not promote subordination. Justice
Harlan clearly believed that the Louisiana law was unconstitutional because it
implied the inferiority of Blacks and the supremacy of Whites. His dissent in
Plessy should be read in the context within which it was written."8 9
They had, as this court has said, a common purpose, namely, to secure "to a race recently
emancipated, a race that through many generations have [sic] been held in slavery, all the
civil rights that the superior race enjoy." They declared, in legal effect, this court has fur-
ther said, "that the law in the states shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all
persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before laws of the states, and, in regard
to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no
discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color."
Id. at 555-56 (citations omitted).
186. Id. at 556. The quoted language provides an, interesting context for interpreting Justice
Harlan's assertion that our Constitution is color-blind. Justice Harlan was concerned about racial
subordination and laws which implied inferiority of Blacks. Similar language is quoted in Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880).
187. Id. at 556. In the context of the facts in Plessy, Justice Harlan must have meant that Louisi-
ana could not enforce its statute because the statute violated the constitutional rights of Black citizens
to occupy the same public conveyance as Whites, if they chose to do so. However, if one removes
Justice Harlan's statements from their context, they seem to establish a universal constitutional color-
blindness standard. The Author argues that legal commentators and jurists have transformed Justice
Harlan's dissent into a broad antidiscrimination principle that prevents the achievement of racial
equality.
188. Id. at 560.
189. For additional support for the view that Justice Harlan was concerned about racial subordi-
nation, see his dissent in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 35 (1883). Justice Harlan wrote:
But I hold that since slavery, as the Court has repeatedly declared .... was the moving or
principal cause of the adoption of [the Thirteenth Amendment], and since that institution
rested wholly upon the inferiority, as a race, of those held in bondage, their freedom neces-
sarily involved immunity from and protection against, all discrimination against them, be-
cause of their race, in respect of such civil rights as belong to freemen of other races.
Congress, therefore, under its express power to enforce that amendment, by appropriate
legislation, may enact laws to protect that people against the deprivation, because of their
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Sixty-five years later19 ° Justice Douglas cited Justice Harlan's dissent
from Plessy in Garner v. Louisiana,1 91 to argue that Louisiana could not en-
force a breach of the peace statute against Blacks who conducted sit-ins to
protest their exclusion from lunch counters at local businesses. 92 The major-
ity reversed the convictions on the grounds that they were so devoid of eviden-
tiary support as to render the convictions unconstitutional under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 193 The Court found that
under Louisiana law, the breach of the peace statute could not be applied
constitutionally to the peaceful conduct of the students.1 94 Justice Douglas
concurred with the majority's reversal of the students' convictions; however,
he thought that the Court should have decided the merits of the Fourteenth
Amendment constitutional issues.
195
Justice Douglas summarized the scope of Louisiana's deep-seated pattern
of segregation. 196 He wrote:
Louisiana requires that all circuses, shows, and tent exhibitions to
which the public is invited have one entrance for Whites and one for Ne-
groes. La. Rev. Stat., 1950, § 4:5. No dancing, social functions, entertain-
ment, athletic training, games, sports, contests "and other such activities
involving personal and social contacts" may be open to both races. § 4:451
(1960 Supp). Any public entertainment or athletic contest must provide sep-
arate seating arrangements and separate sanitary drinking water and "any
other facilities" for the two races. § 4:452 (1960 Supp). Marriage between
members of the two races is banned. § 14:79. Segregation by race is re-
quired in prisons. § 15:752. The blind must be segregated. § 17:10. Teach-
ers in public schools are barred from advocating desegregation of the races
in the public school system. §§ 17:443, 17:462. So are other state employ-
ees. § 17:523. Segregation on trains is required. §§ 45:528-45:532. Com-
mon carriers of passengers must provide separate waiting rooms and
reception room facilities for the two races (§ 45:1301 (1960 Supp)) and sepa-
rate toilets and separate facilities for drinking water as well. § 45:1303 (1960
Supp). Employers must provide separate sanitary facilities for the two races.
§ 23:971 (1960 Supp.). Employers must also provide eating places in sepa-
rate rooms and separate eating and drinking utensils for members of the two
races. § 23:972 (1960 Supp). Persons of one race may not establish their
residence in a community of another race without approval of the majority
of the other race. § 33:5066. Court dockets must reveal the race of the par-
ties in divorce actions. § 13:917. And all public parks, recreation centers,
race, of any civil rights granted to other freemen in the same State, and such legislation may
be of a direct and primary character ....
190. After the Plessy decision upholding the doctrine of separate but equal, the United States
became more rigidly segregated. In the South, much of the segregation was mandated by statute. In
the North, racial separation was the product of public and private choices to segregate. Professor
Woodward has described in detail the extension of racial segregation by statute in the South. See
WOODWARD, supra note 174, at 67-109. For a recent historical essay on segregation in the North,
see DONALD G. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER, 1776 TO THE PRESENT 114-47 (Oxford Univ. Press 1991).
191. 368 U.S. 157 (1960) (Douglas, J., concurring). Garner is also significant because it reflects
the extent to which some states mandated racial segregation as late as the 1960's. I set forth the
Louisiana statute in full to illustrate how far-reaching segregation was only three decades ago.
192. Id. at 176. Justice Douglas noted the irony that Louisiana had restated its policy of segrega-
tion of the races as late as 1960, even though Plessy had been overruled six years previously.
193. Id. at 163.
194. Id. at 174.
195. Id. at 177.
196. Id. at 179-81.
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playgrounds, community centers and "other such facilities at which swim-
ming, dancing, golfing, skating or other recreational activities are con-
ducted" must be segregated. § 33:4558.1 (1960 Supp).
197
Thus in Louisiana in 1960 (and many other states), the race-line was alive and
well. Justice Douglas argued that restaurants were businesses "affected with a
public interest." 198 He wrote:
Those that license enterprises for public use should not have under our Con-
stitution the power to License it [sic] for the use of only one race. For there
is an overriding constitutional requirement that all state power be exercised
so as not to deny equal protection to any group. As the first Mr. Justice
Harlan stated... in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is
in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no
caste. Our Constitution is color-blind ....
Justice Douglas made it clear that he believed racial segregation in public res-
taurants was unconstitutional because it implied White superiority and caste.
State policies could support neither under his view of the Constitution."°°
When Justice Douglas referenced Justice Harlan's colorblindness model, he
was following his predecessor's meaning in applying that model to yet another
case where the government by statute subordinated the civil rights of Blacks to
Whites.
One can infer the same meaning from Justice Goldberg's concurring
opinion in Bell v. Maryland.01 Justice Goldberg wrote:
The historical evidence amply supports the conclusion of the Government,
stated by the Solicitor General in this court, that: "it is an inescapable infer-
ence that Congress, in recommending the Fourteenth Amendment, expected
to remove the disabilities barring Negroes from the public conveyances and
places of public accommodation with which they were familiar, and thus to
assure Negroes an equal right to enjoy these aspects of the public life of the
community.
202
Justice Goldberg said that he believed the Constitution guaranteed all Ameri-
cans the right to be treated as equal members of the community with respect
to public accommodations, 203 and denial of access to Blacks solely because of
their race did not do justice to a constitution "which is colorblind." 2  Justice
Goldberg wrote: "The denial of the constitutional right of Negroes to access
to places of public accommodation would perpetuate a caste system in the
United States.1205 Justice Goldberg, like Justice Harlan in Plessy and Justice
Douglas in Garner, used the doctrine of colorblindness to mean that Maryland
197. Id. (emphasis added).
198. Id. at 183.
199. Id. at 185.
200. Id. Interestingly, Justice Douglas noted that he thought retail stores not licensed by the
municipality might stand on different footing.
201. 378 U.S. 226 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring). In Bell, a dozen Black students refused to
leave a restaurant in the City of Baltimore after they were refused service solely on the basis of their
color. The students were arrested for violation of a criminal trespass law. They were convicted.
While the case was on review to the U.S. Supreme Court, Maryland abolished the criminal trespass
statute under which the petitioners had been convicted. Justice Brennan, writing for five members of
the Court, reversed the convictions and remanded the case to the state court to determine the effect of
the supervening change in state law.
202. Id. at 290 (emphasis added).
203. Id. at 286.
204. Id. at 288.
205. Id.
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could not perpetuate the racial subordination of Blacks by excluding Blacks
from public accommodations. Both Garner and Bell were analogous to Plessy
because state laws operated in a manner that implied the inferiority of Blacks,
denied them rights that Whites enjoyed, and reduced them to the condition of
a subject race.
The same scenario of racial subordination was present in most of the
school desegregation cases. 20 6 A representative case is Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education.207 In a unanimous opinion, Chief Justice
Burger summarized the duties of school authorities in light of Brown 108 The
Court held that when school authorities did not proffer acceptable remedies to
eliminate segregated schools, the district court had broad power to fashion a
remedy that would assure a unitary school system.209 Chief Justice Burger
wrote:
In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by
equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a prac-
tical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and
reconciling public and private needs. These cases call for the exercise of
these traditional attributes of equity power. At stake is the personal interest
of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a
nondiscriminatory basis. To effectuate this interest may call for elimination
of a variety of obstacles in making the transition to school systems operated
206. The landmark school desegregation case was Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
[hereinafter Brown 1]. In Brown I, the Court had before it the century-old practice of state-mandated
segregation in public schools. The Court consolidated cases from Delaware, Kansas, South Carolina,
and Virginia in order to determine whether state-sponsored segregation violated the Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection rights of Black school children. With the exception of the lower court
in Delaware, the other trial courts had ruled that there was no constitutional violation in light of the
separate but equal doctrine announced in Plessy.
The U.S. Supreme Court overruled Plessy and framed the issue as follows:
Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the
physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of the
minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.
To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs
[have been] deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id. at 493-95.
Brown I and its progeny can be read to mandate an end to the racial subordination of Blacks and
to permit government to take affirmative steps to eliminate racial subordination.
207. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). In Swann, the Court addressed the scope of the equitable powers of lower
federal courts to eliminate all vestiges of state-sponsored segregation in public schools. Specifically,
the Court determined that the lower federal courts had broad remedial powers over student and
teacher assignment policies. As for student assignments, the Court said that lower federal courts had
the power to use racial balance or racial quotas, to rearrange attendance zones, and to use transporta-
tion to correct state-enforced racial segregation. The Court did not say that every school in every
community must always reflect the racial composition of the school system as a whole. But it did
state that school authorities had an affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to
convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch. Id.
at 15. And, if they fail and a constitutional violation is found, "a district court has broad power to
fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary system." Id. at 12-13 and 17.
208. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (describing the
equitable powers of the district courts and the duties of the school authorities) [hereinafter Brown ].
209. Swann, 402 U.S. at 12-13.
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in accordance with the constitutional principles set forth in our May 17,
1954, decision. Courts of equity may properly take into account the public
interest in the elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective
manner. But it should go without saying that the vitality of these constitu-
tional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement
with them.=210
Swann stands for the theory expressed in the opinions noted above in
Plessy, Brown, Garner, and Bell. Segregated schools placed Black school chil-
dren in a position inferior to Whites. Segregation implied the inferiority of the
Black children. The district court had the power and duty to act affirmatively
to correct the constitutional violation of school authorities who failed to elimi-
nate state-sponsored segregated schools. To accomplish its duty, the district
court could, consistent with this version of the doctrine of colorblindness, use
temporary racial quotas in both student and teacher assignments, rearrange
attendance zones, and require busing.
That the Supreme Court thought such orders were consistent with the
meaning of colorblindness is apparent from the Court's opinion in Swann. In
Davis v. School Comm'rs of Mobile County,2 11 the companion case to Swann,
school authorities had argued that teachers had to be assigned on a "color-
blind" basis without regard to race. The Supreme Court rejected this argu-
ment and found that the lower court had properly ordered faculty and staff
desegregation.212
Each type of remedy approved in Swann and Davis was essentially affirm-
ative action designed to give Black school children the equal educational op-
portunities that were promised in Brown I. Swann and Davis illustrate that up
to 1971 the Court applied the colorblindness model in a fashion which re-
quired the state to take steps to eliminate the racial subordination of Blacks
caused by segregated public schools.
2. The Transformation of the Doctrine of Colorblindness
Between 1971 and 1978 the U.S. Supreme Court redefined the meaning of
constitutional colorblindness. The Court accomplished that result by shifting
its analytical focus away from the racial subordination of Blacks and placing
its focus instead on the intent or purpose of the government policy. If the
Court had applied the same analytical framework in the initial school desegre-
gation cases such as Brown and Swann, the plaintiffs would have probably lost
because it is extremely difficult to prove an intentional discriminatory purpose.
While it is difficult to point to a single case, Washington v. Davis213 was a
pivotal case in this transformation. After Washington plaintiffs had to prove
evidence of intent to discriminate in order to prevail in race discrimination
210. Id. at 12-13, quoting Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299-300 (emphasis added).
211. 402 U.S. 33 (1971).
212. Swann, 402 U.S. at 19. See also Davis, 402 U.S. at 35.
213. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In Washington, Black applicants for the District of Columbia Police
Department challenged the constitutionality of the verbal ability test required of applicants. Blacks
failed the test at a rate four times the rate of failure for Whites. The plaintiffs claimed that such a
disproportionate or "disparate" impact was unconstitutional. The Court held that only official con-
duct having a discriminatory purpose violates the Equal Protection Clause. Justice White, writing for
the majority, said that standing alone, disparate impact does not trigger the strictest judicial scrutiny.
Therefore, the fact that Blacks scored substantially lower on the verbal test than Whites did not make
it unconstitutional.
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suits. It would no longer be sufficient to show racial subordination from dis-
parate impact alone.
214
The Court in Washington did not explain why, in light of the racial his-
tory in the United States, to say nothing of all the prior cases based upon a
different assumption, the burden of proving nondiscrimination was not placed
on the defendant. Instead, the opinion reads as if in 1976 a majority of the
Court decided that our history of racial subordination and discrimination was
so remote or speculative that Black plaintiffs would have to prove that White
defendants actually intended to subordinate them. In sharp contrast, in 1954,
the Brown Court simply declared that school segregation was inherently un-
constitutional because it subordinated Black school children. Washington v.
Davis, then, can aptly represent the turning point in the Court's race jurispru-
dence and its use of the colorblindness model.
Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke2" 5 was the next decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court to expound upon this new doctrine of colorblindness.
Historically, the case is remarkable for several reasons. First, in all the
Supreme Court's prior colorblindness cases, the plaintiffs were Blacks who
protested state-sponsored segregation in railroads, public accommodations, or
public schools. Bakke was the first Supreme Court decision to apply the doc-
trine of colorblindness on behalf of a White plaintiff. Second, Allan Bakke did
not claim that the University of California-Davis' admissions policies
subordinated or stigmatized him, or that they suggested his inferiority. But in
Plessy, Garner, Bell, and Swann each of the Black plaintiffs had claimed that
state-sponsored segregation subordinated Blacks and treated them as the in-
feriors of Whites. Therefore, in Bakke the Court departed from its prior use
of the colorblindness model.
Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court.21 6 He then ex-
plained that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited racial
discrimination in any program receiving federal funds, proscribed only racial
classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
214. Washington has been critiqued extensively. See, eg., Brest, supra note 14, at 24-52.
215. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Bakke, a White male, challenged the Davis Medical School's admis-
sions policy, which set aside 16 of its 100 seats in the entering class for members of certain racial
minorities. Anyone could qualify for the other 84 spots. After being denied admission for two con-
secutive years, Bakke challenged the special admissions program as a violation of his rights under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court split into two camps
with Justice Powell serving as the critical vote for each camp. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Blackmun were on one side. On the other side were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart,
Stevens, and Rehnquist. Two 5-4 decisions emerged from the six opinions in Bakke: (1) The Davis
admissions program was found constitutionally invalid and Bakke was ordered admitted, and (2) race
could be considered along with other "diversity" factors in making admissions decisions, but it could
not be the sole factor.
216. Id. at 271-72. Justice Powell wrote:
For the reasons stated in the following opinion, I believe that so much of the judgment
of the California court as holds petitioner's special admissions program unlawful and directs
that respondent be admitted to the Medical School must be affirmed. For the reasons ex-
pressed in a separate opinion, my Brothers The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr.
Justice Rehnquist, and Mr. Justice Stevens concur in this judgment.
I also conclude for the reasons stated in the following opinion that the portion of the
court's judgment enjoining petitioner from according any consideration to race in its admis-
sions process must be reversed. For reasons expressed in separate opinions, my Brothers
Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice Blackmun
concur in this judgment.
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teenth Amendment or the equal protection component of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.2" 7 Justice Powell next discussed the appro-
priate standard of review for a case like Bakke. He wrote, "The guarantee of
equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and
something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are not
accorded the same protection, then it is not equal." '218 After defining equal
protection, Justice Powell wrote, "[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the
civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say
that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.
219
After reaffirming that any racial classification requires the most exacting
judicial scrutiny, Justice Powell explained how the reach of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause had been expanded beyond the protection of former slaves to all
ethnic groups seeking protection from state-sponsored discrimination. He
said:
During the dormancy of the Equal Protection Clause, the United States had
become a Nation of minorities. Each had to struggle and to some extent
struggles still to overcome the prejudices not of a monolithic majority, but of
a "majority" composed of various minority groups of whom it was said per-
haps unfairly in many cases that a shared characteristic was a willingness to
disadvantage other groups. As the Nation filled with the stock of many
lands, the reach of the Clause was gradually extended to all ethnic groups
seeking protection from official discrimination.
220
To support his argument, Justice Powell cited language from cases between
1880 and 1954 in which the Court applied the Equal Protection Clause to
Irish, Chinese, Austrian, Japanese, and Mexican-Americans. Justice Powell
thereby introduced the concept of ethnic fungibility into equal protection ju-
risprudence. For Justice Powell, Blacks were simply one of many minorities
in the U.S. struggling against discrimination.
Justice Powell's view is the now familiar version of the racial history of
the United States. It not only minimizes the reality of racial subordination of
Blacks by Whites, but it is quite inconsistent with the specific history of racial
subordination between Blacks and Whites outlined in Part II of this article.
Justice Powell's allusion to immigration in the U.S. seems especially curious in
217. Id. at 287.
218. Id. at 289-90.
219. Id. at 291. To trace the development of the levels of scrutiny reflected in modem race cases
one has to go back at least to 1938 when the Court decided United States v. Carolene Products, 304
U.S. 144 (1938). In a now famous footnote, Id. at 152 n.4, Justice Stone wrote that the presumption
of constitutionality that applied to legislation adopted to achieve public health concerns might have a
narrower scope of operation when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of
the Constitution or when the legislation is directed at particular religious, national, or racial minori-
ties. Id. Justice Stone implied that such legislation may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry. Id.
Six years later in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), Justice Black said for the
Court, "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately
suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that Courts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny." Id. at 216.
The Court has stated that under the strict scrutiny test a government practice or statute which
restricts "fundamental rights" or which contains "suspect classifications" is subject to "strict scru-
tiny" and can be justified only if no less restrictive alternative is available. San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
220. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 292.
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a case such as Bakke: It is as if Justice Powell believed that White males such
as Bakke had experienced a history of racial discrimination similar to that of
Blacks, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Islanders, or Mexican-Americans.
Justice Powell did not stop with his ethnic fungibility theory. He wrote
that:
Because the landmark decisions in this area arose in response to the contin-
ued exclusion of Negroes from the mainstream of American society, they
could be characterized as involving discrimination by the "majority" white
race against the Negro minority. But they need not be read as depending
upon that characterization for their results. It suffices to say that "[o]ver the
years, this Court has consistently repudiated '[d]istinctions between citizens
solely because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to a free people whose insti-
tutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.' ,,221
The clock of our liberties, however, cannot be turned back to 1868.222
It is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all persons
permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection
greater than that accorded others. "The Fourteenth Amendment is not di-
rected solely against discrimination due to a 'two-class theory' that is, based
upon differences between 'white' and Negro.",
223
Justice Powell suggested that much racial discrimination against Blacks was
too remote to remedy. Although he said the Fourteenth Amendment arose in
response to the racial subordination of Blacks by Whites, he said the subse-
quent landmark decisions interpreting that amendment did not depend on the
existence of racial subordination for their results.
Justice Powell ignored the facts of racial subordination in the
"landmark" cases to which he referred, and, instead, articulated the new prin-
ciple that distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry were
odious to the doctrine of equality. Thus, in a series of curious phrases Justice
Powell redefined equality to prohibit distinctions based on ancestry. And,
since the colorblindness model is derived from the doctrine of equality, Justice
Powell also transformed the meaning of colorblindness.
There is other evidence in Justice Powell's opinion to support my view of
his redefinition of equality and colorblindness. He also wrote that the Equal
Protection Clause would no longer permit the recognition of "special wards."
Powell's language is quite similar to that used by Justice Bradley in The Civil
Rights Cases,224 who wrote:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent
legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there
must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of
a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his
rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes by
which other men's rights are protected.
Justice Powell's return to Justice Bradley's "no special ward" language is sur-
prising, especially since it is apparent that Justice Bradley did not define equal-
ity or colorblindness the way Justice Harlan did. (Justice Harlan was the lone
221. Id. at 294.
222. Id. at 295.
223. Id. at 294-95.
224. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24-27.
225. Id. (emphasis added).
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dissenter in The Civil Rights Cases and thought it outrageous for Justice Brad-
ley to refer to Blacks as special wards of the law.)
Justice Powell also undervalued the significance of racial subordination in
the Court's prior equal protection decisions. He wrote:
In the view of Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice
Marshall, and Mr. Justice Blackmun, the pliable notion of "stigma" is the
crucial element in analyzing racial classifications.... The Equal Protection
Clause is not framed in terms of "stigma." Certainly the word has no clearly
defined constitutional meaning. It reflects a subjective judgment that is
standardless. All state-imposed classifications that rearrange burdens and
benefits on the basis of race are likely to be viewed with deep resentment by
the individuals burdened. The denial to innocent persons of equal rights and
opportunities may outrage those so deprived and therefore may be perceived
as invidious. These individuals are likely to find little comfort in the notion
that the deprivation they are asked to endure is merely the price of member-
ship in the dominant majority and that its imposition is inspired by the sup-
posedly benign purpose of aiding others. One should not lightly dismiss the
inherent unfairness of, and the perception of mistreatment that accompanies,
a system of allocating benefits and privileges on the basis of skin color and
ethnic origin.... 226
Again, Justice Powell wrote as if the Court had never decided Brown, Garner,
Bell, or Swann. In each of those cases the Court focused on racial subordina-
tion, stigma, and inferiority. In Bakke, Justice Powell wanted us to believe
that those cases were different because they involved clear constitutional viola-
tions of the rights of Blacks. Justice Powell said there was no history of dis-
crimination by the University of California-Davis other than "societal
discrimination."227
Justice Powell also introduced the concept of White innocence into the
doctrine of colorblindness. But Justice Powell does not explain why White
innocence was not an issue in Brown, Swann, Garner, or Bell. The White
parents and students in the school desegregation cases were arguably "inno-
cent." So were the restaurant patrons in Bell and Garner. Yet the Court in
those cases asserted that equality in educational opportunities and in public
accommodations meant that the White political majority could not
subordinate the Black political minority.
For Justice Powell, Allan Bakke was an innocent person.22 s Justice Pow-
ell wrote, "there is a measure of inequity in forcing innocent persons in re-
226. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295 n.34 (citations omitted).
227. IdL at 307. Justice Powell's use of the term "societal discrimination" is peculiar. It is often
used to describe past treatment of groups by political majorities. The Supreme Court has used the
term to describe how Blacks and women, for example, have been treated historically. For Justice
Powell, societal discrimination was an amorphous conception of injury that might be ageless in its
reach into the past.
In recent race cases, the Court has concluded that plaintiffs must prove individual discrimination
by an identifiable perpetrator in order to prevail. See infra notes 263 to 289 and accompanying text.
228. Justice Powell seemed to understand "White innocence" in the most narrow way. The argu-
ment sometimes offered is that White people living today did not own slaves. Yet, racial subordina-
tion is much more complex than who owned former slaves. It has more today to do with the wages
paid to racial minorities, the educational opportunities available to racial minorities, or the ways in
which the political majority (most often Whites) allocates public resources for services such as
schools, roads, water, or sewage. I reject the concept of innocence because it is clear that political
majorities most often act to benefit themselves to the greatest extent, and in the U.S. those majorities
are Whites.
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spondent's position to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their
making." '229 A close reading of Powell's opinion suggests that if the Univer-
sity of California had operated a dual system of segregated colleges, his opin-
ion might have been more consistent with Brown. But, who in Bakke would
have made a dual system argument? Certainly neither the University of Cali-
fornia nor Allan Bakke would have. That suggests to this Author that cases
such as Bakke should be decided under a different jurisprudential standard.23 °
Ultimately, one must wonder what Justice Powell believed because he
concluded that race "may be deemed a 'plus' in a particular applicant's
file."'2 31 Justice Powell supported diversity admissions programs that would
compare all applicants to each other for all available seats. He wrote:
Such [diversity] qualities could include exceptional personal talents, unique
work or service experience, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated
compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate
with the poor, or other qualifications deemed important. In short, an admis-
sions program operated in this way is flexible enough to consider all perti-
nent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each
applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration, although
not necessarily according them the same weight.232
For Justice Powell, diversity admissions programs were constitutional because
they treated every applicant as an individual with fungible subjective qualities.
Therefore, a candidate would never be rejected under a diversity plan solely
because of race. And, good faith by the admissions committees would be pre-
sumed, absent a showing to the contrary.233
Justice Powell did not use the term "colorblindness" in his opinion. In-
stead, he used the term "equality" and redefined it in a way that would permit
government to use race as one of many factors in allocating benefits and
burdens.234
229. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298. Justice Powell failed to understand that someone bears the burden
of our society's racial subordination. And he did not explain why someone in Bakke's position should
be exempt from bearing some portion of the burden. The fact is Bakke did not bear a burden greater
than the burden of a Black applicant who under U.C. Davis' admissions policies had virtually zero
chance of gaining one of the 84 "open" seats in the first year class. Davis' admissions policies favored
Allan Bakke because he had the kind of credentials sought in applicants.
Bakke is an excellent example of government's use of race-neutral criteria that clearly subordi-
nates Blacks and other minorities. When selecting its admissions criteria, U.C.-Davis knew or should
have known that virtually no Blacks would meet them. The result is that Blacks remain closed out of
many professions under the guise of colorblindness.
230. The Author proposes such an alternative jurisprudential standard in Part VI.
231. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317.
232. Id. Since 1978, most colleges and universities have operated "diversity" admissions
programs.
233. Id. at 319.
234. The meaning of equality suggested by Justice Powell is markedly different from the meaning
suggested by Justice Harlan in Plessy, and by the Court in Brown I. For Justice Harlan, equality
meant the elimination of racial subordination. For the Court in Brown I, it meant the elimination of
state-sponsored segregation which generated feelings of inferiority in Black school children. How-
ever, for Justice Powell, equality meant not using race as the sole factor in allocating government
benefits.
The Bakke decision followed the reasoning in Washington v. Davis rather than Brown I and its
progeny. Just as the proof requirements for discrimination were "redefined" in Washington to place a
higher burden on discrimination-claiming plaintiffs, Bakke altered the meaning of equality not simply
to require that Blacks, Whites, and others be treated the same, but also to prohibit solely race-based
affirmative action designed to benefit Blacks and to eliminate racial subordination.
The Author does not detail here the most salient points of the remaining five opinions in Bakke.
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3. Modern Race Cases
Since Bakke, the Court has decided several similar cases in which a
White plaintiff has challenged an affirmative action program sponsored by a
governmental entity. The most significant of those cases are Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick,2 31 City of Richmond v. Croson Co.,236 and Metro Broadcasting v. FCC.
2 37
Perhaps the clearest conclusion that one can draw from these cases is that the
Court remains divided regarding the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause
in cases involving racial classifications that benefit racial minorities.238 This
division requires that we examine their holdings. Another equally compelling
conclusion is that no Court majority applied a color-blind standard. As in
Brown I, Swann, Bell, Garner, and Bakke the Court was not color-blind in
Fullilove, Croson, or Metro Broadcasting.
In Fulilove, the Court affirmed both lower federal courts' holdings that
the federal minority business enterprise ("MBE") provision of the Public
Works Employment Act,2 39 which required a 10% set-aside of federal funds
for minority-controlled businesses on local public works projects, did not vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause or federal statutes.2' Six Justices concurred
in the judgment of the Court24' and three dissented.242
Chief Justice Burger stated the issue in Fullilove was whether Congress
had the power to enact the MBE set aside provision of the Public Works Em-
ployment Act.243 The Court first noted its usual deference when passing on
the constitutionality of an act of Congress. The Chief Justice said,
A program that employs racial or ethnic criteria, even in a remedial context,
calls for close examination; yet we are bound to approach our task with
appropriate deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch charged by the
Constitution with the power to "provide for the ... general Welfare of the
United States" and "to enforce, by appropriate legislation" the equal protec-
tion guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus, Chief Justice Burger identified two sources of power available to Con-
gress to enact the minority set aside provision: congressional power to spend
for the general welfare245 and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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The other opinions merit full exploration to discern how the Court became so divided in Bakke given
its unanimous decision in Swann seven years earlier.
235. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
236. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
237. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
238. There were 15 separate opinions in Fullilove, Croson, and Metro Broadcasting.
239. Pub. L. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116.
240. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 492.
241. Chief Justice Burger announced the judgment in an opinion, joined by Justices White and
Powell. Justice Powell also wrote a separate concurrence. And Justice Marshall concurred sepa-
rately in the judgment, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun.
242. Justice Stewart dissented, joined by Justice Rehnquist. Justice Stevens dissented separately.
243. The MBE provision was added to the Act after $2 billion had previously been distributed
and minority applicants raised questions about the fairness of distribution procedures. Presumably a
significant portion of the first $2 billion went to nonminority controlled businesses (either contractors
or sub-contractors). The sponsor of the amendment stated that the objective of the amendment was
to direct funds into the minority business community which could not be expected to benefit signifi-
cantly from the public works program as formulated. Id. at 459 n.20.
244. Id. at 472.
245. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Here, the spending power was used to require recipients of funds to set aside
10% of their grants for minority-controlled businesses. The Court has upheld such conditional
grants in many contexts. See, eg., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (upholding conditional grants
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After finding sufficient congressional power to enact the provision, Chief
Justice Burger then determined whether the limited use of racial criteria was a
constitutional means of achieving congressional objectives. The Chief Justice
said:
As a threshold matter, we reject the contention that in the remedial context
the Congress must act in a wholly "color-blind" fashion. In Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, we rejected this argument in consid-
ering a court-formulated school desegregation remedy on the basis that
examination of the racial composition of student bodies was an unavoidable
starting point and that racially based attendance assignments were permissi-
ble so long as no absolute racial balance of each school was required. In
McDaniel v. Barresi, citing Swann, we observed that: "[I]n this remedial
process, steps will almost invariably require that students be assigned 'differ-
ently because of their race.' Any other approach would freeze the status quo
that is the very target of all desegregation processes." And in North Caro-
lina Board of Education v. Swann, we invalidated a state law that absolutely
forbade assignment of any student on account of race because it foreclosed
implementation of desegregation plans that were designed to remedy consti-
tutional violations. We held that "[j]ust as the race of students must be con-
sidered in determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred, so
also must race be considered in formulating a remedy.",
247
Thus, in Fullilove six Justices explicitly rejected the colorblindness model.
The Court next explained that the remedial powers of Congress are
greater than those of any other governmental entity. Chief Justice Burger
wrote:
Here we deal, as we noted earlier, not with the limited remedial powers
of a federal court, for example, but with the broad remedial powers of Con-
gress. It is fundamental that in no organ of government, state or federal,
does there repose a more comprehensive remedial power than in the Con-
gress, expressly charged by the Constitution with competence and authority
to enforce equal protection guarantees. Congress not only may induce vol-
untary action to assure compliance with existing federal statutory or consti-
tutional antidiscrimination provisions, but also, where Congress has
authority to declare certain conduct unlawful, it may, as here, authorize and
induce state action to avoid such conduct.2 48
The clear import of this language is that Congress can force compliance with
its antidiscrimination policies by inducing private contractors or state grantees
to provide affirmative action set asides to remedy past and continuing discrim-
ination in the construction industry.
Chief Justice Burger also rejected the "White innocence" theory
presented in Bakke. The Chief Justice wrote (and Justice Powell joined):
It is not a constitutional defect in this program that it may disappoint
the expectations of nonminority firms. When effectuating a limited and
properly tailored remedy to cure the effects of prior discrimination, such "a
to compel school officials to design language programs for Chinese students). In addition, the Court
suggested that had Congress chosen to do so, it could have used its commerce power under Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3 to regulate the practices of prime contractors.
246. The text of the Fourteenth Amendment is set out at supra note 154. The Court said Con-
gress could have achieved its objectives pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
478.
247. Id. at 482 (citations omitted). Recall that Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion in
Swann.
248. Id. at 483 (citation omitted).
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sharing of the burden" by innocent parties is not impermissible. The actual
"burden" shouldered by nonminority firms is relatively light in this connec-
tion when we consider the scope of this public works program as compared
with overall construction contracting opportunities. Moreover, although we
may assume that the complaining parties are innocent of any discriminatory
conduct, it was within congressional power to act on the assumption that in
the past some nonminority businesses may have reaped competitive benefit
over the years from the virtual exclusion of minority firms from these con-
tracting opportunities.2 49
Along with the Court's rejection of White innocence, the opinion referred to
Congress' ability to employ a limited remedy to cure the effects of "prior dis-
crimination." The Court used the term "prior discrimination" to refer to gen-
eral discrimination practiced in the contracting profession.250 The Fullilove
Court did not require Congress to prove specific identifiable discrimination to
justify the minority set aside, as the Court had required in Bakke.251
Fuilove raised many new questions regarding the constitutionality of af-
firmative action set aside programs. For example, did the Court mean that
this set aside was constitutional because it was sponsored by Congress, but
that a state could not treat its citizens in the same way? Or, did the Court
mean that under any level of judicial scrutiny, the set aside was constitutional?
Such confusion sprang from the Chief Justice's assertion that his opinion did
not adopt the analysis articulated by any members of the Court in Bakke. He
added, "Our analysis demonstrates that the MBE provision would survive ju-
dicial review under either 'test' articulated in the several Bakke opinions." '252
The dissenters in Fullilove used Justice Harlan's dissent from Plessy to
argue that the MBE provisions were unconstitutional. After recalling Justice
Harlan's colorblindness quote, Justice Stewart wrote,
Today, the Court upholds a statute that accords a preference to citizens who
are "Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts"
for much of the same reasons [as were given by the majority in Plessy]. I
think today's decision is wrong for the same reason that Plessy was wrong,
and I respectfully dissent.2" 3
For Justice Stewart, Fulliove was just like Plessy and affirmative action was
another form of invidious racial subordination. It did not matter that the
MBE provision had been enacted by Congress rather than by the State of Lou-
isiana. He said the equal protection standard absolutely prohibited any ra-
cially-categorized discrimination by government. 4 Justice Stewart wanted to
apply a rule of presumptive invalidity to any racial classification and to scruti-
nize any racial classification as inherently suspect.255
249. Id. at 484.
250. Id.
251. The Court concluded that given the broad powers of Congress and the means chosen to
achieve its objectives, the MBE provision did not violate the Constitution. Chief Justice Burger sug-
gested that the constant administrative review system and the waiver provision that permitted a
grantee or contractor to demonstrate a good faith effort to comply with the set aside gave reasonable
assurance that the program will operate constitutionally. Id. at 490.
252. Id. at 492. Chief Justice Burger appeared to apply close scrutiny and appropriate congres-
sional deference in deciding Fulliove. However, his language suggests that the issue of which stan-
dard of review should apply to affirmative action cases remained unresolved.
253. Id. at 523 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
254. Id.
255. Id.
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Justice Stewart's dissent paralleled the language from Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke:2 6
[U]nder our Constitution, the government may never act to the detri-
ment of a person solely because of that person's race. The color of a person's
skin and the country of his origin are immutable facts that bear no relation
to ability, disadvantage, moral culpability, or any other characteristics of
constitutionally permissible interest to government. "Distinctions between
citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a
free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."
In short, racial discrimination is by definition invidious discrimination.
The rule cannot be any different when the persons injured by a racially
biased law are not members of a racial minority. The guarantee of equal
protection is "universal in [its] application, to all persons... without regard
to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality."
257
In Justice Stewart's view, skin color bore no necessary relation to ability, dis-
advantage, or moral culpability. Thus, equality meant disregarding all past
inequities based on color. Justice Stewart believed that the MBE provision
made its beneficiaries more equal than others.258 And his concern about
moral culpability reverts back to the White innocence theory that Justice Pow-
ell introduced in Bakke. Therefore, he concluded that the MBE provision was
an unconstitutional racial classification because it violated the equal protection
standard contained in the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.25 9
The weakness of Justice Stewart's dissent goes beyond its continuation of
Justice Powell's alteration of the meanings of equality and colorblindness sug-
gested by Justice Harlan in Plessy. Justice Stewart offered no alternative to the
MBE provision. He suggested implicitly that nothing "fair" could be done
about the racial subordination of Blacks. In contrast, Justice Powell in Bakke
accepted the diversity model as an alternative to the racial quota of sixteen
seats. Justice Stewart's opinion suggests that he rejected Justice Powell's com-
promise in Bakke, that racial equality to him meant ignoring the past and
treating everyone the same in the future. He gave no explanation justifying
the fairness of ignoring racial subordination of Blacks.
Justice Stewart suggested that the MBE provision gave its beneficiaries
privileges based on birth.2" And he concluded:
Most importantly, by making race a relevant criterion once again in its own
affairs, the Government implicitly teaches the public that the apportionment
of rewards and penalties can legitimately be made according to race-rather
than according to merit or ability-and that people can, and perhaps should,
view themselves and others in terms of their racial characteristics. Notions
of "racial entitlement" will be fostered, and private discrimination will nec-
essarily be encouraged. 26'
256. Compare id. at 523-26 with Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90.
257. Fulliove, 448 U.S. at 525 (citations omitted).
258. Id. at 526.
259. Justice Stewart argued that the MBE provision operated just like the admissions program in
Bakke. He said that some contractors were excluded from 10% of the federal grants, just as Bakke
was excluded from competition for 16 of the 100 seats at Davis Medical School. Even if the programs
are similar, they are not identical. Most significantly, the MBE provision contained a waiver process
that enabled contractors and state grantees to demonstrate good faith efforts to comply. Upon such a
showing, the grantees could obtain access to all federal grants.
260. Fulliove, 448 U.S. at 531. Thus, according to Justice Stewart, the set aside becomes a privi-
lege rather than a remedy for past and continuing discrimination.
261. Id. at 532 (citations omitted).
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This classic summary of the parade of horribles that some assert must neces-
sarily follow affirmative action teaches, according to Justice Stewart, that ra-
cism and racial discrimination are permissible, merit is irrelevant, and racial
polarization is inevitable.262 Yet what does the government teach when it does
nothing to address past and present racial inequality? When the government
does nothing to eliminate racial subordination it teaches that the rights of the
subordinated group are less important than the rights of the superordinate
group. Moreover, when the Court characterizes the remedy to racial discrimi-
nation as reverse discrimination, it teaches that the Court will protect the in-
terests of the group it identifies with the most.
In City of Richmond v. Croson Co.263 the Court was more divided than in
Bakke or Fullilove.26 The facts in Croson were very similar to those in Fulli-
love, except that the set aside was sponsored by the City of Richmond and the
percent set aside for minority-controlled businesses was 30%. In fact, the
MBE provision in Croson was modeled on the federal provision in Fullilove.265
Justice O'Connor announced the judgment of the Court invalidating the
Richmond set aside.266 She distinguished Fullilove on the grounds that Con-
gress has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Four-
teenth Amendment,267 Section 5 of that being a positive grant of legislative
power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether
and what legislation is needed to secure its guarantees.26  On the other hand,
she found Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to be a constraint on state
power and that states could undertake only those efforts to remedy discrimina-
tion which were consistent with that section.269
In order to meet these constraints Richmond had to identify specifically
262. Justice Stevens also dissented. The thrust of Justice Stevens' dissent was that even if Blacks
are entitled to reparations, the MBE provision included other groups who do not have the same claim
for reparations. Id. at 537-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
263. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
264. In Croson there were six separate opinions.
265. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-86. The Richmond City Council (with a Black majority) issued a bid
request for plumbing fixtures at the City Jail. Croson Co. bid for the job. Croson attempted to
comply with the set aside by securing the partnership of an MBE. When bids were opened, Croson
was the only bidder; however, the MBE Croson had selected could not obtain the necessary credit
approval. Thereafter, Croson sought a waiver from the City of the minority set aside provision.
After the City refused the waiver request and elected to rebid the project, Croson sued. Both lower
federal courts applied the reasoning of Fullilove and concluded that the same result should follow in
Croson.
However, since Fullilove the Court had decided Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267
(1986), in which the Court had invalidated a collective bargaining agreement under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. The agreement provided that if layoffs became necessary in the Jackson school district,
at no time would a greater percentage of minority teachers be laid off than the percentage of minority
teachers employed in the school at the time of the layoff. When layoffs became necessary Wygant and
others were laid off before minority teachers with less seniority. There was no majority opinion.
When the U.S. Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in Croson it vacated the Fourth Circuit's
judgment and ordered reconsideration in light of Wygant.
On reconsideration of Croson, in light of Wygant, the Fourth Circuit invalidated the Richmond
set aside program. It was again appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
266. Croson, 488 U.S. at 486.
267. Id. at 490.
268. Id. Justice O'Connor said Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment had been given a similar
reading.
269. Id. at 491-92. Justice O'Connor did not argue that a state or local subdivision could not
eradicate the effects of private discrimination. In fact, she argued the opposite; but, she wrote that
the power must be exercised in a manner consistent with Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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the private discrimination it sought to remedy. =70
Thus, if the city could show that it had essentially become a "passive
participant" in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the local
construction industry, we think it clear that the city could take affirmative
steps to dismantle such a system. It is beyond dispute that any public entity,
state or federal, has a compelling interest in assuring that public dollars,
drawn from the tax contributions of all citizens, do not serve to finance the
evil of private prejudice.271
The opinion suggested that the problem was not affirmative action per se, but
rather the poor evidentiary showing of specific private discrimination in the
local construction industry.272
Justice O'Connor next addressed the proper standard of review. She said
strict scrutiny was essential to determining whether a racial classification is
benign or, instead, motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or
racial politics. 273 Justice O'Connor's opinion seems to acknowledge a distinc-
tion between benign racial classifications and racial classifications based on
notions of racial inferiority or racial politics.
274
Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of
race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important
enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. That test also ensures that
the means chosen "fit" this compelling goal so closely that there is little or
no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial
prejudice or stereotype. 7 5
Justice O'Connor then identified the defects of the Richmond plan. She
said that "societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for
imposing a racially classified remedy," '276 and state and local agencies could
not rely on congressional findings of national discrimination.277 Instead, they
had to "establish the presence of discrimination in their own bailiwicks, based
either upon their own factfinding processes or upon determinations made by
other competent institutions. ' 27 1 Justice O'Connor said that the evidence
presented by the City did not point to any identified discrimination in the
270. Id. at 492.
271. Id. (citations omitted).
272. Justice O'Connor, like Justice Powell in Bakke, appeared to accept the Washington v. Davis
reasoning for what must be proven to establish racial discrimination. Past industry-wide discrimina-
tion was not sufficient. Since Croson, the government must show that there has been discrimination
in the local market against the persons to be benefitted by the set aside. Id. at 493-98.
273. Id. at 493.
274. This distinction in racial classifications is central to the Author's argument that all racial
classifications are not the same. See text infra pp. 64-73 and accompanying notes.
275. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493. Four of the Justices in Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276, had also argued for
strict scrutiny.
276. Croson, 488 U.S. at 497. The proponents of the Richmond plan had argued that only 0.67%
of all prime contracts had gone to minority businesses. Although the minority population was 50%,
there were very few minority businesses in the local or state contractors associations. Congress had
made substantial findings showing how the effects of past discrimination had stifled minority partici-
pation in the construction industry nationally. Id. at 504.
277. Id. at 504.
278. Id. at 502. Since the Croson decision, numerous states and city governments have under-
taken or commissioned Croson disparity studies to determine if there is evidence of local discrimina-
tion in the letting of public contracts. Frequently, the studies are performed by accountancy experts
who bid on the projects. Justice O'Connor wrote that to prove discrimination one had to focus on the
disparity between the number of minority businesses qualified to undertake the task and the percent-
age of total city construction dollars received by minority firms.
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Richmond construction industry.279
Justice O'Connor specifically limited the Croson analysis to Blacks. She
wrote:
The foregoing analysis applies only to the inclusion of blacks within the
Richmond set-aside program. There is absolutely no evidence of past dis-
crimination against Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut
persons in any aspect of the Richmond construction industry .... It may
well be that Richmond has never had an Aleut or Eskimo citizen. The ran-
dom inclusion of racial groups that, as a practical matter, may never have
suffered from discrimination in the construction industry in Richmond sug-
gests that perhaps the city's purpose was not in fact to remedy past
discrimination.
Unlike the Fullilove majority, the Croson majority said the overinclusive-
ness of the minority set aside provision was fatal. Justice O'Connor noted that
one factor that distinguished Fullilove from Croson was that in Fullilove Con-
gress had carefully examined and rejected race-neutral alternatives before en-
acting the MBE provision.281 In Croson, the majority said there was no
evidence that the Richmond City Council had considered any race-neutral
alternatives.282 Therefore, the Richmond plan failed both prongs of the equal
protection analysis.
283
The Croson decision established the constitutional requirements for state
and local governments that wish to promote broader distribution of public
contracts. In order to use a racial preference, the local government must
prove there is a significant statistical disparity between the number of qualified
minority contractors willing and able to perform services, and the number of
such contractors who actually work for the locality or prime contractors.
Croson is another decision that places an additional obstacle on minority
plaintiffs who are least able to afford the costs of meeting that burden,284 or on
local governments that want to eradicate racial discrimination in the construc-
tion industry.
Justice O'Connor did not mention the doctrine of colorblindness. She
thought that race-neutral alternatives, such as simplification of bidding and
bonding procedures, and public financial aid for all races, were available to the
City.285 Her opinion at least implicitly undermines the colorblindness doc-
trine because it clearly permits race-based affirmative action upon a proper
evidentiary showing. 286 So the extreme hostility to affirmative action articu-
279. Id. at 505-06.
280. Id. at 506 (emphasis added).
281. Id. at 507.
282. Id. It seemed equally significant to the Court that five of the nine city council members in
Richmond were Black. The Court suggested several times that the Black political majority was play-
ing racial politics. Yet the Court never quite explained why the percentage of public contracts for
Blacks was so small. Also, it seems ironic that the Court would underscore the race of the majority of
council members, while espousing the doctrine of colorblindness. The members of the Court, like the
rest of us, are simply not color-blind.
283. Id. at 511. To justify a racial classification, the government must show that the classification
serves a compelling state interest and that the means are narrowly tailored to achieve the state's
objective.
284. Croson followed a series of cases that had made it more difficult to prove racial discrimina-
tion. See supra note 213.
285. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507.
286. Id. at 509.
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lated in dissents by Justices Stewart, Stevens, and Rehnquist in Fullilove287
and Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Scalia in concurrences in Croson 2 8 is just
that: a comment in a dissent or concurrence.289
One year later the Supreme Court decided Metro Broadcasting v. FCC.
2 90
The principal issue was whether certain minority preference policies of the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) violated the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. 29 1 In a 5-4 opinion
written by Justice Brennan the Court held that the FCC policies did not vio-
late equal protection principles.292 Justice Brennan's opinion paralleled the
principal opinion of Fullilove so far as the earlier opinion had summarized the
Court's historical deference to Congress and the various sources of power
available to Congress to enact the minority preference policies.293 However,
Justice Brennan then wrote:
A majority of the Court in Fullilove did not apply strict scrutiny to the
race-based classification at issue. Three Members inquired "whether the
objectives of th[e] legislation are within the power of Congress" and
"whether the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria.., is a constitutionally
permissible means for achieving the congressional objectives." . . . Three
other Members would have upheld benign racial classifications that "serve
important governmental objectives and are substantially related to achieve-
ment of those objectives."... We apply that standard today. We hold that
benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress-even if those meas-
ures are not "remedial" in the sense of being designed to compensate victims
of past governmental or societal discrimination-are constitutionally per-
287. 448 U.S. at 522-54. See also supra notes 235 to 262 and accompanying text.
288. 488 U.S. at 511-28. Justice Scalia's concurrence provides the clearest evidence of such hostil-
ity. He wrote:
At least where state or local action is at issue, only a social emergency rising to the level of
imminent danger to life and limb for example, a prison race riot, requiring temporary segre-
gation of inmates.. .can justify an exception to the principle embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment that "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens."
In my view there is only one circumstance in which the States may act by race to "undo
the effects of past discrimination": where that is necessary to eliminate their own mainte-
nance of a system of unlawful racial classification....
Id. at 521-24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Again, it appears that Justice Scalia is using Justice Harlan's colorblindness model out of con-
text. Croson was not a case about the racial subordination of Whites. More than 99% of the Rich-
mond public contracts between 1978 and 1983 went to nonminority-controlled businesses. The Court
would have us believe that such statistical imbalance is normative and uncontroversial, unless proven
otherwise by specific evidence of discrimination.
289. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist made this point forcefully in Railroad Retirement Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177 n.10 (1980), in reference to the comments in dissent by Justice Brennan and
Justice Marshall.
290. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
291. Id. at 455. The two policies under dispute were (1) a program awarding applicants for new
licenses an enhancement for substantial minority ownership, and (2) the minority "distress sale"
program, which permits the transfer of a limited category of existing radio and television broadcast
stations only to minority-controlled firms. Congress enacted the policies after it found that minorities
owned less than 1% of all radio and television stations. Id. at 456.
292. Id. at 459-62. The plaintiffs in the consolidated cases were Metro Broadcasting of Orlando
and Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, who had each lost a bid to obtain a television station. Metro
Broadcasting challenged the award of a station to a firm that received an enhancement under the first
policy because it was 90% Hispanic owned. Shurberg challenged the award of a television station to
a minority-controlled entity via a distress sale program under the second policy.
293. Id. at 462.
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missible to the extent that they serve important governmental objectives
within the power of Congress and are substantially related to achievement of
those objectives.294
Five members of the Court agreed that the standard of review for congres-
sional affirmative action is intermediate scrutiny. Under intermediate scru-
tiny, such programs are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they
serve important governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. 2 95
Justice Brennan also distinguished Croson from Fullilove.2 96  Because
Croson did not involve a question of congressional action, Justice Brennan said
Croson's reasoning could not be used to undermine Fullilove.297 In fact, Jus-
tice Brennan said most of the language and reasoning of Croson reaffirmed the
lesson of Fullilove: that race conscious classifications adopted by Congress to
address racial and ethnic discrimination are subject to a different standard
than similar classifications prescribed by state and local governments.29
The majority in Metro Broadcasting said that Congress' interest in en-
hancing broadcast diversity was at the very least an important governmental
objective.29 9 Specifically, he suggested that diversity on the airwaves served
important First Amendment values.3"o Justice Brennan also said that the mi-
nority ownership policies were substantially related to achieving diverse pro-
gramming.3 0 1 He cited studies by the Congressional Research Service (CRS)
and the FCC to support that view.3 0 2 He also noted a correlation between
minority ownership and minority hiring.
[W]hile we are under no illusion that members of a particular minority
group share some cohesive, collective viewpoint, we believe it a legitimate
inference for Congress and the Commission to draw that as more minorities
gain ownership and policymaking roles in the media, varying perspectives
294. Id. at 462-63 (citations omitted).
295. Id.
296. Id at 463.
297. Id.
298. Id at 463-64. The Court then announced that the FCC policies were constitutional under
the intermediate standard of review because they served the important governmental objective of
broadcast diversity and the policies were substantially related to that objective.
299. Id. at 465. Justice Brennan borrowed from Justice Powell's reasoning in Bakke, regarding
the benefits of a diverse student body, to argue that both broadcast diversity and student diversity
serve important governmental interests.
300. Id. Justice Brennan reasoned that the general public benefitted from wider information
sources.
301. Id. at 465-68. Justice Brennan deferred to congressional findings on the correlation between
minority ownership and diverse programming. Regarding that nexus, he wrote:
The judgment that there is a link between expanded minority ownership and broadcast
diversity does not rest on impermissible stereotyping. Congressional policy does not assume
that in every case minority ownership and management will lead to more minority-oriented
programming or to the expression of a discrete "minority viewpoint" on the airwaves.
Neither does it pretend that all programming that appeals to minority audiences can be
labeled "minority programming" or that programming that might be described as "minor-
ity" does not appeal to nonminorities. Rather, both Congress and the FCC maintain simply
that expanded minority ownership of broadcast outlets will, in the aggregate, result in
greater broadcast diversity. A broadcasting industry with representative minority participa-
tion will produce more variation and diversity than will one whose ownership is drawn from
a single racially and ethnically homogeneous group....
Id. at 472.
302. Id. at 473 nn.31-32.
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will be more fairly represented on the airwaves.3 °3
In addition to the absence of stereotyping, Justice Brennan said that the
minority preference policies were put in place after race-neutral efforts by
Congress and the FCC had failed.3°  He said the policies in dispute were
aimed directly at the barriers that minorities face in entering the broadcast
industry. 305 The policies were also of appropriate scope and duration.
316 Jus-
tice Brennan wrote that Congress and the FCC had also evaluated the poli-
cies. 307 And, finally, the burden imposed by the policies was only slight since
a small fraction of licenses were affected by the policies.
308
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Metro Broadcasting30 9 was far more omi-
nous than her majority opinion in Croson. She criticized the majority for de-
parting from fundamental principles under the Equal Protection Clause and
the strict scrutiny standard of review.310 Beyond criticizing the majority,
however, Justice O'Connor seemed intent on eliminating the term "benign ra-
cial classification" from equal protection jurisprudence. She wrote:
The Court's reliance on "benign racial classifications," .... is particu-
larly troubling. "'Benign' racial classification" is a contradiction in terms.
Governmental distinctions among citizens based on race or ethnicity, even in
the rare circumstances permitted by our cases, exact costs and carry with
them substantial dangers. To the person denied an opportunity or right
based on race, the classification is hardly benign....
We are a Nation not of black and white alone, but one teeming with diver-
gent communities knitted together by various traditions and carried forth,
above all, by individuals. Upon that basis, we are governed by one Constitu-
tion, providing a single guarantee of equal protection, one that extends
equally to all citizens."'
Although Justice O'Connor still seemed to believe that race-based reme-
dial measures could be constitutional in limited situations,312 she could not
accept the term "benign" to mean the same thing as "remedial. 31 3 She as-
sumed that because the majority had employed a less strict standard of review,
it must have intended a different meaning for those terms.314 She wrote, "A
lower standard [of review] signals that the Government may resort to racial
distinctions more readily. The Court's departure from our cases is disturbing
enough, but more disturbing still is the renewed toleration of racial classifica-
303. Id. at 474 (citations omitted).
304. Id. at 478.
305. Id. at 481.
306. Id. at 481-82.
307. Id. at 482-83.
308. Id. at 483-85.
309. Id. at 486 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Ken-
nedy joined in her dissent.
310. Id. at 487. The criticism seems disingenuous. First, the facts of Metro Broadcasting are
much more like those of Fullilove than those of Croson. Second, as in Fullilove, the majority in Metro
Broadcasting deferred to congressional sources of power and evidentiary findings. Third, the reason-
ing presented in Metro Broadcasting tracks that presented by the principal opinion in Fullilove and
meets most of the criticism against the Richmond set aside plan proffered by Justice O'Connor in
Croson.
311. Id. at 491-92.
312. Id. at 492-93.
313. Id. at 491-92.
314. Id. at 492.
tions that its new standard of review embodies.
315
Justice O'Connor referred only once to the colorblindness doctrine.316
Her dissent, however, referred repeatedly to Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke
and she made many of the same assumptions that Justice Powell made. For
example, she assumed equality means identical treatment and that any con-
nection between our past history of societal discrimination and present statisti-
cal disparities is generally too speculative to support a race-conscious
affirmative action plan.317 And, like Justice Powell in Bakke, she did not re-
ject all racial classifications, but believed each one must be examined under the
most searching scrutiny.318
What has emerged from the recent division within the Supreme Court
regarding race-conscious affirmative action programs are the same two com-
peting visions of the meaning of racial equality and nondiscrimination under
our Constitution that were presented in Plessy. For some members of the
Court, the Equal Protection Clause permits government to act affirmatively to
dismantle the legacy of slavery, discrimination, and racial supremacy in the
U.S. These members believe that to treat some persons equally, one must treat
them differently, and they do not consider such different treatment to be racial
discrimination. Justice Blackmun is the clearest advocate of that view. He
wrote:
I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affirmative action
program in a racially neutral way and have it successful. To ask that this be
so is to demand the impossible. In order to get beyond racism, we must first
take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some
persons equally, we must treat them differently. We cannot-we dare not-
let the Equal Protection Clause perpetrate racial supremacy.31 9
For other members of the Court, racial equality and nondiscrimination mean
that government should not classify persons by race, except in dire emergen-
cies or when the government itself has caused or permitted identifiable dis-
crimination to occur within its locale. They use the doctrine of colorblindness
to support their view. Those members believe that to treat persons equally,
one must treat them the same. Justice O'Connor has been an advocate of the
latter view. She wrote, "[T]he guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one
thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a
person of another color."' 320 These two visions of racial equality and nondis-
crimination have been the subject of extensive legal commentary and it is there
that the Author now turns.
4. Legal Scholarship and the Antidiscrimination Principle
Legal scholarship on the evolution of the antidiscrimination principle re-
flects much of the same philosophical division represented in cases such as
Bakke, Fullilove, Croson, and Metro Broadcasting. Several law review articles
published between 1966 and 1978 addressed the issue in ways that later
315. Id.
316. Id. at 503. Actually, Justice O'Connor only referred to the lower court's rejection of the
doctrine.
317. Id. at 494.
318. Id. at 505.
319. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407 (Blackmun, J., separate opinion).
320. Croson, 488 U.S. at 494.
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proved influential.321
The first of these articles was John Kaplan's Equal Justice in an Unequal
World.322 Professor Kaplan posed the questions for discussion as follows:
"(1) [I]n the name of equality, should we apply the same standards to all men
[sic], or does formal equality bear so heavily on some as to result in serious
inequality? (2) When should what appears to be formal inequality be re-
garded as true equality? '323 The former question is reflected in the gradual
demise of Plessy, as the Court came to believe that segregation bore so heavily
on Blacks as to result in serious inequality. The latter question is exemplified
by the call that society compensate for the pervasive economic and social ine-
quality of our society by establishing formally unequal programs that single
out Blacks for special-and in some sense better-treatment. 324 Professor
Kaplan argued that rather than ground the discussion in terms of the meaning
of equality, it was better to ask bluntly what courses of action should be open
to government in solving the problems arising from our multi-racial society.
Although Professor Kaplan discussed preferences in housing and educa-
tion, most of his analysis dealt with employment preferences. He first set forth
arguments supporting affirmative action. Even if our society suddenly became
color-blind, he concluded, our racial history has left so many Blacks educa-
tionally, economically, and psychologically disadvantaged that unless Blacks
receive special treatment they will be condemned by colorblindness itself to
perpetual deprivation.325 Moreover, he argued we can achieve true equality
only by treating persons according to their needs. 326 Third, since White soci-
ety enslaved and exploited Blacks, leaving them in far worse condition to com-
pete in and enjoy the benefits of our society, justice requires that each victim
be compensated for his injuries whether or not that person is presently in
need.327 Under this argument all Blacks, including Black professionals and
others able to climb the ladder despite their handicaps, would be proper ob-
jects of compensation since were it not for the immoral practices of White
society they would be even further along. 28 A final category of arguments for
guaranteeing special preferences to Blacks appeals to self-interest. Bringing
Blacks up to full economic equality would increase the gross national product
and ease the drain on public resources caused by expenditures on welfare and
crime.329 In addition, Kaplan argued that the Black urban poor are social
dynamite and the only way to avoid violent urban conflict is to grant special
preferences.330
On the other hand, Professor Kaplan suggested myriad problems posed
by such special treatment. He noted certain institutional and political con-
321. See supra note 14.
322. Kaplan, supra note 14.
323. Id. at 363.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 364. Unfortunately, Kaplan never proposed how to overcome this perpetual
deprivation.
326. Id. at 365. Kaplan discussed how numerous programs for the poor, physically challenged, or
the elderly have been institutionalized by our society.
327. Id. at 365.
328. Id. at 366.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 367. Kaplan's article was published in between the 1965 Los Angeles riots and the
1967 Detroit riots.
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straints that would limit the scope or effectiveness of any preference.331 Such
constraints would include whether to use a voluntary or mandatory prefer-
ence, whether to employ a quota and where to set the quota, and whether to
use race as a plus factor when two applicants are otherwise similarly quali-
fied.332 Second, he noted that the brunt of the special preference would fall on
other minorities rather than on middle-class Whites.333 Professor Kaplan ar-
gued that status in the underclass was a better proxy for preferential treatment
than race, and employment preferences violate the policy of treating people
according to individual worth or merit and are extremely divisive.334
Kaplan conceded the appropriateness of preferences for the underclass.
335
But he did not connect racial discrimination to the subordination of Blacks.
Race operates hegemonically in ways similar to how law does in society. Pro-
fessor Kimberl6 Crenshaw has made this point emphatically. She has criti-
cized legal scholars on both sides of the modem affirmative action debate for
their failure to acknowledge race and racism as independent causes of the sub-
ordination of Blacks. While Professor Crenshaw understood the nexus among
race, class, and gender subordination, she argued most persuasively that ne-
oconservatives and members of Critical Legal Studies ("CLS") have not re-
flected through their writing any understanding of the independent
significance of race in the United States. For Crenshaw, race is an hegemonic
force in the U.S. that extends racial domination of Blacks by Whites.3 3 6
Professor Kaplan argued that other problems arise in determining how
and when to cease a temporary preference.337 He suggested that once prefer-
ences for Blacks are institutionalized, a principle will have been established
which will encourage other groups to work for the same kind of treatment.338
Professor Kaplan suggested as well that there is no principled way to distin-
guish between Blacks and other claimants, that a preference could mean that
Blacks who are less competent than their White counterparts will be given the
jobs, and preferences posed a consequent risk of self-delusion, lower motiva-
tion, and greater damage to Black self-esteem and sense of worth.3 39
Professor Kaplan also argued that employment preferences would involve
331. Id. at 369-70.
332. Id. at 370-73. Kaplan said that a quota might become a ceiling that limited the opportunities
of Blacks in a particular setting.
333. Id. at 373. Kaplan offered no evidence to support this argument. It is far from axiomatic
that racial preferences favoring Blacks must necessarily fall on other minorities. Indeed, a preference
could favor Blacks along with other racial minorities. Therefore, Kaplan at best makes an argument
for including other racial minorities who have suffered societal discrimination.
334. Id. at 374. The problem with Kaplan's argument is that employment opportunities often are
not assigned by merit or individual worth. Instead, people hear about a job from a relative or institu-
tions promote from within their ranks. And, as Kaplan wrote, frequently a job is advertised in the
most limited circle. And, since Blacks are frequently outside the less formal employment network
they remain unemployed at rates twice or more the rate for Whites.
335. Id. at 374-75.
336. See Crenshaw, supra note 17, at 1334-35, 1339-40, 1358-60 and 1384-87. See also GENO-
VFSE, supra note 67, at 25-49.
337. Id. at 376. One answer (alluded to by Kaplan) is to terminate the preference when the
average Black reaches the same social, economic, and educational level as the average White person.
338. Id. at 377. Kaplan did not argue that Blacks have not been treated differently from other
Americans.
339. Id. at 378. The irony here is that Kaplan argued the jobs would be taken from other minori-
ties, not by Whites. He offered nothing to support the position that less competent Blacks were
replacing Whites, he simply asserted that fact. And finally, Kaplan seemed confused about what has
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the government in the administration of racial classifications,3" and with liti-
gating the race of an individual to determine qualification for preference.
Moreover, he contended that the most important objection to governmental
racial classifications is that they weaken the government as an educative
force.341 Accordingly, if government uses racial classifications it will influence
public opinion and behavior as to the morality of racial discrimination. Pro-
fessor Kaplan argued that a person is entitled to be judged on his or her own
individual merit alone, race is irrelevant to individual worth,342 and special
preferences undermine the antidiscrimination principle and serve as an obsta-
cle to the educational role of government. For Professor Kaplan, constant
education in colorblindness is essential.
3 43
Finally, Professor Kaplan addressed constitutional objections to special
preferences for Blacks.344 He acknowledged that if preferences are held un-
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment it would be ironic because
that amendment was passed to benefit Blacks, not to harm them.345 Also,
Professor Kaplan sounded now familiar constitutional concerns about how to
limit the preference in a principled manner or to distinguish between a benign
or hostile preference.346
Professor Kaplan's article is important because it summarizes many fa-
miliar arguments on both sides of the modem affirmative action debate. The
principal weakness of the article is that Professor Kaplan never explained why
he concluded that the arguments against special preferences were more com-
pelling. He recognized the competing interests and the need for balancing, but
provided no justification for striking it against preferences for Blacks.
Another influential article was John Hart Ely's The Constitutionality of
Reverse Racial Discrimination.347 Professor Ely argued that special scrutiny
of racial classifications was inappropriate when a political majority decided to
favor a political minority at the expense of the political majority. Professor
Ely said his principle was neutral: it was not "suspect," in the constitutional
sense, for a majority, any majority, to discriminate against itself.3 48 Professor
Ely did argue for "careful" scrutiny of all racial classifications, contending
that such was necessary to ensure that the racial classification fell within the
limited group to which the more demanding standard was inappropriate.349
Professor Ely found two principal reasons for application of strict scru-
tiny: (1) racial minorities have been subjected to legal disadvantage through-
caused damage to Black self-esteem. Blacks have always been willing to work. Blacks did not want
to be slaves, to work as "free" persons for slave wages, or under slave conditions.
340. Id. at 379.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 380.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 381-82. Kaplan believed that in most contexts special preferences for Blacks would
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
345. Id. at 382.
346. Id. at 383. Kaplan acknowledged that all racial classifications were not constitutionally im-
proper. He described several cases where the state might employ a racial classification, but in each
instance no preference for Blacks was involved.
347. See Ely, supra note 14.
348. Id. at 727. Therefore, in rare cases where a Black political majority discriminated against
itself, under Ely's neutral principle the case would not be the subject to strict scrutiny.
349. Id. at n.27. Ely seemed to advocate an intermediate level of scrutiny similar to the standard
used in modem gender cases.
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out our history; and, (2) race is generally irrelevant to any legitimate public
purpose.350 The type of racial classification requiring the most exacting scru-
tiny is a "we-they classification." 35 1 "We-they" racial classifications require
strict scrutiny because the White political majority most often has acted to the
disadvantage of the Black political minority.352 Professor Ely reasoned that a
White political majority was unlikely to disadvantage itself for reasons of ra-
cial prejudice, and, therefore, the reasons for being unusually suspicious and
for employing strict scrutiny are lacking.35 3 Such a conclusion was corrobo-
rated, he argued, by the view that the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause
was to prevent political majorities from imposing on minorities laws that pro-
vided different rules for the one than for the other.354 A similar conclusion
had been reached in Justice Jackson's Railway Express opinion in 1949. 355
Professor Ely concluded that "where there is no reason to suspect that the
comparative disadvantage will not be distributed evenly throughout the 'we'
class, we/they classifications that favor the 'theys' do not merit special
scrutiny.
356
Professor Ely believed that in order to defeat racial prejudice it was nec-
essary to take race into account for some purposes. He wrote, "Governmental
use of benign racial classifications may destroy blinding myths by teaching
people that race is indeed a factor of great importance in our society and that
many people are now disadvantaged because of past and continuing racial dis-
crimination. ' 35 7 Professor Ely stated finally that "it may be that the actual
participation of blacks in positions alongside whites will ultimately prove to
have the most important and long-lasting educative effect against
discrimination.
'358
In 1976, Professor Paul Brest published his Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle.359 He wrote that a century after the Civil War,
the U.S. was committed to the antidiscrimination principle.3e ° Congress had
read such a principle into the Thirteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court had
350. Id. at 730-31.
351. Id. at 732. Professor Ely wrote:
Racial classifications that disadvantage minorities are rooted in "we-they" generalizations
and balances as opposed to "they-they" generalizations and balances. Few legislators are
opticians; but few are optometrists either. Thus, although a decision to distinguish opti-
cians from optometrists incorporates a stereotypical comparison of two classes of people, it
is a comparison of two "they" stereotypes, viz., "They [opticians] generally differ from them
[optometrists] in certain respects that we find sufficient on balance to justify the decision to
classify on this basis." Legislators, however, have traditionally not only not been Black;
they have been White. A decision to distinguish Blacks from Whites therefore has its roots
in a comparison between a "we" stereotype and a "they" stereotype, viz "They [Blacks]
differ from us [Whites] in certain respects that we find sufficient on balance to justify the
decision to classify on this basis."
Id (emphasis in original).
352. Id. at 733.
353. Id. at 735.
354. Id. at n.48.
355. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111-13 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
356. See Ely, supra note 14, at 736.
357. Id. at 739.
358. Id. at n.56. This argument is similar to the view that one is less likely to treat Blacks nega-
tively if one has substantial associations with Blacks, including some close friends who are Black.
359. See Brest, supra note 14.
360. Id. at 1.
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construed the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to make ra-
cial classifications "suspect," and the Fifteenth Amendment expressly embod-
ied the antidiscrimination principle.361 Professor Brest continued, "the
antidiscrimination principle lies at the core of most state and federal civil
rights legislation, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. "362
Professor Brest described the antidiscrimination principle as: "[T]he gen-
eral principle disfavoring classifications and other decisions and practices that
depend on the race (or ethnic origin) of the parties affected.... The heart of
the antidiscrimination principle is its prohibition of race-dependent decisions
that disadvantage the members of minority groups.' 3 63 However, he specifi-
cally left open whether the antidiscrimination principle also disfavored "be-
nign" racial classifications designed to advantage the members of traditionally
disadvantaged minorities. 36
Next, Professor Brest described how persons claiming adherence to the
antidiscrimination principle fall into at least two camps.
Among those who still profess to adhere to the antidiscrimination principle,
many support sweeping measures, including race-conscious ones, designed
to prevent ongoing discrimination, to eliminate the effects of past discrimina-
tion, and otherwise to benefit racial minorities. Others argue that these
measures are excessively costly, that they impose unjust burdens on nonmi-
nority persons, and that the antidiscrimination principle forbids race-con-
sciousness even for benign purposes.
365
He contended that coalitions that had existed in the 1960's fell apart in the
1970's when members began to object to widespread school busing, govern-
361. Id.
362. Id. at nn.5-7 and accompanying text.
363. Id. at 1-2.
364. Id. at n.l.
365. Id. at 2. Professor Alan Freeman has more recently developed an analytical model to char-
acterize the two meanings of the antidiscrimination principle. Freeman has written that the commen-
tary on antidiscrimination law is written from one of two perspectives: the victim perspective or the
perpetrator perspective.
The victim perspective focuses on concrete historical experience, the consequences of racism
against Blacks, including residential segregation, inadequate education, overrepresentation in the low-
est-status jobs, disproportionately low political power, and a disproportionate share of the least and
worst of everything valued most in our materialistic society. From the victim perspective, when
antidiscrimination law announces that racial discrimination has become illegal, that law's promise
will be tested by the only relevant measure of success-results. Therefore, if those same conditions
exist in virtually identical form after antidiscrimination laws have prohibited racial discrimination,
the law has yet to become effective.
From the perpetrator perspective, the goal of antidiscrimination law is to identify and punish
racial discrimination as individual acts of badness in an otherwise nondiscriminatory social realm.
Therefore, one can find violations of the antidiscrimination principle only in specific actions of indi-
vidual perpetrators who have purposefully and intentionally caused harm to specific victims who will
be offered a compensatory remedy. From the perpetrator perspective, what society must do is iden-
tify the villains and place responsibility where it belongs. Freeman said that the perpetrator perspec-
tive has become the dominant one in legal culture today.
Freeman contended that the perpetrator perspective denies historical reality-in particular, the
fact that we would never have fashioned antidiscrimination law had it not been for the specific histori-
cal oppression of particular races. The denial of history allows some commentators to assert that
discrimination against Whites should have the same status as discrimination against Blacks, and,
therefore, all racial classifications should be struck down on the grounds of colorblindness.
See Freeman, supra note 17, at 1409-13.
60 NATIONAL BLACK LAW JOURNAL
ment-mandated affirmative action, and special admissions programs.3 66 He
then reviewed the major cases from the 1975 Supreme Court term, concluding
that the Court accepted race-conscious actions to remedy past
discrimination.367
The purpose of Professor Brest's essay was to explore the propriety of
granting racial preferences to traditionally disadvantaged minorities and the
operational relevance of the fact that a color-blind policy has a disproportion-
ate impact on members of a racial minority group.368 The antidiscrimination
principle prevents and rectifies racial injustice without subordinating other im-
portant values369 and principles of justice, such as distributive justice and com-
mutative justice.
In order to explore the issues set out above, Professor Brest examined the
rationales for the antidiscrimination principle.37 ° One rationale was to pre-
vent both irrational and unfair infliction of injury from race-dependent deci-
sions. 371 Brest stated that race-dependent decisions are irrational insofar as
they reflect the assumption that members of one race are less worthy than
other people.372 He argued that statistical generalizations were commonplace
and essential to the functioning of developed societies.3 73 But, he concluded,
the antidiscrimination principle filled a special need because race-dependent
decisions that are rational and purport to be based solely on legitimate consid-
erations are likely to rest on assumptions of the differential worth of racial
groups or on racially selective sympathy or indifference. 374 By the phrase "ra-
cially selective sympathy and indifference," Professor Brest meant the failure
to extend to a minority the same recognition of humanity, sympathy, and care
given as a matter of course to a member of one's own racial group. 375 Brest
concluded that race-dependent decisions caused by indifference or hostility
were unfair because they would not be made if the disadvantaged person were
a member of the dominant group.
376
A second rationale for the antidiscrimination principle was the preven-
tion of harms which may result from race-dependent decisions.37 7 Such harms
included the denial of opportunities, stigmatic harm, and cumulative debilita-
tion. Professor Brest explained that a Black person suffered cumulative
debilitation because he was not denied only one opportunity, but rather virtu-
ally all desirable opportunities solely because of his race.378
Professor Brest stated that the Court has forbidden race-dependent deci-
sions (at least those that are not obviously benign) unless they meet the strict
366. Brest, supra note 14, at 2-3.
367. Id. at 3. For example, in Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976), the Court affirmed a
ruling requiring that governmental agencies remedy their past discriminatory selection of public
housing sites by consciously locating future projects in predominantly White neighborhoods.
368. Id. at 4-5.
369. Id. at 5.
370. Id. at 6-11.
371. Id. at 6.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 6-7.
374. Id. at 7.
375. Id. at 7-8.
376. Id. at 8.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 10.
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scrutiny standard of review. 379 The strict scrutiny standard guards against
harms of race-dependent decisions by permitting them only in extraordinary
circumstances. 380 However, the antidiscrimination principle does not require
that race-dependent decisions benefitting minorities be scrutinized in the same
way that race-dependent decisions disadvantaging minorities are scruti-
nized.38 ' Brest contended that from the point of view of the White individuals
affected, it was highly improbable that decisions disfavoring them were pre-
mised on assumptions that Blacks are superior to Whites, no stigmatic injury
was likely to accompany the deprivation,382 and there was not likely to be any
cumulative effect on Whites.383
Professor Brest acknowledged that even benign race-dependent decisions
may actually injure their supposed beneficiaries because they can reflect as-
sumptions about the inferiority of minorities or reinforce feelings of differen-
tial worth in children of all races. 384 Nonetheless, he argued that:
... where the objective and immediate effect of the race-dependent decisions
are to benefit racial minorities, it seems inappropriate to subject the practice
to the demanding criteria of the suspect classification standard. It should
suffice for a policy maker to conclude that the probable benefits outweigh the
harms, that the benefits cannot readily be gained by other than race-depen-
dent means, and that the program is designed to minimize possible adverse
consequences.385
Brest proposed a variable standard of judicial review for benign race-depen-
dent decisions.38 6 Under that standard, race-dependent decisions would not
automatically be subjected to the demands of strict scrutiny. Instead, the
Court would assess the extent to which the decision implicated the concerns of
the antidiscrimination principle.38 7
William Van Alstyne's Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and
the Constitution3 8 pondered the extent to which the Civil War amendments
enacted a color-blind restriction on governmental power to regulate or allocate
by race, a question that remained unsettled as late as 1979.389 He argued that
the language of the Civil War amendments and their legislative history was
amenable to more than one reasonable interpretation.390 Van Alstyne argued
that it was appropriate to treat the Constitution as repudiating the propriety of
regulating people by race or allocating among people by race, although that
379. Id. at 15.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 16.
382. Id at 16-17.
383. Id. at 17. Brest argued that even when there is competition among beneficiaries of prefer-
ences the antidiscrimination principle is most concerned with the cumulative, pervasive frustration of
opportunities, not the isolated lost opportunity. Id. at 18.
384. Id. at 18.
385. Id. at 19. Professor Ely argued this same point. See Ely, supra note 14, at 731-36.
386. See Brest, supra note 14, at 21.
387. Id. The balance of the article analyzed whether the disproportionate impact theory has a
constitutional or moral life apart from the antidiscrimination principle. Brest concluded it did not.
Id. at 52.
388. See Van Alstyne, supra note 14.
389. Id. at 776.
390. Id Van Alstyne did not explain why his construction of the Civil War amendments and
their legislative history was more tenable than Professor Gressman's, for example, discussed supra
notes 150 to 170 and accompanying text.
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result was not compelled.391 He wrote that, "it is oddly a matter of what we
might wish to make of it. It has always been this way."
392
Professor Van Alstyne contended that the Supreme Court had gone
through distinct rites of passage and that in Fullilove it was about to consider
yet another one.393 He suggested that race-based laws had so generally tended
to produce negative side effects vastly greater than the benefits that were sup-
posed to be forthcoming. 39 4 He wrote, "if the court yields once again to the
Lorelei, racism, racial spoils systems, racial competition and racial odium will
be fixtures of government in the United States even into the twenty-first
century."
395
He quoted Alexander M. Bickel to argue that, "[t]he lesson of the great
decisions of the Supreme Court and the lesson of contemporary history have
been the same for at least a generation: discrimination on the basis of race is
illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of demo-
cratic society."' 396 According to Van Alstyne, all race-based laws were illegal,
immoral, unconstitutional and destructive of democratic society; he made no
distinction between cases such as Plessy and the Civil Rights Cases, on the one
hand, and Bakke and Fullilove, on the other.397
Interestingly, Professor Van Alstyne used Justice Harlan's dissent in
Plessy to support his view, 398 arguing that Justice Harlan believed the Civil
War amendments should have been construed to disallow race-based laws.
399
Van Alstyne cited several long passages from Justice Harlan's dissent, yet did
not acknowledge that Justice Harlan thought that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited state-sponsored racial subordination. Instead, Van Alstyne argued
that the Civil War amendments condemned the assignment of entitlements by
race.' Moreover, Van Alstyne contended that cases following Brown ap-
peared to embrace completely Justice Harlan's position that the three amend-
ments "removed the race-line from our governmental systems." 1 Professor
Van Alstyne concluded that the object of cases decided between 1954 and
1976 was to "disestablish particular, existing uses of race, not to establish new
391. Id. at 777.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 778. Professor Van Alstyne argued that prior to 1976 there had been at least two
"rites of passage" regarding race-based laws. The first was symbolized by the Court's modest inter-
pretation of the Civil War amendments between 1873 and 1896. The second was represented by the
Court's about-face in 1954 in the Brown decision and continued until approximately 1976. Id. at 789-
84.
394. Id. Van Alstyne did not explain why the elimination of racial subordination would not be a
vastly greater benefit than the negative effects to which he alluded.
395. Id. Van Alstyne continued by suggesting that his views were not shared by the majority of
constitutional law professors who had written on the subject. See id. at n. 11.
Unlike Professor Van Alstyne, this Author thinks that unless we interpret the Constitution to
require eradication of racial subordination through public and private benign affirmative action, ra-
cism, racial spoils systems, racial segregation, and racial odium that currently operate throughout the
U.S. will extend well beyond this century. Van Alstyne wrote as if racial subordination had been
eliminated in 1979, implicitly propagating a myth about racial equality in the United States.
396. Id. at 779.
397. Id. at 779-81.
398. Id. at 781.
399. Id. The Author has argued earlier for a markedly different reading of Justice Harlan's dis-
sent. See supra notes 177 to 190 and accompanying text.
400. See Van Alstyne, supra note 14, at 782.
401. Id. at 783.
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ones."
4 2
Professor Van Alstyne argued that the second rite of passage was accom-
panied by consistent interpretations in Congress and the courts regarding a
policy of race-blind application of laws. 4°3 He cited the language of Titles VI
and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to support his race-blind theory.'
Also, Professor Van Alstyne also noted that the Executive branch issued an
order framed in terms of strict nondiscrimination. 4°5 In addition, Professor
Van Alstyne cited Justice Douglas' dissent from Defunis v. Odegaard41 6 to
further support his argument that the Equal Protection Clause did not permit
the creation of new race-based preferences. Justice Douglas had written that,
"A Defunis who is white is entitled to no advantage by reason of that fact; nor
is he subject to any disability, no matter what his race or color... .."'7 Pro-
fessor Van Alstyne concluded Part I of his article by writing that the state
could neither use race in its own business nor could it encourage others to take
it into account.4° 8 He wrote, "Laws that divide and index people to measure
their civil rights by race are unconstitutional. Laws that encourage others to
do so are similarly invalid."'' ° 9
In Part II of his article, Professor Van Alstyne criticized the efficacy of
the rebuttable presumption approach to racial classification cases. 410 He
found the flexible test easily subject to manipulation and abuse because one
must decide other matters, such as:
(1) what kinds of public purposes are sufficiently compelling to justify
explicitly treating some people less well than others on racial grounds; and
(2) who is to say (and on what basis) that a law, which on its face is
402. Id. at 784.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 784-85. Title VI of that Act (§ 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976)) which is applicable to
all programs receiving federal financial assistance, states: "No person in the United States shall, on
the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assist-
ance."
Title VII of the Act (§ 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1976)) which is applicable to all
large-scale employers, provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin....
405. Id. at 785. Here, as elsewhere, Professor Van Alstyne seemed to tell just part of the story.
While he accurately presented what the Executive Order provided, he nonetheless ignored the legisla-
tive history of the Order; that is, he mentioned that the Order was amended but does not state what
necessitated the amendment. Congress had made specific findings regarding discrimination against
minorities in federal contracts. (See Exec. Order No. 11246, § 202, 3 C.F.R. 339, 340-41 (1964-1965
Compilation), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11375, 3 C.F.R. 684, 685-686 (1966-1970 Compila-
tion), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, at 1233 (1976)). Id. at 786, n.35.
406. 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
407. Id. at 337. Professor Van Alstyne also cited cases, such as Hughes v. Superior Court, 399
U.S. 460 (1950) (Court upheld state supreme court's injunction forbidding picketing meant to induce
race-based hiring in proportion to racial identification of customers), and Anderson v. Martin, 375
U.S. 399 (1964) (Court invalidated state statute requiring designation of each candidate's race on
each ballot), to further support his position that race-consciousness was unconstitutional.
408. Van Alstyne, supra note 14, at 790.
409. Id. at 792.
410. Id. at 792-94. Van Alstyne said that the value of the strict scrutiny test which had been
adopted in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), had not appreciated with the
passage of time. Id at 793 n.62.
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nominally very well connected with a sufficient public purpose, making its
purposive racial discrimination "justifiable" under (1), was indeed enacted
solely to promote that objective rather than to enact some baser interest with
which it is equally well connected?
411
Thus, Van Alstyne argued that the strict scrutiny standard was not a constitu-
tional standard at all,a12 he and argued that the only sure way to avoid racial
discrimination was to abide by a rule prohibiting all racial discrimination as
"illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of dem-
ocratic society. 4 1 3 He concluded that we get beyond racism by getting be-
yond it now privately and publicly.
414
Ely and Brest concluded that benign racial classifications were constitu-
tional. Kaplan argued for a ban on racial classifications, except in emergen-
cies. Van Alstyne articulated an inflexible, absolute prohibition of racial
classifications. Thus, the philosophical division reflected in the legal scholar-
ship mirrored the numerous separate positions articulated by members of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Bakke, Fullilove, Croson, and Metro Broadcasting.
Just as some members of the Supreme Court have transformed the meaning of
colorblindness, some legal commentators have transformed the meaning of the
antidiscrimination principle into a general prohibition of all or almost all ra-
cial classifications. For those members of the Court and those legal commen-
tators, the modem articulation of the antidiscrimination principle is the
transformed doctrine of colorblindness.415 Indeed, the Supreme Court seems
poised to use the transformed meaning of colorblindness and nondiscrimina-




1. The Colorblindness Model is Confusing
Colorblindness is a confusing metaphor because of its rhetorical and as-
pirational value. Rhetorically, the argument goes that if individuals and gov-
ernment would not use race to disadvantage others, the United States could
get beyond its history of racial subordination.416 Aspirationally, it is argued
411. Id at 797 (emphasis in original).
412. Id Van Alstyne continued, "It is, rather-a sieve, a sieve that encourages renewed race-
based laws, racial discrimination, racial competition, racial spoils systems, and mere judicial sport."
Id.
413. Id. at 802-03.
414. Id at 809-10.
415. It is important to understand how the two competing visions of the antidiscrimination princi-
pie have been collapsed into one principle- the transformed doctrine of colorblindness. After two
centuries of state and federal laws creating or sanctioning racial classifications that disadvantaged
Blacks, a body of law evolved prohibiting racial classifications against Blacks qua Blacks. The newly
enacted laws, however, were drafted in race-neutral terms. While it is clear that the Civil War
Amendments and modem civil rights legislation were enacted to eliminate government sponsorship
or complicity in the racial subordination of Blacks by Whites, the use of neutral language in the laws
has left the laws subject to competing interpretations. And, adherents to the modem colorblindness
model have argued that the constitutional amendments and related civil rights laws apply to Blacks
and Whites alike. Therefore, colorblindness proponents argue that affirmative action benefitting
Blacks violates the same body of law that evolved specifically to benefit Blacks.
416. This is in essence the argument made by Professor Van Alstyne. See Van Alstyne, supra note
14, at 809-10.
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that government cannot achieve its educative role of teaching that racial dis-
crimination is wrong, while simultaneously permitting the use of racial classifi-
cations that benefit a small racial minority.417 However, these arguments
ignore the great lessons of our racial history. These lessons are that (1) since
its inception the U.S. has had a policy of racial supremacy that continues to
subordinate Blacks and other minorities to Whites; (2) efforts by Congress and
later by the U.S. Supreme Court to eradicate the policy of racial supremacy
have been obfuscated by members within those institutions and by noncompli-
ance throughout the nation; (3) Americans are intensely color-aware and use
race regularly to disadvantage others; (4) most of the Supreme Court's seminal
race cases reflect colorawareness, not colorblindness; and (5) the U.S. Supreme
Court's application of the colorblindness model will extend the nation's legacy
of racial supremacy into the next century.418 Therefore, when Professor Van
Alstyne echoed Professor Bickel to assert that all racial discrimination is ille-
gal and unconstitutional, he proves too much because, if racial discrimination
is unconstitutional, then the cumulative racial subordination of Blacks in the
United States that has resulted from racial discrimination is also illegal and
unconstitutional, and must be affirmatively eradicated.
The colorblindness model is also confusing because no one seems quite
sure what it means or how it is to operate. Will the Court apply strict scrutiny
or intermediate scrutiny? Will the Court strike down benign racial classifica-
tions, unless there are exigent circumstances, such as a prison riot? The
Court's recent race jurisprudence is so splintered that it is difficult to predict
what the Court will do in the next racial classification case.4 19
Professor Neil Gotanda has argued recently that for the modern Court
colorblindness "is a collection of legal themes functioning as a racial ideol-
ogy."'42 Professor Gotanda concluded that since a color-blind interpretation
417. This argument was advanced by Professor Kaplan. See Kaplan, supra note 14, at 379.
418. The late Professor Alexander Bickel announced other "great" lessons of our history. He
wrote that racial discrimination was "illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and de-
structive to a democratic society." See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALrrY OF CONSENT 133
(Yale Univ. Press 1975).
What appears to have been a neutral assertion by Professor Bickel is far from it. He like many
legal commentators was unwilling to acknowledge White racial supremacy and racial subordination
in our society. He wrote as if Blacks had used race to subordinate Whites for four centuries.
Professor Bickel might have written that racial discrimination by Whites against Blacks was
illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong and destructive to a democratic society. But he
did not. He also did not suggest what we should do about past and continuing racial subordination
and discrimination.
419. It is difficult to identify an organizing principle among cases such as Bakke, Fullilove,
Croson, and Metro Broadcasting. Moreover, it is impossible to predict how the current Court will
analyze and resolve the next case presenting a benign racial classification. As a result, lower courts
must adopt a wait-and-see approach and meanwhile fashion their own race jurisprudence.
420. See Gotanda, supra note 17, at 3. Professor Gotanda argued that the Court's colorblindness
jurisprudence contains five themes: (1) the public-private distinction; (2) nonrecognition of race; (3)
racial categories; (4) formal-race and unconnectedness; and (5) racial social change. The first theme
is perhaps most familiar: the impermissibility of racial discrimination by government, in contrast to
the constitutionality of discrimination by private persons in many contexts. The second theme repre-
sents situations where members of the Court forbid the use of one's race in assigning benefits or
burdens. The third theme is manifested by the Court's use of terms Black and White as immutable
facts rather than as malleable socially-constructed categories that are laden with social and political
consequences. The fourth theme appears to be an extension of the third: when the Court uses the
terms Black or White they are used as mere racial labels, unconnected to the social realities and
historical context underlying the constitutional dispute. The fifth theme is illustrated by the Court's
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of the Constitution legitimizes, and thereby maintains, the social, economic,
and political advantages that Whites hold over other Americans, the Court
should abandon the colorblindness model.421 He proposed as an alternative
that the Court borrow an analytical model from its religion jurisprudence.422
Unfortunately, Professor Gotanda does not explain fully why he proposed that
model. The only weakness in his otherwise brilliant article is that its final
section does not advance a case for the new analytical model.423 Thus, while I
concur with Professor Gotanda on rejecting the colorblindness model, I pro-
pose a different alternative analytical model to replace it.
Another aspect of the confusion surrounding the colorblindness model is
its origin. As argued earlier, Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy can reasonably
be interpreted to prohibit racial subordination and to require its affirmative
eradication.424 Professor David Strauss argued a similar position in his article
The Myth of Colorblindness.425 Professor Strauss contended that the prohibi-
tion against discrimination established in Brown was not rooted in colorblind-
ness, but "is, like affirmative action, deeply race-conscious; like affirmative
action, the prohibition against discrimination reflects a deliberate decision to
treat blacks differently from other groups, even at the expense of innocent
whites."4 26 Yet, recent race jurisprudence demonstrates that the Court and
many commentators use the rhetoric of colorblindness differently than in-
tended by Justice Harlan. Because of such confusion and its significant sub-
stantive impact of continuing Black racial subordination, the colorblindness
doctrine should be abandoned.
2. Colorblindness is Counter-intuitive
Race operates in the United States as an independent hegemonic force
that extends the racial subordination of Blacks from one generation to the
next.4 27 Americans are trained throughout life to think in terms of racial cate-
gories such as Black and White and to believe that these racial categories are
natural, pure, and immutable.428 We learn quickly that racial categories are
almost divine and that we should not transgress them. Thus, we learn to care-
fully decide the race of our life partners, the race of our neighbors, and the
race of the other children enrolled at our children's schools. We learn that
view that racial classifications promote racial blocs and an escalation of racial hostility and conflict.
For some members of the Court, the prescription for ending racial problems is for the government to
adopt a position of "never" considering race. Id. at 5-7. See also Crenshaw, supra note 17, at 1369-
87.
421. See Gotanda, supra note 17, at 2-3.
422. Id. at 62-68.
423. Id. at 65-67. I am not persuaded that the similarities between race and religion compare as
readily as do the similarities between race and gender. The problem in the U.S. today is not so much
the "establishment" of racial subordination. The more significant problem is the inability of govern-
ment to eliminate racial subordination without running afoul of the colorblindness doctrine. What is
needed is a jurisprudence that permits the government to eliminate racial subordination root and
branch.
424. See supra notes 183 to 190 and accompanying text.
425. See Strauss, supra note 17, at 100-13.
426. Id. at 100-103. Professor Strauss concluded that the failure to engage in race-conscious af-
firmative action may sometimes be unconstitutional.
427. See Crenshaw, supra note 17, at 1358-64; Gotanda, supra note 17, at 43-52; and Aleinikoff,
supra note 17, at 1062-63.
428. Gotanda, supra note 17, at 26.
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people who challenge racial lines frequently experience reprisals, such as
crosses burned in their yards or other anonymous forms of intimidation.
Given how race operates in the United States, colorblindness seems preten-
tious and counter-intuitive. And, as Professor Gotanda wrote, "color-blind
constitutionalists live in an ideological world where racial subordination is
ubiquitous yet disregarded unless it takes the form of individual, intended, and
irrational prejudice."42 9
Americans are intuitively color-aware. One fact that supports this argu-
ment is that government statistics and records regarding any significant fact
are most often organized and reported by "dubious" racial groupings.
Whether one examines statistics on education, income, accumulated wealth,
birth, marriage, voting, type of employment, crime, unemployment, or disease,
for example, the information is most likely organized by racial groupings.43°
In the United States almost anyone can see that there are still Black neighbor-
hoods, schools, parks, swimming pools, restaurants, churches, social clubs, fu-
neral homes, and cemeteries. And, usually not very far away, but beyond the
social, economic, or political reach of most Blacks, there are White neighbor-
hoods, schools, parks, swimming pools, restaurants, churches, social clubs, fu-
neral homes, and cemeteries. How can individuals living and thinking within
such a world apply a colorblindness model when they have been trained to
think and live in terms of racial categories and to divide by race? The answer
is that they cannot.
Colorblindness is counter-intuitive in other ways. Despite arguments to
the contrary, Americans not only recognize race and divide by race, we also
assign moral worth and culpability based on race. There is an unstated as-
sumption that Black people are poor and unlettered because they lack the
capacity and ambition of Whites; "they" have what "they" deserve.431 The
corollary assumption is also obvious, yet unstated: White people are not poor
and are lettered because they are more capable and have more ambition than
Blacks; "they" have what "they" deserve. It is no wonder that when given a
choice some minorities prefer to be classified as White.432
Professor Hacker has argued aptly that in the United States there is a
value to being classified White.4 3 3 Facts supporting this argument are the all
too familiar disparities in life for most Blacks and most Whites. For example,
Whites continue to earn higher wages than Blacks for comparable work, while
life expectancy for Blacks remains lower than life expectancy for Whites by
several years.434 Also, Whites can obtain commercial loans on more favorable
terms than Blacks, and can obtain housing opportunities with fewer obstacles
than Blacks. These points were presented to millions of Americans when the
429. Id. at 46.
430. ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL
ix (Charles Scribner's Sons 1992). Professor Hacker wrote, "dividing people into races started as
convenient categories. However, those divisions have taken on lives of their own, dominating our
culture and consciousness, coloring our passions and opinions, contouring facts and fantasies."
431. This argument is now not only made about Blacks, but it has recently been articulated,
although dressed up, by Shelby Steele, who has received critical acclaim for his book, THE CONTENT
OF OUR CHARACTER 57-75 (Harper Perennial 1990) (Steele argues that Blacks make excessive claims
to victimization and have not inculcated an ethic of individual responsibility).
432. See HACKER, supra note 430, at 6.
433. Id.
434. IM
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ABC Prime Time Live staff went undercover in St. Louis, Missouri in the fall
of 1991. The news agency followed two 28-year-old men, a Black and a
White, in search of a new car, housing, and services at a local store. Although
the apartment was available for lease to the White applicant, a few minutes
later it was unavailable to the Black applicant. The White applicant was given
better terms for a car loan and obtained immediate service at local stores.435
The St. Louis experiment demonstrates that it remains a privilege to be
White in the United States. Professor Brest has argued that one source of this
racial privilege is the racial sympathy that Whites afford each other in contrast
to the racial indifference, or often hostility, that Whites afford Blacks.4 36 The
doctrine of colorblindness ignores the role of racial sympathy and racial indif-
ference in decisionmaking.
Similarly, the colorblindness model preserves "White" rule in the United
States. Professor Hacker put it this way, "America is inherently a 'white'
country: in character, in structure, in culture. Needless to say, black Ameri-
cans create lives of their own. Yet, as a people, they face boundaries and
constrictions set by the white majority."4 3 7 Whites have never had to compete
equally with Blacks for access to economic and political power. The Nation's
Founding Fathers gave themselves an original advantage which subsequent
generations of Whites have inherited. Many Whites ignore this subtle socio-
economic history and believe that they have "earned" their economic and
political position. They also believe that White racial hegemony is normative.
Application of the transformed colorblindness model enshrines the very racial
hegemony that Justice Harlan contended was unconstitutional.
Finally, colorblindness is counter-intuitive because the labels "Black"
and "White" have symbolism beyond color.43 8 When we encounter members
of a race, we meet a complex set of racial generalizations and experiences.439
Racial generalizations are commonplace in America. We use them to label
the most perplexing phenomena, such as "White flight" and "Black bloc vot-
ing." We even assign points of view based on racial generalizations. There-
fore, the colorblindness model discounts the significance of racial
generalizations in the United States.
3. Colorblindness Undermines Our Achievement of Racial Equality
The colorblindness model presupposes equal status by race among Amer-
icans. Yet, there has never been equal status between Blacks and Whites in
America. Although the Declaration of Independence proclaimed equality
among men, it was limited to a small class of White men. Its principal author,
Thomas Jefferson, was not sure that his declaration applied to Blacks.' 0
Moreover, our Constitution did not contain an explicit provision regarding
equality until the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.1 Twelve
decades later we are still debating what that provision of equality means in
435. See Walter Goodman, Looking Racism in the Face in St. Louis, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1991,
at C22.
436. See Brest, supra note 14, at 14-15.
437. See HACKER, supra note 430, at 4.
438. See Williams, supra note 17, at 528-33.
439. See Strauss, supra note 17, at 114-15, and HACKER, supra note 430, at 19-22.
440. See HACKER, supra note 430, at 25.
441. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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relation to racial subordination." 2 If racial equality is to have any rational
meaning, its nature and scope must respond to the comparative status of
Blacks and Whites. To paraphrase Aristotle, to treat Blacks equally to Whites
may sometimes require treating Blacks comparatively better." 3 Therefore,
the colorblindness model prematurely concludes our detailing the nature and
scope of the concept of racial equality."
There are many additional reasons to reject the doctrine of colorblind-
ness, the most significant of which is that the colorblindness model allows us
to continue our avoidance of one of this Nation's most enduring problems-
the ideology of racial supremacy. Colorblindness is a myth, and the color-
442. Equality is an elusive term. Professor Peter Westen has asserted that the study of the mean-
ing of equality must begin with the work of Plato and Aristotle. According to Professor Westen, it
was Aristotle, building on the work of Plato, who wrote: "(1) Equality in morals means this: things
that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike should be treated unalike in
proportion to their unlikeness. (2) Equality and justice are synonymous: to be just is to be equal, to
be unjust is to be unequal." See 3 ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA 113 la-1 131b (W. Ross trans.
1925), cited in Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537, 542-43 (1982)
(additional citations omitted).
Many other commentators have written about equality. For example, see Peter Westen, The
Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542 (1982) (arguing that statements of equality
logically and necessarily collapse into simpler statements of rights so that the additional step of trans-
forming simple statements of rights into statements of equality not only involves unnecessary work
but also engenders profound confusion), and Kenneth Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REv.
245, 247-48 (1983) (arguing that the equal citizenship principle that is the core of the Fourteenth
Amendment does have substantive content; that is, to be treated by organized society as a respectable,
responsible, and participating member who belongs to our national community). Karst says the prin-
ciple is violated when the organized society treats someone as an inferior, as part of a dependent
caste, or as a nonparticipant. Professor Karst has expanded his discussion of equality in his recent
book, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION (Yale Univ. Press
1989).
See also Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 575, 576 (1983) (arguing that the concept of equality is morally necessary because it compels us
to care about how people are treated in relation to one another, is analytically necessary because it
creates a presumption that people should be treated alike and puts the burden of proof on those who
wish to discriminate, and finally is rhetorically necessary because it is a powerful symbol that helps to
persuade people to safeguard rights that otherwise would go unprotected), and Kent Greenawalt,
How Empty is the Idea of Equality? 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1167, 1168-69 (1983) (arguing that rather
than banish the concept of equality from moral and legal argument it is more promising to.explicate a
fuller understanding of the significance of existing concepts of equality). Professor Westen has re-
plied to some commentators' critiques of his seminal article in Peter Westen, On "Confusing Ideas"
Reply, 91 YALE L.J. 1153 (1982); Peter Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math and
Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REv. 604 (1983); and Peter Westen, To Lure The Tarantula From Its
Hole: A Response, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1186 (1983).
443. I recently visited an elementary school in Tuscaloosa to discuss the Los Angeles riots of 1992
and I asked members of a fourth and fifth grade class what equality means. All the students were
Black and ranged in age from 9 to 11 years old. Their answers ranged from fairness or justice to
treating people the same. I then asked the students the following question: If one member of the
class had chicken-pox and another member had a mild cold, could I give the student with chicken-
pox more medicine? After thinking about the relative severity of the illnesses, the students almost
uniformly agreed that it would be consistent with their definition of equality to provide more
medicine to the student with chicken-pox. The students appeared to intuit that a mild cold did not
require the identical treatment as chicken-pox. The students appeared to understand that persons
should be treated differently in proportion to their difference.
444. There is an obvious risk of confusion in using Aristotlean philosophy to discuss racial equal-
ity since ancient Greece was a slave society. Yet Aristotle seems helpful because under slavery differ-
ences were used to subordinate groups. Below, I advocate that we use differences between Blacks and
Whites as a basis for treating Blacks preferentially in some contexts. See text infra pp. 73-82 and
accompanying notes.
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blindness model is an easy doctrinal way to ignore the complex, modem mani-
festations of racial supremacy contained in our laws.' 5
The colorblindness model as used today is in essence a restatement of the
doctrine of separate but equal." 6 Both doctrines ignore reality: America re-
mains a divided and unequal nation, racial enmity is again on the rise, and
Whites continue to hold economic and political advantages in large part by
virtue of their historical control over Blacks.
Justice William Brennan said it best when he wrote about Plessy that the
Equal Protection Clause was "turned against those whom it was intended to
set free, condemning them to a 'separate but equal' status before the law, a
status always separate but seldom equal."" 7 The disregard of racial inequality
about which Justice Brennan wrote suggests to Professor Bell and others that
the Court remains a White institution designed to protect the interests and
privileges of Whites over Blacks." 8 We must never forget that the Plessy
Court gave us both the separate but equal doctrine and the colorblindness
doctrine; however, the former was articulated in the majority opinion while
the latter appeared in the dissent. The transformed colorblindness model
seems to mean what the majority wrote in Plessy in 1896: mere social distinc-
tions based on color that subordinate Blacks do not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment." 9
Just as the Court ignored differences between the lives and opportunities
of Blacks and Whites after Plessy, today the Court ignores the substantial dif-
ferences between Blacks and Whites. Professor Hacker has recently confirmed
445. To confront and eradicate racial supremacy from American law is a formidable task. Ini-
tially, we would have to acknowledge our individual and collective racist beliefs. We would have to
analyze how race factors into individual and group life experience. We would have to examine how
and why Whites and Blacks live differently and die differently.
The principal distinction between racial supremacy and affirmative action is that the latter is
designed to remedy past racial supremacy. As a result, affirmative action does not impose on Whites
any badge of inferiority or vestige of slavery.
446. Plessy, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Between 1896 and 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court largely ig-
nored the qualitative and quantitative differences between the lives and opportunities of Blacks and
Whites. There are some Blacks who have argued that separateness was better than the way we live
today because the formal racial separation did not leave Blacks with the huge class stratification that
exists today and which permits some Blacks to escape into integrated middle or upper middle class
neighborhoods. I reject this view since most Blacks do not live integrated lives and every Black is
subject to racism whether in terms of economic subordination or in the form of humiliation, embar-
rassment, or indignities arising from such incidents as poor services in stores or restaurants or being
stopped by police for walking or driving in the wrong neighborhood. In addition, throughout our
history there have been rich Blacks with wealth far in excess of most Blacks. Such exceptions then
and now cannot be used to explain away the stark inequalities between most Whites and Blacks.
447. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326-27 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
448. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEsT FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, supra note
1, at 72-73.
449. HACKER, supra note 430, at 17-49, 93-106, 134-46 and 179-98. Hacker presents by stark
statistical references the reality of racial differences between Blacks and Whites in terms of education,
income, mortality, and crime. See also GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (20th Anni-
versary, Harper & Row 1962) (1944) (discussing how the Negro problem is intertwined with all other
social, economic, political, and cultural problems in America and the author's optimism about future
race relations in America), and A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (Gerald
David Jaynes and Robin M. Williams, Jr., eds., National Academy Press 1989) (discussing the unfin-
ished agenda of a nation still struggling to come to terms with the consequences of its history of
relations between Blacks and Whites).
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the stark disparities in the lives of Blacks and Whites in the United States.45°
For example, Hacker reports that Black children are born to unwed mothers
at a percentage 3.5 times more often than White children. 451 Also, he found
that 56% of Black families are headed by women, while only 17% of White
families are.45 2 And, of the families headed by women, 60% of the Black
families live in central cities, while only 28% of the White families do.4 53
Professor Hacker also reported significant racial disparities in causes of
death.454 For instance, Blacks die of tuberculosis 7 times more often.
455 Simi-
larly, Blacks die of A.I.D.'s, meningitis, anemias, kidney diseases, alcohol-in-
duced causes, infant deaths, nutritional deficiencies, diabetes, and drug-
induced causes at rates between 2 to 3 times the White rates.456 Blacks also
die from homicides at a rate 6.5 times greater than Whites. 45 7 At the begin-
ning and at the end of life in the United States, Blacks and Whites have signifi-
cant differences.
Important racial disparities also exist throughout life. Professor Hacker
reports that for persons between the ages of 25 to 34, 4.5% of Blacks who
completed college are unemployed, while 2.2% of Whites are.458 For persons
in the same age range who did not complete high school, 25% of the Blacks
are unemployed, as opposed to 11% of the Whites.45 9 Similarly, of the Black
and White families below the poverty line in the Northeast, Midwest, South,
and West, the rate for Blacks is between 3.8 and 5.1 times greater than for
Whites.46°
Professor Hacker also found differences in educational attainment and
employment. For example, for persons between the ages of 25 to 35, 82% of
all Blacks completed high school, while 89% of all Whites completed high
school.461 However, only 12.7% of Blacks in that group completed four or
more years of college, while 24% of such Whites did.462 Blacks earned only
5.7% of the Bachelor's degrees conferred in 1989, while Whites earned
84.5%.463 Blacks also received only 3.5% of the Doctorates conferred in
1989, while Whites received 89.3 %. 464 Similarly, Blacks earned 5.1% of the
medical degrees and 4.9% of the law degrees conferred in 1989, while Whites
earned 86% of the medical degrees and 89.9% of the law degrees.465
Professor Hacker found that Black families earned $580 per $1,000
earned by White families.466 So, the 1990 median income for White families
450. See HACKER, supra note 430, at 223-36.
451. Id. at 230.
452. Id. at 231.
453. Id. at 230.
454. Id. at 231.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id. Among young Black males, homicide is the leading cause of death. A COMMON
DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, supra note 449, at 23.
458. HACKER, supra note 430, at 233.
459. Id.
460. Id.





466. Id. at 94.
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was $36,915, for Black families it was only $21,423.467 For all men who
worked, White men had a median income of $21,170, Black men $12,868.468
White women had a 1990 median income of $10,317, while the figure for
Black women was $8,328.469 Professor Hacker found that even when Black
men reach the same academic level as White men, their incomes remain sev-
eral steps behind their White counterparts.47 Ironically, Black women earn
almost the same income as their White female counterparts with 1 to 4 years
of college.4 7 Hacker suggested that because women are underpaid in compar-
ison to men, it is easier for Black women to gain equity.472
A factor related to comparative income is unemployment. In 1990 White
unemployment was 4.1%, while Black unemployment was 11.3 %.473 In con-
cluding his chapter on the racial income disparities, Professor Hacker wrote:
"To be Black in America is to know that you remain last in line for so basic a
requisite as the means for supporting yourself and your family."'474
His conclusions are consistent with the work of the Committee on the
Status of Black Americans, which published its major findings in 1989." 75 The
Committee's summary and conclusions47 6 begin with a statement about
changes in the United States in the lives of Black and White Americans:
[T]he great gulf that existed between black and white Americans in
1939 has only narrowed; it has not been closed. One of three blacks live in
households with incomes below the poverty line. Even more blacks live in
areas where ineffective schools, high rates of dependence on public assist-
ance, severe problems of crime and drug abuse, and low and declining em-
ployment prevail.477
The Committee wrote that despite evidence of clear progress since 1940, espe-
cially for Blacks who have entered the middle-class, the American dilemma
has not been resolved.478
Black people still aspire for equal opportunity and some measure of
equality in participation in the best the United States affords its citizens in
terms of employment, housing, education, and political power.47 9 Blacks,
then, have the same desire for equality of treatment in governmental policy
that Whites have. But, the Committee found, there is a dynamic tension "be-
tween many whites' expectations of American institutions [toward them] and
their expectations of themselves [toward Blacks]."48 This divergence between
expectations and individual practice means that our institutions (which are
mostly run by Whites) do not provide full equality of opportunity. The Com-
mittee wrote that foremost among the reasons for the present state of Black-








474. Id. at 104.
475. See A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, supra note 449.
476. Id. at 3-32.
477. Id. at 3.
478. Id. at 4.
479. Id. at 5.
480. Id.
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cent history of racial inequality. One factor is the negative attitudes held to-
ward Blacks, and the other factor is the actual disadvantaged conditions under
which many Blacks live.481
The Committee concluded:
(1) By almost all aggregate statistical measures-incomes and living
standards; health and life expectancy; educational, occupational, and resi-
dential opportunities; political and social participation- the well-being of
both blacks and whites has advanced greatly over the past five decades.
(2) By almost all the same indicators, blacks remain substantially be-
hind whites.
(3) The greatest economic gains for blacks occurred in the 1940s and
1960s. Since the early 1970s, the economic status of blacks relative to whites
has, on average, stagnated or deteriorated.482
For too long we have shut our eyes, or blinded ourselves, to the racial reality.
The statistical disparities in the United States between Blacks and Whites con-
tinue to mirror those reported by the Kerner Commission in 1968: we remain
a nation of "two societies, one Black, one White- separate and unequal.
483
And, even though there are myriad causes for the racial disparities between
Blacks and Whites today, most experts contend that a central cause is racial
discrimination. 84
Disparities in the lives of Whites and Blacks are real. They are similar to
the disparities that exist in the lives of men and women. Interestingly, the
Supreme Court has made some progress toward eradicating gender subordina-
tion. The Court's recent gender jurisprudence is therefore instructive on how
the Court might similarly make progress toward eradicating racial
subordination.
PART V
GENDER CLASSIFICATIONS AND THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION
PRINCIPLE
1. Modern Gender Cases and the Ground of Difference Jurisprudential
Standard
In contrast to the doctrinal division within the Court's race jurispru-
dence, the Supreme Court's gender jurisprudence reflects greater consensus
regarding how to analyze cases that involve gender classifications. For exam-
ple, in Reed v. Reed485 the Court invalidated an Idaho statute that preferred
males to females in the choice of persons to administer an intestate estate. The
Court said that, "A [gender] classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike."' 486 The Court found that there was no reason to prefer
men over women in the administration of an estate other than administrative
481. Id.
482. Id. at 6.
483. REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968).
484. HACKER, supra note 430, at ix. See also A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY, supra note 449, at 5.
485. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
486. Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
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convenience.487 The Court concluded that the Idaho statute was inconsistent
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it
provided dissimilar treatment for men and women who were similarly
situated.488
Three years later the Court decided Kahn v. Shevin,489 and upheld a Flor-
ida law which granted a $500 property tax exemption for widows, but not for
widowers. The reasoning of the Court is instructive:
[T]he financial difficulties confronting the single woman in Florida or in any
state exceed those facing the man;
The job market is inhospitable to the women seeking any but the lowest
paying jobs; [i]n 1972 women working full-time had a median income which
was only 57.9 percent of the median income for men and the figure had
fallen six percentage points since 1955; and tIhe general economic disparity
is likely to be exacerbated for the widow.4 9
The Court concluded that the statute favoring women rested upon a ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation,
that object being the reduction of the disparity between the economic capabili-
ties of a man and a woman.4 9 I The Court did not require Florida to prove
that Mrs. Kahn had been discriminated against, but merely recounted how
society's "male-dominated culture" reduced the opportunities available to
women.
4 92
In Craig v. Boren"93 the Court invalidated an Oklahoma statute which
prohibited sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under
the age of 18. Following its holding in Reed, the Court said that classifications
based on gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. 94 The Court
found that Oklahoma had an important public safety objective. However, the
Court said the gender-based distinction did not closely serve to achieve that
objective and thus the statute was unconstitutional law. 95
In Califano v. Webster4 96 the Court upheld a federal statute which per-
mitted women, in computing retirement benefits under Social Security, to de-
duct three more lower earning years than a similarly situated male wage
earner. In the per curiam decision, the Court wrote: "Reduction of the dis-
parity in the economic condition between men and women caused by the long
history of discrimination against women has been recognized as an important
governmental objective. . . . The only possible purpose for the statute is the
487. Id.
488. Id. at 77.
489. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
490. Id. at 353-54.
491. Id. at 355.
492. Id. at 353. The Court also distinguished Kahn from Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
689-91 (1973) (plurality opinion). There the Court had held that administrative convenience was not
a sufficient reason to distinguish between a male and female serviceperson's right to claim a spouse as
a dependent. Frontiero is one of the few gender discrimination cases where the Court divided on the
proper standard of review. Four members of the Court (Brennan, Douglas, White, and Marshall)
argued for strict scrutiny, while four others (Stewart, Powell, Burger, and Blackmun) argued for
intermediate scrutiny.
493. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
494. Id. at 197.
495. Id. at 199-202.
496. 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
NATIONAL BLACK LAW JOURNAL 75
permissible one of redressing our society's longstanding disparate treatment of
women."
497
In Michael M. v. Superior Court"49 the Court upheld a California statu-
tory rape law,499 under which men alone could be criminally liable for an act
of sexual intercourse, as not violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiff, a 17-year-old male, argued that the
statute created an impermissible gender classification in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed in part the judgment of the California
Supreme Court. However, a majority of the justices, although not agreeing on
an opinion for the Court, held that the statutory rape law was constitutional
and subject to intermediate scrutiny under Reed and Craig. The Court wrote,
"[it] has consistently upheld statutes where the gender classification is not in-
vidious but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly
situated in certain circumstances. ' '"" ° The Court found that the California
statute was sufficiently related to the State's objective of deterring teenage
pregnancies because only women became pregnant, the law would deter males
and equalize deterrence between males and females, and a gender neutral stat-
ute would frustrate effective enforcement.
2. The Court's Rejection of Genderblindness
In Rostker v. Golberg, 02 the Court had before it a provision of the Mili-
tary Selective Service Act ("MSSA") authorizing the President to require mili-
tary registration of males, but not of females. Former President Carter
wanted an amendment and appropriations to permit the draft of females.
Congress refused to amend the Act and provided funds only for registration of
males. The federal district court held this limitation unconstitutional. The
U.S. Supreme Court reversed. 0 3
The Court applied mid-level scrutiny articulated in Reed and Craig."°4
Relying on the extensive congressional hearings regarding the draft/combat
exclusion of women, the Court held that, "Men and women, because of the
497. Id at 317 (emphasis added). The Court has rejected attempts to justify gender classifications
as compensation for past discrimination against women when the classifications in fact penalized
women wage earners or when the statute and its legislative history revealed that the classification was
not enacted as compensation for past discrimination. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199,
209 n. 9 (1977) (the Court invalidated a statute that paid old-age survivor's benefits on a man's
earnings, but did not pay such benefits on a woman's earnings). But compare Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268 (1979) (invalidating Alabama statutory scheme imposing alimony obligations on husbands but
not wives).
498. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
499. The California statutory rape law defined the crime as an act of sexual intercourse accom-
plished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator where the female was under the age of 18 years.
500. Id. at 469. In addition, the Court has stated "a legislature may provide for the special
problems of women." Id.
501. Id. at 472-73.
502. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
503. The Court said that the customary deference to Congress is certainly appropriate where as
here Congress specifically considered the question of constitutionality. And, the Court said that this
case arises in the context of congressional authority over national defense and military affairs. In
addition, the Court suggested that great deference was appropriate because the lack of judicial com-
petence was marked. Id. at 64-65.
504. Id. at 69-70.
NATIONAL BLACK LAW JOURNAL
combat restrictions on women are simply not similarly situated for purposes of
registration for a draft or a draft generally." ' Therefore, the Court found
that Congress acted within its constitutional authority when it authorized the
registration of men under the MSSA.50 6
In Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,07 the Court reviewed the con-
stitutionality of a Mississippi statute that excluded males from enrolling in a
state-supported professional nursing school.5 08 The Court said that the party
seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of gender
must carry the burden of showing an exceedingly persuasive justification for
the classification, and the burden will be met only by showing at least that the
classification serves important State objectives and that the means employed
are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.50 9 Justice
O'Connor wrote:
Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself re-
flects archaic and stereotypic notions. Thus, if the statutory objective is to
exclude or "protect" members of one gender because they are presumed to
suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective it-
self is illegitimate.
If the State's objective is legitimate and important, we next determine
whether the requisite direct, substantial relationship between objective and
means is present. The purpose of requiring that close relationship is to as-
sure that the validity of a classification is determined through reasoned anal-
ysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, often
inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women.
5 10
Applying mid-level scrutiny, the Court held that Mississippi had failed to es-
tablish that the alleged objective of its statute (compensation for past discrimi-
nation) was the actual purpose underlying the discriminatory classification, or
to establish that the gender-based classification was substantially related to its
proposed compensatory objective.511 The Court wrote, "Rather than compen-
sate for discriminatory barriers faced by women, MUW's policy of excluding
males from admission to the School of Nursing tends to perpetuate the stereo-
typed view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job." '12 The Court con-
cluded that the admission policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
51 3
However one might view the correctness of these decisions or their sexist
bent, at least the Supreme Court's equal protection gender jurisprudence per-
mits government to treat men and women differently when they are arguably
not similarly situated. Women can be treated more favorably so long as the
gender classification is based on a ground of difference, serves important gov-
ernmental objectives, and the statutory means are substantially related to the
505. Id. at 78.
506. Id. at 82.
507. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
508. Id. at 719.
509. Id. at 724. The Court also said that although the test for determining the validity of a
gender-based classification is straightforward, it must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the
roles and abilities of males and females. Id. at 725.
510. Id. at 725-26.
511. Id. at 730.
512. Id. at 729.
513. Id at 733.
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achievement of those objectives. 14 The Court has never held that the Consti-
tution requires "genderblindness." Indeed, the Court has held the opposite-
males and females can be treated differently if the classification favoring one
sex can be justified because it directly assists members of the sex that are dis-
proportionately burdened.
515
My proposal is modest in the sense that I do not propose a new analytical
standard for all discrimination cases. If I were to propose such a new stan-
dard it would have as its chief objective the elimination of subordination. Pro-
fessor Ruth Colker has expressed the origins of such an equal protection
jurisprudence. 516 But, I have written this article to make a different point:
even if one thinks gender jurisprudence suffers from its own doctrinal inconsis-
tencies, the Court has been able to reduce gender subordination and to avoid
the legal conundrum that has been created in race jurisprudence. Moreover,
my proposal is not so modest in the sense that I propose that the Court apply
its antisubordination principles from its gender jurisprudence to racial subor-
dination, a subject that it has been reluctant to attack. I propose that the
Court apply its ground of difference analysis to cases presenting racial classifi-
cations designed to reduce racial subordination.
PART VI
APPLICATION OF THE GROUND OF DIFFERENCE MODEL FROM
GENDER CASES TO ANALOGOUS RACE CASES
As we have seen, the Court treats gender discrimination differently from
race discrimination. For example, when the Court analyzes gender-based dis-
crimination cases it has at times focused on past societal discrimination. 17
However, in recent race-based discrimination cases the Court has focused on
specific evidence of individual discrimination against the plaintiff by the de-
fendant.51 8 The plaintiff challenging a racial classification must meet a higher
evidentiary burden than a person challenging a gender classification. Two
questions arise here: (1) Why has the Court applied intermediate scrutiny in
gender classification cases and strict scrutiny in race classification cases? (2)
Why has the Court not struggled with benign gender classifications to the
same extent that it has struggled with benign race classifications?
The Court has occasionally tried to explain why it analyzes race discrimi-
nation cases and gender discrimination cases differently.519 For example, the
514. Id. at 724.
515. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728; Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508-09 (1975); and
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. at 318. In Califano, the Court wrote:
The challenged statute operated directly to compensate women for past economic dis-
crimination. Retirement benefits under the Act are based on past earnings. But as we have
recognized: "Whether from overt discrimination or from the socialization process of a
male-dominated culture, the job market is inhospitable to the woman seeking any but the
lowest paid jobs." Thus, allowing women, who as such have been unfairly hindered from
earning as much as men, to eliminate additional low-earning years from the calculation of
their retirement benefits works directly to remedy some part of the effect of past
discrimination.
Id. at 318 (citations omitted).
516. Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1003, 1007 n.12 and 1014-16 (1986).
517. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729; Califano, 430 U.S. at 317; and Kahn, 416 U.S. at 355.
518. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90, and Croson, 488 U.S. at 492.
519. See, eg., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302-03.
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Court has said that gender-based distinctions are less likely to create the ana-
lytical and practical problems present in preferential programs premised on
racial criteria.520
With respect to gender there are only two possible classifications. The
incidence of the burdens imposed by preferential classifications is clear.
There are no rival groups who can claim that they, too, are entitled to pref-
erential treatment. Classwide questions as to the group suffering previous
injury and groups which fairly can be burdened are relatively manageable for
reviewing courts.... More importantly, the perception of racial classifica-
tions as inherently odious stems from a lengthy and tragic history that gen-
der-based classifications do not share. In sum, the Court has never viewed
such classification as inherently suspect, or as comparable to racial or ethnic
classifications for the purpose of equal protection analysis.52'
The Court assumes that in race-based classification cases advantaging Blacks,
many rival groups are waiting in the wings to claim that they, too, are entitled
to preferential treatment. On closer examination, that assumption appears
false. Although many persons in America have suffered discrimination, no
other race or ethnic group was enslaved. After slavery was abolished, the
rights of Blacks remained subordinate to the rights of Whites. And, even if a
group could make a similar historical argument regarding its subordination,
that would only provide an argument for including that other group in a reme-
dial program, not for rejecting the legitimacy of remediation for Blacks.
In addition, the Court assumes that class-wide questions about who in the
Black group has suffered and which Whites can fairly be burdened are unman-
ageable for reviewing courts. That assumption also seems false. Why is it
easier for the Court to address class issues between women of all races and
classes and to determine which men can be fairly burdened by a gender classi-
fication? The Court usually does not even make such a close examination of
the race or class of beneficiaries of gender-based classifications, and, on the
limited occasions that it does, it simply states that when individual hearings
are available, the hearings should be utilized to examine such class-wide
issues.
5 22
Finally, the Court assumes that the history of racial discrimination is
more tragic than the history of gender discrimination. If that is true, why
would the Court be more willing to permit gender preferences that benefit
women than racial preferences that benefit Blacks? It would seem more logi-
cal to permit racial preferences too.
One might question whether the histories of race and gender discrimina-
tion are markedly different. Both had at their origins stereotypes and notions
of innate inferiority or divined destinies. Therefore, race and gender discrimi-
nation are both odious and the Court should interpret the Constitution con-
sistently to permit government to eradicate both.
The Fourteenth Amendment mandates that government treat similarly
situated persons the same and the Equal Protection Clause is violated only
when government invidiously classifies similarly situated people on the basis of
520. Id. Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality held gender classification
subject to strict scrutiny).
521. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302-03.
522. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. at 281-82.
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an immutable characteristic with which they are born. 23 Therefore, we must
ask if people of different races are always similarly situated for constitutional
purposes, as Justice Stewart contended.524 He wrote that "detrimental racial
classifications always violate the Constitution, for the simple reason that, so
far as the Constitution is concerned, people of different races are always simi-
larly situated." '525 Justice Stewart cited concurring or dissenting opinions to
support his argument.526 But I have found no decision where a majority of the
Court adopted his view. Interestingly, Justice Stewart continued:
By contrast, while detrimental gender classifications often violate the Consti-
tution, they do not always do so, for the reason that there are differences
between males and females that the Constitution necessarily recognizes.
When men and women are not in fact similarly situated in an area covered
by the legislation in question, the Equal Protection Clause is not violated.527
I contend that in light of the racial history in the United States and cur-
rent racial disparities between the economic, political, and social experiences
of Blacks and Whites, Blacks and Whites are not always similarly situated for
constitutional purposes. If persons are not similarly situated, the statutory
classification should be evaluated under intermediate scrutiny requiring only
that the party seeking to uphold the statute must carry the burden of showing
that the classification serves important governmental objectives and the dis-
criminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives. Moreover, just as the Court has permitted evidence of socie-
tal discrimination against women as an appropriate justification to support
benign affirmative action policies designed to eliminate gender subordination,
the Court should permit evidence of societal discrimination against Blacks as
an appropriate justification to support benign affirmative action policies
designed to eliminate racial subordination.
Below, I apply the ground of difference model to the facts of Croson 52 to
demonstrate that the application of that model would more effectively serve
the goal of eradicating racial subordination than does the modern colorblind-
ness model. Under the ground of difference model, if the Richmond City
Council adopted a statute treating Blacks more favorably than Whites with
respect to public contracts, the first question would be: Are Blacks and
Whites similarly situated in relation to the area covered by the legislation-
access to and participation in public construction projects?
If Blacks and Whites are similarly situated, the statute would be pre-
sumptively invalid because the Equal Protection Clause requires that similarly
situated persons be treated substantially the same. However, if Blacks and
Whites are not similarly situated in the area covered by the statute, the City
Council would have to show that the racial classification serves important gov-
ernmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substan-
tially related to the achievement of those objectives.
523. Michael M, 450 U.S. at 477-78 (Stewart, J., concurring).
524. Id. at 478.
525. Id.
526. Id. (citations omitted).
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a) Are Blacks and Whites similarly situated?
The evidence in Croson suggested that between 1978-1983 Blacks ob-
tained 0.67% of the Richmond public construction contracts offered for
bids. 29 Other evidence illustrated that few contractors' associations in Rich-
mond, or in Virginia generally, had Black members.5 30 Additionally, studies
of the construction industry showed that the effects of past discrimination had
stifled minority participation in the construction industry nationally.531
Given such evidence, we must ask: Are Blacks and Whites similarly situ-
ated in the area covered by the statute? To answer this question it is helpful to
substitute women and men for Blacks and Whites. On the facts in Croson, if
women had 0.67% of public contracts and were excluded from the industry by
past discrimination, the Court would probably conclude that men and women
could be treated differently because they are not similarly situated. Likewise,
Blacks and Whites are not similarly situated in the area of public construction
contracts in Richmond or nationally.
b) Does the statute serve important governmental objectives?
The Richmond Plan declared "that it was 'remedial' in nature, and en-
acted 'for the purpose of promoting wider participation' by minority business
enterprises in the construction of public projects. ' 532 The City Council said it
was attempting to remedy various forms of past discrimination, including the
exclusion of Blacks from skilled construction trade unions and training
programs.
Are these governmental objectives important? Under the ground of dif-
ference model, the classification must be free of fixed notions concerning the
roles and abilities of the persons classified. The statutory classification itself
must not reflect archaic or stereotypical notions that members of one group
are presumed to be innately inferior or to suffer from an inherent handicap.
5 33
The objectives articulated by the Richmond City Council are important. They
did not reflect archaic or stereotypical notions about the roles of Blacks or
Black inferiority. Instead, they were an appropriate response to the substan-
tial racial disparity in the opportunities of Whites and Blacks to obtain public
contracts.
c) Are the discriminatory means employed by the City Council substantially
related to the achievement of the objectives?
Assuming that the state's objectives are important, we next determine
whether the requisite direct, substantial relationship between objective and
means is present. The 30% set aside was designed to remedy past discrimina-
tion in the construction industry and to promote wider participation by mi-
nority businesses in public projects. There is a clear link between the objective
and the means selected by Richmond. The question is not whether the Rich-
mond Plan is the least restrictive alternative. The Richmond Plan does not
undermine the City's goals, nor does it relate to anything but the achievement
529. Id. at 479-80.
530. Id. at 480.
531. I d at 498-500.
532. Id. at 478.
533. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725.
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of important governmental objectives. The Plan is designed to eliminate dis-
parities in the participation of Blacks and Whites in the construction industry.
Thus, under the ground of difference model, the results in Croson would
likely have been different. This is true in part because the Court would ex-
amine less rigorously the nexus between the objectives and the means. In ad-
dition, the Court would only require evidence of past discrimination against
Blacks in the construction industry, it would not insist on evidence of identi-
fied discrimination in a specific community by an identifiable perpetrator.
I would limit the application of the ground of difference model to racial
classifications clearly designed to remedy past discrimination and continuing
racial subordination against Blacks. I would not argue for application of that
model to racial classifications rooted in notions of Black inferiority, nor would
I urge its use to permit racial classifications that further disadvantage or
subordinate Blacks.
CONCLUSION
In Metro Broadcasting,534 as has been seen, five members of the Court
held that the congressional/FCC affirmative action scheme was subject to an
intermediate standard of review. The majority, however, did not state that it
was applying its ground of difference gender model. Indeed, the Court relied
on Fullilove as the controlling precedent and distinguished Croson on the
grounds that it involved a state-sponsored affirmative action plan, not a federal
plan.535 I argue that the ground of difference model should apply to a state or
federal affirmative action plan designed to eradicate racial subordination.
There should be nothing unconstitutional about governmental efforts to eradi-
cate racial subordination. The Court has held as much in terms of the eradica-
tion of gender subordination. And, if our Constitution is not required to be
gender-blind, I see no reason that it should be required to be color-blind.
I have argued that the Court should abandon the colorblindness model.
This position is informed by my personal experiences, a close examination of
our racial heritage, a continuing legacy of racial subordination, and by the
Supreme Court's multiple interpretations of the meaning of constitutional col-
orblindness. I have proposed that the Court apply its ground of difference
analysis from gender jurisprudence to analogous race cases. That application
would permit the government to eradicate racial subordination without violat-
ing the Constitution.
AFTERWORD
The student Notes which follow are the product of a seminar on race,
racism, and American law taught at the University of Alabama School of Law
in the fall of 1991. Mark Sabel has proposed a separate court system for
Blacks. Scott Clark has applied the principles of nonviolent direct action from
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. to refute a gradualist approach to continuing
racial injustice. Twala Grant has asked whether one-race schools are constitu-
tionally legitimate after Brown. Valerie Hermann has criticized the National
Association of Black Social Workers for its opposition to transracial adoption.
534. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
535. Id. at 463-64.
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Kenneth Lay has argued that the legacy of anti-miscegenation statutes is alive
in the United States. David Martin has examined the birth of "Jim Crow"
laws in Alabama. Reggie Speegle has critiqued the likely impact of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. Each Note underscores the continuing significance of
race in American law.
The seminar was patterned after Derrick Bell's course. Students in the
seminar served as co-teachers and undertook roles of teacher, discussion
leader, and critic. Each participant wrote two short "Racial Reflections" and
conducted research for longer papers. The guiding principle for the seminar
was that each voice was important and every participant would listen to the
views of others. Again, Professor Bell is to be commended for leading the way
in designing an essential course in legal education.
